Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

158. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State⁰

Taipei, October 6, 1958, 6 p.m.

548.1. Foreign Minister asked me to call this morning. He said he had been present at interview President had granted Admiral Smoot earlier in morning which I have referred to in previous telegram.¹ Minister said he had been directed by President to inform me of President’s attitude toward most recent development in strait crisis: “As far as GRC and people concerned, we will disregard Commie broadcast completely and will continue our plans and actions as usual. We hope US will continue its plans and convoy activities as usual. We hope US will give no serious consideration to Peng’s or other similar Commie utterances or threats. Unless Commies formally announce or declare renunciation of use of force in offshore area, US should not consider any change in its military actions”. Minister said President had asked Admiral Smoot to relay foregoing message to JCS on his behalf and that of Chinese people.

2. Minister said after Smoot left President directed he make following additional points to me:

(A) He hopes US will tighten its vigilance in wake of Peng broadcast. He fears those Americans opposing administration policy will advocate acceptance of Peng’s offer and even use it as pretext to suggest withdrawal or reduction of GRC garrisons from offshores. He hopes US Government will do everything possible to prevent such development which would do great damage to US and GRC.

(B) He hopes US Government will not propose or talk about withdrawal of offshore garrisons. He suggests US Government attempt to explain to US people it impossible to defend Taiwan and Penghu if GRC should withdraw or reduce garrisons on offshores. He fears if US pressed such withdrawal, armed forces and people might adopt anti-American attitude; this is source of concern and worry to him.

(C) If some Americans ask US Government to persuade GRC to withdraw or reduce offshore garrisons, he hopes US Government will firmly declare it cannot interfere with sovereign rights of ally defending its own territory. US cannot well suggest doing something opposite will of people and armed forces to resist aggression, et cetera.

3. Minister and Vice Minister Shen who also present then proceeded to analyze Peng message as follows: Message issued in name Defense Minister and not Chou En-lai. Not addressed to GRC or officials but to “compatriots in Taiwan”. Judging from content it amounts to “peace offensive”. Commies know GRC leadership will ignore message. It is directed at people and armed forces and is designed to slacken vigilance and divide people and government. Even in this regard Commies know they can influence only certain sections of people—those uninformed or who have not had experience with Commies. Commies were probing deep when they brought up Secretary’s press conference remarks which they sensed had caused disquiet and apprehension here. But Peng message is more addressed to US and European public opinion. This opinion does not know Commies as Chinese here do and may be misled. Peng’s message indicates no basic change in Commie policy. It calls for abolition of US–GRC defense treaty, it maintains offshores and Taiwan are internal problem. Charge of US aggression remains and its purpose of Warsaw talks. There is no reference to cease fire or renunciation of force, but merely halt of bombardment for seven days to reach “peaceful settlement”, terms of which are not spelled out. Recall Commie broadcast of August 27² threatened invasion of Kinmen. That is more accurate statement of Commie intentions; Peng statement more likely designed to slacken vigilance. Peng broadcast marks beginning of second stage of Commie drive which will be more aggressive than first stage. Message marks open effort to extend anti-US movement to Taiwan. Conditions in regard US convoy are attempts to sow trouble either if convoy maintained or withdrawn. If US withdraws convoy on Commie terms, equivalent to saying they set terms and US accepted. If US refused withdraw convoy, Commies will say US not interested in lifting provocations.

4. Minister argued US decision to withdraw escort operations would put GRC in almost impossible position. It would imply US acceptance of Peng proposal and would indicate to many ill-informed people GRC prepared to negotiate on basis Peng message. This preposterous and utterly impossible. GRC has had enough experience negotiating with Commies and will not do so again. If US withdraws convoy it will do so over strongest objections of GRC. GRC would be obliged to disclose step taken without its concurrence. This would signal split between GRC and US which Commies seeking and our position would be weakened. This open division would have harmful effect on public opinion and in armed forces. It would revive press criticism of US.

5. I told Minister I fully understand his position, viewed Peng message an example of Commie tactical trickery. I said I regarded it as largely intended for non-Chinese public consumption and as intended to embarrass United States. I had no doubt Commies would still try to take off shores by hook or crook. With Deptel 301³ in mind, but without saying I had instructions, I said US Government might be disposed to call off convoy operations so long as they not needed. I also said it appeared desirable for GRC to refrain from all provocative actions so long as Commies do likewise. Minister said it would be great mistake to fall into Commie trap re convoys, but GRC would refrain from retaliatory attacks as long as Commies refrain from attacks.

6. Minister said Foreign Ministry had no alternative but to issue press statement for tomorrow’s newspapers. He said he would keep it as restrained as possible. Statement would call on people for redoubled vigilance against Commie machinations which may be expected to lead to renewed and expanded attacks. Statement would exhort US and GRC to stand firm in face of new divisive tactics of Commies. Statement would in effect reject Commie overtures which would be branded as propaganda gesture and not worthy of any formal reply.

7. I continue to doubt advisability of our recognizing Peng statement to extent of abandoning our convoys which are peaceful and have thus far occasioned no engagement. If necessary, I would prefer to reduce number of our escorting ships and perhaps keep them a bit further to sea. In view of determination of GRC to ignore Peng message, and I think it a wise decision from GRC point of view, I believe it would be highly undesirable for us to dignify it by withdrawing our convoy. In face President’s adamant objections and explanations given by Foreign Minister, our withdrawal from convoy operations will harm our relations and create further doubt as to our basic intentions. Commies will have thus succeeded in aim of driving wedge between us. Moreover, whole import of Peng broadcast is utterly hostile to US and reflects no change whatever in ultimate aims. For these reasons alone, I would advise that we disregard Peng message and continue at Warsaw to seek cessation of attacks.

Drumright

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–658. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Received at 10:17 a.m. Repeated niact to CINCPAC.
1. Document 157.
2. See footnote 6, Document 53.
3. See footnote 5, Document 156.