281. Telegram From the Consulate General in Naha to the Department of State 0
177. For Robertson from Parsons. At Embassy reception several hours after my long conversation with President Chiang morning of May 2,1 Foreign Minister Huang asked if he could see me privately to convey at President Chiang’s request several points relative to morning’s conversation. We retired to private room and Huang spoke as follows:
- (1)
- Chiang wished to convey personal regards to Secretary Herter, recalling with pleasure Herter’s 1957 visit to Taiwan.2 He hoped Secretary would find it possible to revisit Taiwan soon.
- (2)
- Chiang wished to make clear that his remarks that morning re State Department criticisms of GRC statements on recovering mainland [Page 564] had not been intended as formal complaint to be conveyed to Department. Chiang had spoken in same spirit of frankness and friendship to Secretary Dulles and to you. He was speaking casually and not trying to make an issue of it.
- (3)
- GRC would certainly never undertake any large scale military action on mainland without prior consultation with US. Even on guerilla activities, GRC, though not bound by documentary obligations to do so, would keep US informed as appropriate so it would not be taken by surprise.
In response to latter point, I stressed as I had during morning conversation with Chiang the importance and good results already deriving from close consultations. Conversely failure to consult even on matters not covered by documents might lead to serious unexpected consequences. Balance of our conversation related to MSA, status of forces, Tibet, Laos, Malaya. Full account being air pouched from Seoul.
Comment: I am sure you will agree in reading my cable account of morning’s conversation with Chiang (telegram reference numbers unavailable here) that Chiang through Huang was seeking to correct oversight and possible misunderstandings deriving from our conversation. Regarding point 3 above, Chiang as well as Vice-President Chen who also talked boldly about guerilla-support activities may have done so in considerable measure of “face” purposes (they were speaking in presence other ministers and politicos). I think they are quite realistic about need to consult with us and clearly do not expect their actions to go as far as their words would imply. There is no question but that success over Quemoy has deepened GRC understanding of value of close collaboration with US.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–459. Secret.↩
- See Document 280.↩
- September 12–16, 1957; for his report of the visit, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. III, p. 603.↩