Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

173. Record of Meeting⁰

Washington, October 10, 1958, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Defense
  • Secretary Quarles
  • General Twining, JCS
  • General Taylor, JCS
  • Adm. Burke, JCS
  • General White, JCS
  • Lt. Gen. McCaul,
  • Lt. Gen. Picher
  • Lt. Gen. Moore
  • Vice Adm. Dennison
  • Maj. General Carraway
  • Lt. Gen. Gerhart
  • Maj. Gen. Roberts
  • Brig. Gen. Hillyard
  • Capt. Cobb
  • Rear Adm. Triebel
  • Maj. Gen. Terrill
• State
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Herter, Under Secretary
  • Mr. Murphy, Dep. Under Secretary
  • Mr. Robertson, Asst. Secretary, FE
  • Mr. Becker, Legal Advisor
  • Mr. Reinhardt, Counselor
  • Mr. Smith, S/P
  • Mr. Parsons, FE
  • Mr. Martin, CA
• CIA
  • Mr. Allen Dulles

SUBJECT

• Offshore Island Situation

At the Secretary’s request General Twining outlined the JCS thinking on the future course of our offshore island policy. He said there were several courses we could adopt. One would be to maintain the status quo. We could carry this on indefinitely. We should by no means pull back while under Communist pressure.

Another course would be to withdraw part of the GRC forces from the offshore islands. The idea would be to make them outposts with about one-third of their present troop strength. This would mean about two divisions on Quemoy and less than one on Matsu.

A third possible course would be for Chiang to renounce force as a means of returning to the mainland but not his right to return if there were a revolution there and he was invited back.

The fourth alternative would be complete evacuation by the GRC and establishment of a UN mandate.

Turning to ways in which the GRC might be compensated for changing its policy re the offshore islands, General Twining listed the following:

1. Offer of United States protection for evacuation of GRC forces;

2. Modernization of GRC forces beyond that now visualized;

3. Measures which would enable the GRC to resupply the offshore islands in the event of attack and give it much more flexibility. These would include:

(a) Improvement of GRC Air Force by provision of more advanced planes;

(b) Strengthening the Navy by provision of some heavier destroyers;

(c) Increasing GRC’s amphibious lift capacity to 25,000 or 30,000 troops.

4. Increase the scale of economic aid to the GRC; specifically, provide it with some merchant shipping;

5. Provide continued United States military support to Taiwan and Penghus;

6. Continue United States efforts to prevent the Chinese Communists from being seated in the UN.

General Twining remarked that the foregoing was a good-sized and expensive package to offer President Chiang. It would put him in a better military position than he now occupies.

General Taylor said that there were two aspects which impressed him: First, it must not appear that we are retreating under Communist threats or that the Communists are gaining anything. Secondly, when the right moment comes (when there would be no appearance of retreat), it would be a definite advantage to cut down on the size of the forces in the offshore islands. They would still have good capability in military terms. Reallocation of forces on a sound military basis would represent a more effective use of the forces available.

Admiral Burke said that except for psychological reasons it did not make much difference how many troops were on the offshore islands. However, when the islands are under attack it made a difference in the amount of military supplies that had to be brought in.

General Taylor said that there should be enough troops on the offshore islands a) to prevent infiltration by the Communists; b) to cope with a surprise attack mounted on junks; and c) to delay an all-out attack long enough to permit reinforcements to arrive.

General White said that he presumed our short-term objective was to obtain military stability in the Taiwan area and our long-term objective was destruction of the Chinese Communist regime. It was necessary in the short term to give something to both the Nationalists and Chinese Communists—to save face all around. It was necessary to prevent a defeat for the GRC and to deny victory to the Communists. He had tried to evaluate certain courses of action in terms of plus or minus from the viewpoint of the GRC and the Chinese Communists: 1) Chiang Kai-shek would go before the United Nations and renounce the use of force as a means of returning to the mainland but would confirm his will to return by peaceful means when called. This would present Chiang as a statesman. It would be a plus for the GRC; it would also be a plus for the Communists; 2) Reduction of GRC forces on the offshore islands would represent a minus for the GRC, a plus for the Communists; 3) United States protection for evacuation would be a stand-off; 4) Increased military aid for the GRC would be a plus for the Nationalists but not a minus for the Communists; 5) Increased economic aid for the GRC would be a plus for the Nationalists but not a minus for the Communists; 6) Continued support of the defense of Taiwan and Penghus would be neither a plus nor a minus for either side; 7) Seeking Chinese Communists’ renunciation of force would be a minus for the Communists; 8) United States guarantee of the integrity of the offshore islands would be a minus for the Communists; 9) Continued status quo in the UN would be neither a plus nor a minus.

