Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

156. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 5, 1958, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Suspension of U.S. Convoy Escorting During Chicom Cease-fire

PARTICIPANTS

• The Acting Secretary
• Mr. Allen Dulles
• Admiral Burke
• Mr. J.G. Parsons
• Mr. Marshall Green

Mr. Parsons handed the Acting Secretary a draft message (copy attached)¹ the substance of which he suggested might be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs to COMTAIWANDEFCOM ordering the suspension of U.S. convoy escort activities if and for as long as the Chicoms suspended bombardment of Quemoy (as announced for the week of October 6–13 in the Chicom Defmin’s broadcast of October 5)² and if and for as long as the Chicoms did not interfere with resupply operations. Obviously a cease-fire situation obviated the military need for convoy escorts.

The Acting Secretary subsequently expressed agreement with the message with two exceptions: (1) we should make it clear that we did not yet know whether or not the Chicoms had inaugurated a cease-fire, (2) we should make no announcement at this time of our suspension of convoy activity. On the latter score, he agreed with Mr. Parson’s suggestions that he (Mr. Parsons) discuss the matter that evening with Ambassador Yeh.³

Admiral Burke ventured the thought that the Chicom cease-fire announcement was based on Chicom need for a respite and that it was timed to coincide with a period of anticipated bad weather in the Straits when resupply would be difficult even under cease-fire conditions.

Mr. Dulles disagreed on the weather factor. He produced a copy of an intelligence report [report number and date not declassified] which in effect strongly suggested that the Chicoms had planned this move well in advance of the availability of any accurate weather forecasts bearing on the October 6–13 period.

Admiral Burke concurred with the Acting Secretary that there was no need for U.S. convoy escort if and for as long as the Chicoms suspended gunfire and attacks on resupply operations. The Admiral proceeded to draft a message to Admiral Smoot which he then read aloud. The message stated in effect that Admiral Smoot should suspend all U.S. convoy escort activities under the above-mentioned conditions. It further directed maximum resupply during the cease-fire period, the avoidance of GRC and U.S. provocative actions and a complete survey of the situation on each island of the Quemoy group.⁴

The Acting Secretary believed that a parallel message should be sent by State to Ambassador Drumright and he asked Mr. Parsons to have such a message sent right away.⁵

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5411/10–558. Secret. Drafted by Green on October 8. The conversation was held at Secretary Herter’s residence.
1. Not printed.
2. A message from People’s Republic of China Defense Minister Peng Te-huai to “compatriots in Taiwan” was broadcast to Taiwan at 12:40 a.m. on October 6 (16:50 GMT, October 5). Text of the message, as broadcast immediately afterward in English, reads in part as follows: “Out of humanitarian considerations, I have ordered the bombardment to be suspended on the Fukien front for seven days starting from Oct. 6. Within this period, you will be fully free to ship in supplies on condition that there be no American escort.” (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, October 6, 1958, pp. AAA1–2; see Supplement) A somewhat different text was published in Peking Review (No. 32) Supplement, October 7, 1958; extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1172–1173.
3. Parsons’ memorandum of his meeting with Yeh that evening is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–558.
4. Telegram 060045Z from CNO to CINCPAC, COMTAIWANDEFCOM, and COMSEVENTHFLT, October 5, reads in part: “Consult with GRC and unless strenuous objections raised by GRC do not use U.S. ships or aircraft to escort convoys to offshore islands during this period as long as ChiCommies do not fire on islands or otherwise attack.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48) Section 40) The change was agreed upon in a telephone conversation between Herter and Burke, recorded in a memorandum for the record, October 6, by Burke. (Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator’s File; both documents are in the Supplement)
5. Telegram 301 to Taipei, October 5, informed the Embassy of the message to Smoot and stressed the importance of avoiding all provocative actions while hostilities were suspended. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–558; see Supplement)