Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

196. Talking Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles⁰

Taipei, October 21, 1958.

I

We congratulate the GRC upon its success in withstanding and repelling the Communist attack on Quemoy. There has been bravery and competence. We are proud to have been associated.

II

We express thanks, but not surprise, at the loyal manner in which the GRC has complied with the agreement not to use force, except in emergency self-defense, unless this was jointly agreed. We know that this restraint was exercised in the face of grave provocations.

III

We believe that it is possible to cope with the military effort of the CPR. If they resume efforts at interdiction by bombardment, that will be overcome, as in the past. If they seriously raise the level of that effort, as by use of bombers against Q and M, that may call for raising the level of GRC reply. If they attempt an amphibious assault, that can be and will be repulsed. If they attack Taiwan by air, that will evoke a joint reply.

There is capacity and will to cope with any aspect of assault at whatever level the CPR make it. In each case, the initiative will be theirs. The final word will be ours. In each case we shall use only the measure of effort needed for repulsion. If the war becomes more intense and general, theirs will be the responsibility before the world.

IV

The great danger faced by the GRC is not primarily military, but political. It stems from the world’s longing for conditions of peace and the feeling of almost all free world countries that the relationship between GRC and CPR not only endangers the peace, but that the GRC wants it to endanger the peace.

The two other “civil” wars promoted by the Communists in Asia— the Korean War and the Indochina War—have been ended by armistices. Germany is peacefully divided. These involved considerable sacrifices.

These measure the desire for peace, if it can be reconciled with preservation of essential values.

In the case of the China civil war, there has been no armistice and while, from time to time, there have been considerable periods of de facto tranquility, both sides have claimed the right to resume fighting, and the ChiComs have exercised it, notably in relation to the Tachens, Quemoy and Matsu. In view of US relation to the GRC, and its world-wide power position, there is deep concern within the free world that the US will become involved, with consequences that may be world-wide and disastrous to mankind.

There is a resulting desire to see liquidated the “trouble spots”.

V

The international political situation today is serious as regards the GRC. Except perhaps for the Republics of Korea and Vietnam, the USA is the only vigorous supporter of the GRC.

It has required the strongest representations from the US upon its friends to prevent the community of free nations from according to the CPR the unlimited status of the only China, entitled without external interference to liquidate by force the remaining elements of the civil war and thus end the risk of general war. See Lodge cable Delga 37, Sept. 24, 1958.¹

It is doubtful whether even the US can long protect the GRC under present circumstances. It is far from certain that a subsequent US administration will be willing to be as staunch for the GRC as has been the Eisenhower-Dulles administration of foreign policy.

VI

It is today widely assumed that the GRC has only a limited life expectancy. It seems to be threatened on three fronts:

(1) There is the overt threat of the CPR with its vast military and propaganda capability.

(2) There is the threat that stems from the fact that the GRC on Taiwan is inevitably becoming more and more dependent on Taiwanese, e.g., Chinese whose families have long lived in Taiwan, who have no homes and family responsibilities on the Mainland and who cannot be expected to want to prolong the civil war aspect of the present phase.

(3) Free world opinion, which wants to see a liquidation of the “civil war” which carries with it the risk of general war.

It devolves upon the GRC, and the US, in consultation with it, to find a reply to these dangers, just as we have found a reply to the direct military threats. Such a reply exists, and is, we believe, to be found in a fresh approach to the mission of the GRC as spokesman for Free China.

VII

The Government of the Republic of China continues primarily to appear as a civil war survival, which is essentially militaristic in its outlook. This needs to be changed. There is still a military role to defend Taiwan against armed attack, to preserve the offshore islands from Communist seizure and to be prepared to cooperate hereafter with Chinese Mainland rebellious elements which, on the one hand, have enough sympathy and support from Communist Red military elements so that they had a chance of survival, and, on the other hand, desire such cooperation—cooperation which under some circumstances could be decisive.

But we believe that it is possible for the GRC, in cooperation with the USA, to find ways to discharge all of these military roles consistently with finding for itself a larger and more acceptable world mission.