The Secretary noted that General White had added to the courses of action mentioned by General Twining, a United States guarantee of the offshore islands. He inquired about this.

General Taylor said that this idea had been kicked around, also the idea of a UN guarantee.

The Secretary asserted that everyone agreed that we should make no attempt to change the situation under Communist fire. We should have a suspension of hostilities of sufficient duration as a prerequisite to any moves on our part.

The Secretary asked what effect reduction of GRC forces on the offshore islands would have on GRC ability to defend them against a renewed Communist attack. General Taylor replied that he thought that a garrison of 25,000 would be adequate.

The Secretary asked about the possibility of improving the defensive weapons which GRC forces on the islands had so that they could be given more defensive power with a smaller number of men. General Taylor pointed out that we were now embarked on a program of giving these forces more modern equipment. The new weapons, however, demanded the same number of men. He pointed out there were two kinds of weapons—1) short-range, and b) heavy artillery (such as the 8” howitzers now being furnished). Possibly there were not yet enough of the heavy artillery pieces on the isles, but there were plenty of short-range weapons.

The Secretary then inquired about the ability of the Communists to keep up their intense bombardment. How much did it cost them per round? General Taylor estimated about 50 dollars per round. The Secretary noted this would mean a cost of about 25 million dollars for the approximately half-million rounds fired at Quemoy. It was agreed that it might not cost the Chinese Communists this much in cash, but that in any case, shelling represented a major effort for the Communists. The Secretary understood that these artillery shells came from the Soviet Union and that the Russians made the Chinese Communists pay for them. Mr. Allen Dulles agreed. He pointed out that the Chinese Communists had been using old equipment, but there is some indication that in recent days they had used more modern shells with delayed fuses. General Taylor noted that delayed fuses were not new.

The Secretary said he had not been thinking in terms of big howitzers, but of smaller automatic weapons, when he had asked about giving the GRC forces more modern equipment. General Taylor replied that GRC forces were well supplied with such weapons, and noted again that we were engaged in modernizing the seven divisions on the offshore islands.

General White expressed the opinion there would be a major air battle if the Communists renewed hostilities. In reply to the Secretary’s question whether there would be an airborne attack, General White said possibly but in any case there would be a very big air battle.

Secretary Quarles expressed the view that the Communists would not invade the offshore islands without attacking Taiwan bases. General White said that he wouldn’t go that far.

General Taylor pointed out that the Communists could attack without any air cover if they used lots of junks in the dark of night. Secretary Quarles said that unless the Communists pursued the tactics just mentioned by General Taylor they would be facing a Yalu situation in reverse. He didn’t think, therefore, that they would take on an invasion of the offshores without bombing Taiwan.

The Secretary asked if the GRC could defend the islands as well if their forces were reduced. General Taylor replied that if they only had one-third of their present forces they would not do as well as with the full number. However, they should be strong enough to stave off a first wave of attack until reinforcements arrived from Taiwan.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that an advantage of reducing forces on the offshores would be that GRC could remove Taiwanese troops.

The Secretary recalled that General Twining had suggested giving the GRC an amphibious lift capacity of 25 to 30 thousand men. General Taylor said that this would be for reinforcement, rotation, and replacement of troops on the offshores.

The Secretary said if there were a more complete demilitarization there would be a need for some form of guarantee of the integrity of the islands. He assumed also that they would still need forces for internal security. General Twining agreed. The Secretary asked if the forces could be reduced below the figures previously given and still provide for the need for internal security. General Taylor said that if the Communists took parallel action, forces could be reduced to a constabulary.

Mr. Murphy asked what would happen if there were a total evacuation. Admiral Burke commented that the military fights with its heart. If you give up part of the objective, they will ask why they should fight.

The Secretary said that it is the spirit which counts. Defeat can always be rationalized. We can’t have the appearance of retreating without endangering morale. We must look for something which will strengthen the situation as a whole. The President feels that we should treat the islands as outposts, prevent them from becoming Dienbienphus upon which everything depends.

The Secretary then asked about air and sea mobility. What would the amphibious lift involve? Admiral Burke indicated it would involve providing the GRC the following additional ships: 3 DD or DE, 10 LST, 8 LSM, 8 LCU, 11 LCVP, 3 APD, 2 APA, 2 LSMR, 2 LSD. This program would cost about $35 million. It could be rationalized as increasing the GRC’s ability to reinforce the offshore islands under attack.

