Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

227. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, October 30, 1958, 10:55 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Dulles
• General Twining
• Major Eisenhower

REFERENCES

• JCS telegram 947298;¹ Navy telegram 4744; Navy telegram 25929²

This informal meeting was called in order to verify the specific instructions which are now in effect with regard to U.S. convoy activities in the Taiwan Straits. In the meeting with General Twining on 27 October,³ the President had understood that only “normal” patrolling would be in effect; however, the above referenced messages indicated that convoying up to a three-mile limit was permissible. In this regard, General Twining had met with Secretary Dulles on the afternoon of 27 October on this subject and they had likewise conferred with Admiral Burke on 29 October. Initially, Secretary Dulles gave the following background to the problem as it exists today: The Chinese Communists are willingly allowing the Nationalist Chinese to re-supply Quemoy on even numbered days. Whether or not the Nationalist Chinese attempt to re-supply on odd numbered days should be left to them, Secretary Dulles feels, as a political decision. It would be bad politically to coerce the Nationalist Chinese into “jumping through the hoop”—i.e. complying slavishly to the policies of the Chinese Communists. Accordingly, U.S. Commanders are instructed to convoy only in case of military necessity, which would be limited to situations where the Communists attack supply convoys on even numbered days. The Secretary feels that we have no responsibility to convoy in the event the GRC choose to convoy on odd numbered days.

At this point the President introduced the question of pre-decision. If there is not a big emergency, in the President’s view, Admiral Felt can easily check with Washington for instructions. Secretary Dulles then outlined three major points at issue in the convoy, which had been covered in a recent telegram from Admiral Felt:⁴

(a) First, there is the question of re-supplying on odd versus even numbered days. Admiral Smoot had desired to limit the GRC to re-supplying on even numbered days. In this matter, Admiral Felt disagreed, and in the light of political considerations, Secretary Dulles sided with Admiral Felt.

(b) Next, there is the issue of U.S. convoy policy. U.S. ships will not convoy so long as the re-supply on even numbered days is proceeding satisfactorily.

(c) Finally, there is the question of areas to patrol. The twelve-mile limit theoretically imposed By the Chinese Nationalist Government resulted in a line which extends sometimes thirty miles from the coast. In view of this, Admiral Felt had desired to make occasional, purposeful intrusions so as to indicate our nonacceptance of this limit. In this connection, Secretary Dulles, with the concurrence of General Twining, pointed out that our position in the Warsaw conferences makes our attitude clear and there is no need to demonstrate our attitude by overt acts at this time.

The positions taken by Secretary Dulles received the President’s approval subject to an additional modification with respect to the convoy instructions. Here he pointed out that a convoy affords protection against naval action but not against artillery fire from the shore. Accordingly, it was decided that the United States, pending further instructions, would not engage in convoying operations unless the Chinese Communists attempted by sea and/or air to interfere with the re-supply on even days in what we regard as international waters.⁵

General Twining then brought up a final point with reference to reconnaissance activities, which is set forth in a separate memorandum.⁶

John S.D. Eisenhower
Mayor, United States Army

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Major Eisenhower. The conference was held after the NSC meeting (see Document 226). A memorandum of the conversation by Dulles, attached to a memorandum for the record by Boster, October 31, is in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.
1. Document 53.
2. Telegram 231355Z from COMUSTDC/MAAG to CNO, and telegram 232149Z from CNO to COMUSTDC, both October 23; see footnote 1, Document 214.
3. See Document 219.
4. Telegram 282336Z from CINCPAC to CNO, October 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–2858; see Supplement)

5. Attached to the source text is an addendum by Major Eisenhower, October 31, stating that Dulles, with Twining’s concurrence, subsequently forwarded the following paragraph which represented his understanding of the policy on convoy operations approved by the President:

   “The United States, pending further instructions, would not engage in convoying operations unless the ChiComs attempted by sea and/or air to interfere with the resupply on ‘even’ days in what we regarded as international waters. Such convoy and escort protection will be engaged in by the United States only in case of military necessity and to extent necessary.”

   The addendum states that the President had approved this.

6. Document 228.