Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland⁰

Washington, October 3, 1958, 4:24 p.m.

375. Beam–Wang Talks. Following is guidance for next meeting:

You should concentrate on making forceful follow-up on our draft announcement presented last meeting,¹ with view demonstrating that it offers reasonable, hopeful means of peacefully resolving Taiwan Straits crisis. Effort should be made put Wang on defensive and place on record unmistakable picture of extreme nature Chinese Communist demands and of their intransigent attitude. You should take up our draft announcement paragraph by paragraph, reading Wang each paragraph and pointing out in which respects it coincides with Chinese Communist or Soviet positions and public statements. Demand that Wang state clearly just what there is in each paragraph he finds unacceptable.

Emphasize our draft announcement represents positive and constructive new move to accomplish peaceful settlement. Chinese Communist rejection of it shows they more interested in maintaining crisis than in resolving it and are using talks as screen behind which to push their aggressive designs on off shores and Taiwan. Peace-loving and civilized nations of world have accepted principle of settlement of disputes by peaceful negotiation. If Chinese Communists prepared to accept this principle they should give serious consideration to US proposal.

According Section 5 urtel 494² Wang seems to be making assertion that during Geneva talks we confined our proposal for renunciation of force except for inherent right of individual and collective self-defense to, Taiwan and did not have in mind its extension to offshore islands. Thus Wang says “you would in first place gain so-called individual collective self-defense. That is right you have never claimed before in Quemoy and Matsu”. You should endeavor find out whether this is in fact position Wang is adopting. If so you should point out that in Geneva talks US always spoke of “Taiwan area” which means not simply Taiwan and Penghu but offshore islands as well. This is still our position; our present proposal represents no change in this respect.

Re paragraph 6 urtel 503³ if Wang makes point again in next or later meeting, point out forcefully that Communist aggression in Korea completely altered situation and required US take steps to meet threat of force against Taiwan. In his statement of June 27, 1950 directing Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan, President Truman declared: “The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied orders of Security Council of UN issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances occupation of Taiwan by Communist forces would be a direct threat to security of Pacific area.” You may also note that if Chinese Communists consider Mr. Truman’s views as authoritative they should consider article by him in New York Times September 14; pertinent excerpts this article sent by Deptel 376.⁴

Pick up Wang suggestion (Section 8) that peace as conceived by US entirely different from peace as Chinese Communists know it. This most assuredly case. As made amply clear by Soviet and Chinese Communists’ actions in past, peace to them means condition which would prevail after surrender by world to Communist force or threat of force. Even in these negotiations Wang’s minimum demands involve unconditional surrender of our ally GRC and its territories to Chinese Communists’ threat and use of force. Chinese Communists’ minimum demands as stated in talks to date are that (1) US forces be withdrawn from Taiwan and Taiwan area; and (2) US not interfere with Chinese Communists’ takeover from our ally GRC by force if necessary of Quemoy Islands, Matsu Islands, Penghus and Taiwan. Much less than agreeing to renounce use of force, Chinese Communists do not even seriously consider our proposal for ceasefire in order to permit negotiations in peaceful atmosphere. This is not negotiation but demand for unconditional surrender to threats of force by Chinese Communists echoed by Soviet Union. As demonstrated by proposals it has tabled US stands ready as always to negotiate in good faith but will not surrender to demands such as these. US awaits Chinese Communist response.

FYI. Re guidance requested paragraph 4 urtel 503 Deptel 372 rptd info 392 Taipei⁵ contains our basic conception of object of continuing Warsaw talks. Additionally you may find helpful Secretary’s message to Ambassador Drumright (Deptel 290 to Taipei, repeated to Warsaw as 377)⁶ and Secretary’s September 30 press conference.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–358. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lutkins and Martin; cleared by Parsons, Reinhardt, by Becker in draft, and with S/S; and approved by Herter. Repeated to USUN for Lodge and priority to Taipei. The telegram reflects instructions by Dulles which were conveyed to Robertson in Greene’s memorandum of October 1; see the source note, Document 152.
1. For text, see Document 139.
2. Document 145.
3. See footnote 1, Document 152.
4. Dated October 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–358)
5. Document 152.
6. Document 146. Telegram 377 to Warsaw was dated October 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–158)