The Secretary said that the GRC could play an active role if and when there was a revolution on the mainland. He said that if there had been a free Hungarian government at the time of the Hungarian revolution, there might have been a different outcome. Forces in Formosa might have a decisive effect in a case like this. He wouldn’t be surprised if this happened in the next ten years.

He said that the Chinese people, who are individualists, don’t like the Communist system but they are now bowed down under it. It was unnecessary to assume that there will be no ups and downs or that there will not be situations similar to those in Eastern Europe. He recalled the uprisings in East Berlin, in Hungary, in Poland. He assumed that if such an event occurred on the China mainland, Quemoy and Matsu would not be much help. Quemoy, for example, was encircled by strongly-held Communist positions. What the GRC needed was greater mobility, both sea and air.

The Secretary recalled that the Generalissimo had talked about paratroops and wondered if the JCS had gone into that. General Twining replied in the negative. General Taylor did not think that from a military standpoint large numbers of paratroops would be useful against the mainland. The Secretary said that he was thinking of their use only in conjunction with other elements. General Taylor indicated that there was no justification for a major contribution to paratroop units. The Secretary said he thought a study had been made. Governor Herter recalled that when he was in Taiwan, President Chiang had spoken to him about paratroop training, and there were then 10,000 to be trained. President Chiang wanted 30,000. General Taylor said that paratroop training was good training and you could put the paratroops back into the airborne units.

Secretary Quarles expressed concern that provision of amphibious lift to the Chinese Nationalists would not square with our disavowal of support for the return of the GRC to the mainland. He thought it might also worry the Philippines or Japan. He thought we might have a private understanding with Chiang Kai-shek to keep the vessels in our hands. Mr. Robertson said there are other factors in favor of providing an amphibious lift to the Chinese Nationalists. For example, if the Chinese Communists started something in Korea, we might like to have forces on Taiwan ready to turn loose on the mainland and Southeast Asia. General Taylor recalled that Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei was sold on this idea. Admiral Burke agreed with Mr. Robertson.

The Secretary showed General Twining the President’s memorandum.¹ General Twining said that he had not previously seen it but that the President had talked to him about it. There was a brief discussion of Hainan, the Secretary recalling that an operation had been under consideration when he was working on the Japanese peace treaty.

The Secretary asked whether reduction of forces was acceptable from a military standpoint if it was all right politically. General Twining said yes so long as it would not appear that it was being carried out under military threat. The Secretary said this was the premise upon which all our thinking was based and he read a pertinent extract from the President’s memorandum.

General Twining said that Chiang Kai-shek might think we can now supply him indefinitely, he doesn’t realize how hard the job is. The Secretary said he thought that Chiang had had a practical lesson, and would realize the virtue of the position we had taken at the time of the Radford– Robertson talks. On the other hand, he might be frozen in his position more strongly than ever.

Mr. Murphy raised the question of how long a cease-fire would have to be, to be considered long enough for our purposes. General Twining said a couple of weeks if everything was quiet. General Taylor said it might depend on the Warsaw talks.

The Secretary pointed out that there were really no negotiations at Warsaw. These talks serve two purposes: 1) As a kind of excuse for the Communists to let their military action subside as they did in 1955. It was good then for three years. It is an interesting fact, though perhaps a coincidence, that the Communist attacks resumed when the talks had been in temporary suspension. 2) While we get no response from the Communists in Warsaw, they get some feel of our intentions and attitudes. What the Communists do is revealed in Peiping—not at Warsaw. There is no give and take at the Warsaw talks.

General White asked what leverage there was on Chiang. General Taylor mentioned concessions from the Communists.

The Secretary pointed out that we had suggested reciprocal concessions at Warsaw. General White suggested that these would not be bought. The Secretary agreed but said we must show flexibility.

Mr. Murphy asked how many American personnel were on the off-shores. General Twining replied very few, perhaps a dozen.

Mr. Robertson said that it made little difference to the Communists how many GRC troops there were on the offshore islands; their interest lay in Taiwan, which is the menace to them, not the offshores. However, reducing the number of troops on the offshore islands would be helpful in terms of world opinion, which has been led to believe that the troops were deployed to the islands for offensive action against the mainland rather than for the defense of the islands. Admiral Burke agreed with this, but was afraid that the islands might be lost through subversion if they were demilitarized. Mr. Robertson indicated in passing that the acquisition by the GRC of strong popular support in the United States and abroad might be worth the defection, if it occurred. Admiral Burke agreed but doubted whether such popular support would be forthcoming in any case. Moreover, the Communists would continue to make trouble for us. He felt that there was no way we could help in the situation unless President Chiang would go along. Mr. Robertson agreed and emphasized that our program was predicated on getting Chiang’s voluntary agreement.

