Office of the Historian

214. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)0

Taipei, October 25, 1958, 4:08 p.m.

250808Z. CNO 232149Z1 NOTAL authorizes me to resume operations accordance para 1A of JCS 291926Z August. In order provide you background of climate here re convoy ops have conducted several conferences with Minister Yu, Tiger Wang, Admiral Liang. These have been most satisfactory and reflect a very different attitude [from that] which prevailed prior to the cease-fire. In general all agree supply situation on offshore islands is in excellent shape and that there is no need to demonstrate our capability of running convoys just for the sake of running them. Accordingly there are no specific convoy plans now and there has been no request to resume convoy escort with US forces. The agreed position is that LST–LVT method will be used as necessary to provide critical items as required and as limited by weather. Attitude demonstrated by GRC authorities indicates this general posture for convoy ops should suffice for several weeks. Minister particularly wishes to avoid resumption air resupply to obviate possibility of expanding air war.2

Question of use of LSD came up and have general agreement that there is no need for its use until movement of heavy equipment is called for. Nothing in sight in this category at the moment but arrival of 240 millimeters planned by Army will undoubtedly call for use of LSD.

TDC preparing recommendations for future employment of LSD in resupply ops and will submit soonest.

New subject. Ambassador informed me yesterday that Secretary of State and Gimo had short discussion of use of nuclears against Commie gun positions which demonstrated alarming ignorance of Gimo on capabilities and limitations of nuclear weapons. It was Sec State’s desire that I brief Gimo on this subject but find our capability here to do so intelligently [Page 449] very limited. I would not undertake this project without complete knowledge of all phases including the extent to which Gimo can be briefed. Solicit CINCPAC’s help and views in this matter.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–2558. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to CNO, COMSEVENTHFLT, and CTF 72. Received at the Department of the Navy at 7:32 a.m.↩
  2. Telegram 232149Z from CNO to COMUSTDC, October 23, authorized Smoot to resume operations in accordance with paragraph 1 A of JCS 947298 (Document 53) but called his attention to the stipulation of military necessity. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 41) It was sent in response to telegram 231355Z from COMUSTDC/MAAG to CNO, October 23, which stated that Smoot expected a GRC request for the resumption of convoys and requested instructions. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Telegram 251839Z from CNO to COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US), October 25, replied that Smoot’s telegram was welcome; the announcement that the Communists would bombard Quemoy only on odd days had caused some concern that escorting would be resumed unnecessarily. (Ibid.; see Supplement)↩