321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea0
1160. For Ambassador from Parsons. In anticipation Assembly approval Constitutional amendment, believe it would be useful to develop concept of role US Govt can most usefully play in ensuring that aspirations of April 19 movement, free world interests, and our own national interest best served. Views which follow purely exploratory to this end.
We believe, as does Embassy, that experiment with parliamentary government should be tried, in view not only of apparent sentiment Korean [Page 666] people but also of lack clear identification leadership talent at present time. Parliamentary system may well bring leaders to fore, and offers opportunity for some reshuffling. At same time political maneuverings in National Assembly will provide excellent means for US to observe and possibly to influence course of Korean development for immediate future. Nevertheless parliamentary system has obvious handicaps: (1) risk of unstable and shifting coalition government, depending upon purchasable support of considerable number Assembly members, without clear majority any one political group; (2) at opposite extreme, possible degeneration into one-party system and consequent renewed danger corruption and abuses liberty.
Short-run success parliamentary government from viewpoint US objectives and Korean stability depends in large measure upon existence organized moderately-oriented majority in Assembly, with access to experienced politicians and technicians for effective conduct government. This particularly true in light absence expected one-year moratorium on non-confidence votes. Only group which can provide at least core of such majority at present is Democratic Party. Accordingly we should discreetly support DP in election campaign in hope ensuring DP majority, but not to extent or in ways which would give rise to evidence or widespread rumor of US intervention. On other hand manifestation now of friendly attitude toward DP members will add to our subsequent ability influence them maintain Korean headway toward democratic development and to avoid excesses previous regime.
Regarding leadership new govt, ideal arrangement would be election Chang Myon as President, in which capacity his presence, personal integrity and broad understanding international affairs would be effectively utilized; younger man of more dynamism as well as political and executive ability would probably be better Prime Minister–preferably a man acceptable both factions DP, hence not of North Korean provenance or member Chang’s immediate entourage. Dept uncertain whether Chang disqualified by DP affiliation, but this problem could perhaps be met by his resignation from DP when elected President. Seems not impossible Chang himself could be brought to prefer Presidency, combining prestige and security with probable considerable measure informal influence, to uncertainties and risks Prime Ministership. If Chang does not become President, in view virtual certainty his election to Assembly, considerations of face might make it necessary for him and his supporters to seek his election Prime Minister, as only other position compatible his status as ex-Vice President and Party head. Result might be weak leadership government, popular resentment at influence of Chang’s associates who mostly from North Korea, and tensions within DP.
[Page 667]Although DP majority appears desirable if not indispensable for immediate future, it also desirable that effective minority representation be present Assembly to represent other areas Korean opinion. Best outcome might be Assembly composed of (1) DP majority, (2) sizable conservative minority group, and possibly (3) smaller “progressive” but of course non-Communist group. Conservative minority group could provide pole around which opposition could rally in event later change of government–possibly with shift of moderates’ party affiliations, such as combination portions DP and ex-Liberals–while “progressives” would ensure means of expression for socialist-minded Koreans and thus avoid driving them underground or making martyrs of them. We recognize this group would be obvious Communist target; it would therefore provide convenient focus for security surveillance.
In order ensure armed forces stability during critical period next few months Dept believes desirable Yi Chong-ch’an remain Defense Minister view his unquestioned prestige, probity and ability. Accordingly propose we use our influence with incoming Govt to keep Yi as Defense Minister and meantime assure Yi of our support for him within constitutional framework. Such action seems most effective way of meeting rumors of coup d’état, whether or not they have any validity.
Would appreciate Embassy’s consideration foregoing thoughts, with particular reference to possible candidates Prime Minister, and Embassy suggestions for means most effectively influencing course of events in this direction without too far undermining Korean responsibilities determine own future or laying US open to charges unwarranted intervention. Dept views our responsibility as being, not to dictate Korean political development, but discreetly and with aid of indirect means to support constructive elements Korean society and inhibit excesses until Korea develops sufficient stability and sophistication to make such support unnecessary. In meantime we believe US Govt should encourage Koreans to solve their own problems in their own way and should use its influence only when Free World and US objectives are clearly in danger as they were in recent crisis.1
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/6–1160. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Macdonald and approved by Bane and Parsons. The time of transmission is illegible.↩
- McConaughy responded on June 23, in telegram 1401 from Seoul, that he had studied the “thoughtful analysis” contained in telegram 1160 to Seoul and would return an assessment as soon as possible, (Ibid., 795B.00/6–2360) On June 28 Parsons addressed telegram 1317 to McConaughy and reminded him that he was still waiting for the Ambassador’s response to telegram 1160 to Seoul. Elections were pending and Parsons saw a number of undesirable possibilities in the Korean political mix. (Ibid., 795B.00/6–2760) See Supplement.↩