Mr. Murphy raised the question of evacuating the Tan Islands. Admiral Burke said we should let the Communists into the Tans and then clobber them. Mr. Robertson indicated that he had already discussed this question with Ambassador Yeh, who had agreed with us.

Secretary Quarles advanced the thesis that since Chiang Kai-shek had refused to negotiate, the Chinese Communists would resume hostilities Sunday and that they would take greater measures than they did before since the old tactics had failed. He was worried about what we would do then. Admiral Burke pointed out that there were standing orders to deal with the situation. If the Communist artillery bombardment resumed, we would resume escorting GRC convoys. If the Communists used air bombardment, the GRC air force would be authorized to engage in hot pursuit. If the Communists attacked Formosa, we were in it.

Secretary Quarles said he was satisfied with the standing orders but thought we should face facts. There was a brief discussion of a telegram from Admiral Smoot regarding the Tan Islands.² It was agreed that his recommendation was sound.

[1 paragraph (7–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified] Admiral Burke noted that we hadn’t told the GRC about our position regarding the Tans. Mr. Robertson said that he had told Ambassador Yeh.

Admiral Burke asked if the Secretary felt JCS ideas were sound. The Secretary replied he thought some reduction could be brought about; this might be helpful in the free world as a gesture; it would at least indicate we had no intention of resorting to force. It would make no impression on the Communists. If the impression exists that the offshores represent a threat, that would impair our free world relations. Reallocation of forces would also improve the GRC’s military posture. The President has felt this strongly since 1955 and has wanted the offshores merely as outposts. This was reflected in the Radford and Robertson talking paper.³ The GRC is better off in the event revolution occurs on the mainland to have 50,000 troops on Formosa than on Quemoy. It would have greater flexibility.

Mr. Allen Dulles asked if there was any clue on what would be likely to happen if the cease-fire were prolonged. The Secretary replied that Ambassador Lodge had been busy dropping clues Friday night at the UN in conversations with the Indians, Norwegians, and others.

General Twining asked if the Russians were taking a softer line. The Secretary said yes. Khrushchev’s interview with Tass⁴ modified the language he used in his letter to Eisenhower. Governor Herter said the Communists were grasping at small straws; they had expressed satisfaction at our announcement re stopping convoys.⁵

Mr. Allen Dulles asked if interdiction of trade in the harbor of Amoy would be resumed if the military operations resumed. The Secretary said there had been no interdiction of trade by the GRC. Admiral Burke confirmed this, saying there had been no regular shipping to Amoy, only troops. The Secretary said that the British Ambassador had remarked that there had been no interference with shipping. The Secretary said we should continue that policy. He noted that there had been no grave provocations from Quemoy and Matsu, no commando raids, no agents. He noted we had instructed Ambassador Beam to inquire at the next Warsaw meeting as to just what harassments the Communists had in mind.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1058. Top Secret. Drafted by Martin on October 14. The conversation was held at the Pentagon.
1. Apparently Document 166.
2. Reference is apparently to telegram 090942Z from COMUSTDC to CINCPAC, October 9, in which Smoot stated that he had not been asked whether the United States would support defense of the Tans but that he had laid the groundwork so that, if asked, he could reply casually:. “Of course not. Defense of those islands would be silly from a military standpoint and I would not recommend it.” He also stated that he had recommended to General Wang that he reduce forces on the Tans to the bare minimum. (Ibid., ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands (Navy Tels.) Sept. 5–Dec. 30, 1958; see Supplement)
3. For text of the talking paper for Robertson’s and Radford’s mission to Taipei in April 1955, approved by the President on April 17, 1955, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. II, pp. 493–495, but see also the President’s memorandum of April 5, 1955, to Dulles, ibid., pp. 444–449.
4. Telegram 770 from Moscow, October 6, reported that Pravda had published that day an answer by Khrushchev to a TASS correspondent’s question in which he stated that the Soviet Union would come to the aid of the PRC if it was attacked by the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/10–658)
5. A statement issued on October 8 by the People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry stated that no “intrusions” by U.S. warships or aircraft into Chinese territorial waters or air space had been observed for a day, and commented that this was “worthy of notice.” A copy is attached to an October 8 memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Dulles. (Ibid., 793.00/10–858; see Supplement)