197. Memorandum of Conversation0
PRESENT
- President Chiang Kai-shek
- The Honorable John Foster Dulles
- Ambassador George Yeh (Interpreter)
I spoke along the general lines of the attached talking paper—points I–VII inclusive.1 I did not discuss points VIII and IX, saying that I thought it better to postpone until tomorrow any concrete lines of action. With this the Generalissimo agreed.
I added that no doubt from time to time the USG and its members do or say things that the GRC does not like. However, it should be appreciated that this is done not with any desire to drive a wedge between us but because of the imperative need of winning popular support both in the US and with allied governments for our policy. No single person, even President Eisenhower, can under our system carry out a foreign policy unaided. There is a desperate need for public support.
The Generalissimo in his response said that he never mistrusted the purpose of sincerity of the US. He did feel that there was misunderstanding of him and lack of confidence in him. He hoped that this visit would enable us to clear our minds and to agree on basic principles which would guide our policy. Possibly presentations would be different in our different countries but the essence would be the same. I asked whether he had in mind making some sort of a joint declaration. He said no, that he thought in the main our decisions should be private. The President went on to explain that he thought that if we agreed on the principles, then it would be possible to reach agreement on the methods. He did not want a world war in order to free the Chinese people on the Mainland. He himself was a revolutionary. He realized that you could not have a revolution merely by force. What was required was popular support. If [Page 419] force alone was used, that was “aggression”, not revolution. He said that we had agreed together on the principle of not attacking the Mainland by air. That was hard for them but they accepted it because they agreed with us on the principle of not taking action which might precipitate a world war. There was no desire to put the US on the spot. He above all wanted more of our confidence. He felt that even the Eisenhower Administration lacked trust in him. I said that I hoped that he was not referring to me. There was no one in the world that I would trust more implicitly than he, once he had given his word. I did not disguise the fact that there were many people, some on Taiwan, who thought that the GRC, not necessarily the President himself, were trying to involve us in war as a means of returning to the Mainland. I personally defended the Generalissimo whenever I had the opportunity. The President indicated that he was aware of these suspicions which were generated at Taiwan and he made it clear that he bitterly resented them. He discussed briefly the tactics of the Communists, saying that these intermittent attacks were bad on morale; no one could settle down. He wondered what was the effect in the US of the present type of Communist propaganda saying that the troubles here were all due to us and that we should get out and let them settle their own difficulties. I said I thought this line would not have any particular effect because it was the same line that they had taken for years in relation to NATO. I asked whether the propaganda would have an effect here. He said he thought not on Taiwan, but it might have some little effect on Kinmen. He remarked incidentally that if Kinmen were lost, he thought the effect of that on the morale on Taiwan would be so serious that the defense of Taiwan itself would crumble.
At about 6:30 I said that I thought we should leave to get ready for dinner but that I hoped we could talk again tomorrow. He said he would hold the entire day at my disposition. I said we could fix an hour at dinner. We then joined the rest of the party.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dulles. The conversation was held at President Chiang’s residence. The source text, initialed by Dulles, incorrectly bears the notation “REAT MC–9,” but other copies subsequently made and duplicated for the files are labeled REAT MC–18 (Taiwan). REAT was the document designator for the Secretary’s trip to Rome, England, Alaska, and Taiwan. (Attached to the source text; also ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136)↩
- The talking paper used by Dulles is printed as Document 196. The paper attached to the source text is a copy of sections I–VII of that document, with Dulles’ handwritten revisions incorporated. Copies of the talking paper attached to other copies of the memorandum of conversation in Department of States files do not include those revisions.↩