The culture, the tradition of the Chinese nation and the wisdom of the educated Chinese constitute an asset which is valued throughout the world. Under Communist rule the true virtues of China are being liquidated and the Chinese people sought to be turned into a mass of disciplined slaves working for the rulers of International Communism.

The GRC has an opportunity to represent the China which has been and is honored and revered throughout all of the free world. It cannot play this role and enjoy the support of the free peoples if the image of the GRC which is transmitted abroad is that of a regime which is essentially militaristic and which is represented as having no role but a military one that is apt to precipitate a third world war.

That is an unattractive image and one which is largely regarded as unrealistic and highly dangerous to world peace.

In fact the GRC is different from this image. But it needs to dramatize that difference and to cast itself unmistakably into the larger role of custodian of Chinese culture, virtues and education. Thus it can give the world a prospect which all free peoples will welcome and support.

In this way, and perhaps only in this way, will it be possible to prevent the GRC itself being liquidated under the various pressures which now are operating against it.

VIII

In order to dramatize the GRC in its new role various lines of action will need to be vigorously pursued.

(1) The GRC should make clear that, so far as it is concerned, and on a basis of de facto reciprocity, it will conduct itself as though there were an armistice along the line of present division, and indeed would be willing itself to conclude such an armistice.

(2) There should be reemphasis on what the Gimo has already declared—that the GRC will not attempt forcibly to return on the Mainland unless invited by Chinese elements there that are respectable in their quantity and responsible in their quality.

(3) There will be an avoidance of commando raids, and like provocations and of overflights.

(4) So far as the offshore islands are concerned, the GRC recognize the danger of opposing military forces being in close proximity (e.g., demilitarized zone along Korean and Vietnam armistice lines). It will accept any solution which seems dependably to assure that the civilian population will neither be turned over to Communists or uprooted. The GRC does not intend to use these islands for its own prosecution of the civil war, e.g., for blockading the Ports of Amoy and Foochow, or “jumping off” to the Mainland.

(5) The character, and perhaps the size, of military forces of the GRC should be reviewed in an effort to achieve greater mobility with, perhaps, smaller numbers and less burden on the people of Taiwan. However, it is recognized that these adjustments cannot readily be made under fire.

The foregoing are negative acts. In addition there should be positive acts designed to dramatize the shift of effort to assure the survival of Chinese civilization. It should seek solid yet dramatic ways to cast itself in the role of the custodian of China’s real greatness. There should be increasing emphasis on Chinese education, art and other aspects of Chinese culture.

Thus the GRC can better thwart the materialistic efforts of the CPR on the Mainland; can be a symbol which the Mainland Chinese will observe and envy; can attract more lasting support on Taiwan; can better hold the loyalty of overseas Chinese; and can make itself into something which not only the US but the free peoples everywhere will want to sustain and cherish.

A role on the China Mainland is more apt to come as a by-product of this new sense of mission than if such a Mainland role is looked on as something that needs to be urgently pursued and soon realized as the only alternative to extinction.

IX

It is essential that a shift of emphasis to the new mission should be authentic. It is nothing that can be imposed, but should come from the mind and spirit of the free Chinese themselves.

There is nothing novel about such an evolution. There have been comparable evolutions in many great institutions, notably that of Christianity.

Such evolutions, when responsive to the needs of the time, are not retreats, but advances. They assure continuing vitality, or the alternative to extinction.

0. Source: Princeton University, Dulles Papers, Box 127, Chiang Kai-shek. Secret; Personal and Private. Published with permission of Princeton University Libraries. The text printed here incorporates revisions that appear on the source text in Dulles’ handwriting. Other handwritten notations on the source text indicate that Phyllis Bernau was to keep it for the Secretary’s meeting with Chiang at 4 p.m. Brief notes of the conversation in Dulles’ handwriting appear on the reverse of the last page; for his memorandum of the conversation, see Document 197. Dulles’ handwritten draft of the talking paper is in the Princeton University, Dulles Papers, Box 127, Chiang Kai-shek.
1. See footnote 3, Document 127.