78. Editorial Note
At a conference among President Eisenhower, Secretary of Defense McElroy, and General Goodpaster at 3:15 p.m. on September 11, 1958, there was some discussion of the Taiwan Strait situation. That portion of Goodpaster’s memorandum of the conversation, dated September 15, reads as follows:
“The President then asked Mr. McElroy what he thought the views of the Chiefs were regarding the Chinat forces on Quemoy and Matsu, from a military standpoint. Mr. McElroy said it is quite clear that they feel that, from the standpoint of military considerations alone, the islands should be vacated. The President said he agreed that it is a military debit to hold them. Accordingly, he said that in his speech, while stressing that he will not yield them under attack, he was trying not to be intransigent with regard to getting out of them through negotiation. He recognized the difficulties, and realized it is because of them that the Secretary of State tends to take a somewhat suffer view than he holds. Mr. McElroy said he had been wondering whether, if we cannot persuade Chiang to get off the islands without losing control in Formosa, there isn’t someone else who could step into the position. He commented that Chiang’s only hope is to provoke a big fight, with the idea of getting back into China during the aftermath. The President said he was trying to find a way in which a strong country can conciliate. It is not adequate simply to say that we will stand on Quemoy and Matsu. We must move beyond that.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)
The President was to make a radio-television address on the Taiwan Strait situation at 10 p.m. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, pages 694–700.