309. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)0
SUBJECT
- US Exploitation of Sino-Soviet Rifts
Following our recent discussion, I have given some more thought to the question of the Sino-Soviet relationship and to the reaction of those two countries to possible efforts by the US directly to influence that relationship, either by public statements or by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], I have examined the question from an intelligence rather than policy standpoint, although I recognize that in the present instance it is difficult to draw a clear line between the two functions.
It may be useful for me first to recapitulate, very briefly, our estimate on the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship.
We believe that underlying the relationship at the present time are very real mutual interests and mutual benefits. Nevertheless, problems arise. Both partners certainly are realistic enough to recognize that some problems are inevitable, and at the present time both are determined to prevent such problems from seriously weakening the alliance. To this end, each is prepared to make some accommodations to the other’s point of view. Despite this effort, it is very possible that during the coming years—and this may be in some ten or twenty rather than one or two— the frequency and intensity of these frictions will increase substantially.
Secondly, there is no quarrel with the fact that Moscow does consider itself to be the leader of world communism, and that, generally speaking, Peiping so regards it and publicly accepts it as such, in the belief that at the present time only Moscow can provide that leadership. Here again, however, the coin has two sides, for Peiping has—and Moscow recognizes that it has—considerable autonomy on both domestic and foreign policies. Communist China is not a subservient satellite, and Moscow probably estimates that an attempt to force Peiping into certain courses of action might jeopardize the alliance itself. Moscow, certainly at present, is unwilling to take this risk, although it undoubtedly attempts, with some success, to influence Peiping on matters of major concern to the Soviet Union.
[Page 612]On the basis of this estimate, in which we have considerable confidence, it is possible to make some further estimates of the effect on the Soviets and the Chinese Communists—and, also, on other countries—of particular US moves to influence the alliance and the actions of the two partners.
In the first place, the future course of the Sino-Soviet relationship will be determined primarily by certain basic factors. What the US—and the rest of the world—says about that relationship is of some importance and may have at least a marginal impact. What the US does on major policy issues affecting the Soviet Union and Communist China will, of course, exert even more influence on the policies of the two countries and therefore on their alliance, but this point is outside the scope of my comments here.
With respect to this marginal impact, it seems to me that the Soviet and Chinese Communist reaction to any US effort to exploit possible differences by publicly emphasizing them might well be a renewed determination to display their essential solidarity. Moreover, this would probably be their minimum reaction, since it is very possible that a publicized display of solidarity would be accompanied by genuine efforts to reduce their differences in order to strengthen their common front against the West. It is by no means certain that this process would be limited to Peiping’s accommodating itself to Soviet views; the reverse might also occur. Moreover, there is already so much public speculation in the West (and perhaps within the bloc) regarding Sino-Soviet rifts that official US statements, particularly if they occur with any frequency, may serve to aggravate Soviet and Chinese Communist concern.
A possible additional disadvantage of continuing US public stress on Sino-Soviet differences is, of course, the reaction of non-Communist countries, since there may be a tendency to take undue comfort from the thought of a Sino-Soviet rupture and to assume that since the Chinese Communists are the more belligerent at present, Moscow is in fact “peaceful.”
It is somewhat more difficult to assess Moscow’s and Peiping’s reaction to further US public emphasis on the concept of Soviet responsibility for Peiping’s actions, but I believe that the effect may be roughly similar to that described above. It might be more difficult for the two partners to discuss frankly their countermoves to such US moves. However, Peiping is likely to be considerably less inclined to respond to Soviet policy suggestions if it believes—or can argue—that the Soviets are making such suggestions under US pressure. The Soviets, in turn, are less likely to make such suggestions if the Chinese Communists, the bloc or the West are given grounds for believing that the Soviet action is in response to US demands. In its capacity as “leader” of the Communist bloc, Moscow nevertheless prefers not to act in a manner that casts it in the role of blatantly [Page 613] dictating policy to another Communist country, and obviously this aversion would be increased if the dictation could be interpreted as being prompted by US insistence. Now that we have publicly made the point of Moscow’s “leadership” responsibility, it would seem perhaps counter-productive to keep on repeating it in public statements.
My comments above are directed at overt US actions. Non-publicized moves might be more fruitful. It seems to me that there may well be merit in non-publicized official US statements to the Soviets to the effect that they cannot make exceptions to their “peaceful coexistence” proposals on the grounds that they have no control over the actions of other Communists throughout the world, including the Chinese Communists, and to remind them of their self-avowed leadership role. [4-½ lines of source text not declassified]
I hope these thoughts will be of some use to you. As you will note, my discussion has been a generalized one, and I will be glad to fill in the details if this would be helpful.
Foregoing represents the considered views of INR: China experts as well as Soviet experts.2