298. Editorial Note

At the 419th meeting of the National Security Council on September 17, 1959, the Council discussed NSC 5913, “U.S. Policy in the Far East,” September 3, 1959. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5913 Series) Some of the discussion focused on paragraph 37, which reads as follows: [Page 589]

“Do not agree to GRC, ROK or GVN offensive actions against Communist territory, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to actions by these countries against Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Communist attack, provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Communist reaction against free Asian countries.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed a substitute that reads as follows:

“Under circumstances approved by the President, agree to actions by the GRC, ROK, and GVN which are in clear retaliation against Communist attack; and condone and support certain military activities by these governments against Communist held territory which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success.”

After some discussion, the Council agreed on the general terms of a revised version of the original paragraph; the precise language was determined after the meeting. The Council adopted NSC 5913, as amended, as NSC 5913/1, “U.S. Policy in the Far East,” approved September 25, 1959. Paragraph 37 reads as follows:

  • “a. Except under circumstances approved by the President, do not agree to GRC, ROK, or GVN offensive actions against Communist territory.
  • “b. Under circumstances approved by the President, agree to actions by the GRC, ROK or GVN against Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Communist attack, provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the risk of provoking heavy Communist reaction against free Asian countries.” (ibid.)

For text of NSC 5913/1, see volume XVI, pages 133144.

Following the discussion of paragraph 37, the memorandum of the NSC discussion by Boggs includes the following discussion:

“Continuing his briefing, Mr. Gray then noted that NSC 5913 did not include language which clearly stated U.S. policy in the event of a major uprising in Communist China. The President said that a major uprising had once occurred in Hungary and everyone had been afraid to take action. In the event of an uprising in Communist China, we have to decide what would be gained by action and what the people of China wanted. The Chinese people were not a pawn in a struggle between Mao and Chiang. If they wanted freedom and called for help, that might be one thing; but a decision by the U.S. to intervene in the absence of in appeal for help would be quite another thing. This was the type of situation the governing factors of which could not be calculated in advance. General wining wondered whether Paragraph 37 could not be used in such a situation. Mr. Gray said he had merely wanted the Council to be aware of [Page 590] this gap in NSC 5913. He believed the problem of a major uprising might be considered covered by Paragraph 37, however.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

For the record of the discussion of paragraph 37, see volume XVI, pages 116127.

A September 25 memorandum from Lay to all holders of NSC 5723, “U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China,” October 4, 1957, enclosed a revised page of NSC 5723, stating that it incorporated amendments in paragraph 11 to bring that paragraph into conformity with paragraph 37 of NSC 5913/1. Lay’s memorandum requested that the revised page should be substituted in all copies of NSC 5723 for the superseded page, which should be destroyed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5723 Series) The text of NSC 5723 as printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, volume III, pages 619623, includes only the revised page including revised paragraph 11.

Paragraph 11 of NSC 5723, as approved October 4, 1957, was identical to paragraph 11 of NSC 5503, January 11, 1955 (see ibid., volume II, pages 3034), except that the names “Formosa” and “the Pescadores” were changed to “Taiwan” and “the Penghus.” It reads as follows:

“Do not agree to GRC offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to GRC actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Taiwan and the Penghus.”

Paragraph 11, as revised September 25, 1959, reads as follows:

  • “a. Except under circumstances approved by the President, do not agree to GRC offensive actions against the mainland of Communist China.
  • “b. Under circumstances approved by the President agree to GRC actions against Communist China which are a prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack, provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the risk of provoking heavy Chinese Communist reaction against Taiwan and the Penghus.”

A copy of NSC 5723 including both the original and revised pages is in the Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File, NSC 5723. See Supplement under date of August 24, 1960. See also Document 347.