280. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State0
Taipei, May 3,
1959, noon.
1156. For Robertson from Parsons. Drumright sending you full account of two and half hour conversation we had today1 with Generalissimo, also attended by Green, Foreign Minister, two Vice Foreign Ministers, and interpreter.2 Highlights as follows: [Page 562]
- (1)
- I gave him highlights of conclusions of SEATO and Baguio conferences, stressing SEATO’s and Ambassadors’ views as how best to exploit Tibet situation, importance of economic development in consolidating security and institutions of free Asian countries, growing recognition in FE area of Chinese Communist menace and growing capability free FE countries to meet that menace. I stressed our continuing support for current China policies which we consider essential part of broader US world policies.
- (2)
- Generalissimo paid warm emotional tribute to Secretary Dulles. It was clear throughout our conversations that he was worried over Dulles’ resignation and yours.3 He described you both as principal architects of policy which will long be renowned for its realism, uprightness and success. He Felt it was a policy which had passed the acid test at Quemoy.
- (3)
- Re Liu’s appointment as Mao’s successor, he had three points to make:
- (A)
- Mao did not step down; he was overthrown;
- (B)
- Mao’s failure at Quemoy gave Khrushchev opportunity to exercise pressures for his removal and replacement by someone more pliant to Moscow’s will, as result of which Peiping will be even more under Moscow’s control than previously;
- (C)
- Soviets will do everything possible to build up Liu’s power and prestige, possibly even stirring up something in the Straits to prove Liu’s greater stature.
- (4)
- Re Tibet, Generalissimo recognized events had proved helpful in opening eyes of Asia to Red menace, but he repeatedly expressed strong displeasure over so-called failure of US so far to cooperate with GRC to exploit uprising. This was a Chinese affair in which Generalissimo felt GRC must play a role if it is to justify its mission and very reason for existence. GRC proposed to undertake guerilla warfare on the mainland, whether or not US approved; and GRC under no obligation to consult US on such matters, as distinct from obligation to consult under mutual defense treaty in event of GRC attack against mainland.
- (5)
- Similarly, Generalissimo was critical of what he regarded as demeaning, irritating US State Department reminders of alleged GRC failure to live up to spirit of joint communiqué. Stressed that GRC was the tried and true ally which stood by its word. GRC will never try to pull anything behind US back. Even though GRC must accent recovery of mainland, it will abide by communiqué’s letter and spirit in fulfilling that mission. He added that State Department remonstrances over this [Page 563] matter conveyed impressions not only of US distrust but also of casting GRC in role of puppet.
- (6)
- I replied that these matters would have to be carefully studied by my government before giving US response but that my personal preliminary reaction was that close consultations over past year had paid handsome dividends and should be continued on all matters affecting our common interests. I said that if our views had been expressed in a way or through means damaging to GRC then that was regrettable matter which must be corrected.
- (7)
- I also alluded to GRC’s difficult international position and said that efforts to improve it in spirit joint communiqué were most important in that defeat in UN and acceptance ChiComs were directly related to GRC’s mission to recover mainland. If GRC lost international position, realization their position as legitimate government of China, which we supported, would be gravely affected.
- (8)
- Comments in light this and subsequent talks with Vice President and Foreign Minister will follow soonest.
Drumright
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5–359. Secret; Limit Distribution.↩
- May 2. Parsons, accompanied by Marshall Green, visited Taipei May 1–3, after attending the SEATO Council meeting held in Wellington April 8–10, and a U.S. Chiefs of Mission conference held in Baguio, Philippines.↩
- Drumright’s memorandum of conversation was transmitted with despatch 629 from Taipei, May 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–459; see Supplement)↩
- Secretary Dulles resigned on April 15. Robertson’s resignation was to take effect on June 30.↩