Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

309. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, April 26, 1960, 7 p.m.

987. CINCPAC for POLAD. State pass DA, CNO, DAF. Following is substance my conversation this morning with President Rhee at which MinDef Kim and newly-appointed Foreign Minister Ho Jung also present. In order this exchange can constitute basic reference our continued efforts move ROKG toward fundamental resolution current crisis, I intend provide MinDef with following text as agreed minute our discussions:

“Conversation with President Rhee and his Ministers began at 1040 AM April 26, 1960, when, after greetings, Minister Kim undertook to enumerate and describe four points which were at that time being broadcast over Korean radio, as a message from President Rhee to population. These four points, in English translation, are attached this memorandum as Attachment A.¹ Minister Kim had earlier asked Ambassador McConaughy if he would issue statement, on behalf of American Embassy, lending support to actions described four points, and urging population respect them and re-establish public order.

President Rhee observed that he had just come from meeting with group student representatives. He described them as being good young men who eager do right thing, and who simply want know truth. President Rhee had told them it only on evening April 25 that he had learned of illegal way in which March 15 election conducted. He further told them he will do whatever people want of him, and that he will thus serve people as had in past. He said he asked students tell him what they wanted him do and they had criticised elections. President Rhee told them he had decided elections must be corrected, and that he would accomplish this.

Minister Kim added that although President and Ministers had known of technique ‘group voting’ during March 15 elections, and had assumed there might be some minor irregularities, that none them could believe allegations complete corruption elections, which they now accepted as truth.

Ambassador McConaughy proceeded to examination four points earlier mentioned by Minister Kim (see Attachment A). In response variety questions put to him by Ambassador McConaughy, President Rhee responded substantially as follows:

A. With regard to point one, President Rhee said that he meant for people understand that ‘if I stand in your way, I will resign.’ Ambassador McConaughy asked pointedly how popular will [in] this case would be determined, as seemed him statement inconclusive. Explanations which ensued not fully clear, but firmly conveyed President Rhee’s determination respect sincerely desires Korean people.

B. Concerning point covering new elections, President Rhee said ‘as I have heard that elections unfair, I have decided hold re-election.’ Specific manner in which these new elections would be called, and when would be called, were points yet to be decided, but again gist conversation conveyed sincere resolution this step be announced and taken promptly. President Rhee interjected that in connection illegalities March 15 election, responsible and guilty persons would be found and punished.

C. With respect former Speaker Yi Ki-pung, President Rhee said he personally told Mr. Yi Ki-pung he was to resign all his posts, both governmental and party. This resignation would include his post as national assemblyman. President Rhee said Mr. Yi said he had done so and was without office. Minister Kim observed that some members of LP wanted Mr. Yi remain National Assembly, and retain his Liberal Party office, but that decisions reached and actions already taken preclude this, and Minister Kim reaffirmed President Rhee’s statement that Mr. Yi had in fact and effectively resigned all his offices.

D. Minister Kim responded Ambassador McConaughy’s questions concerning how fourth point would be put effect, by saying that by provisions constitution it would be up National Assembly modify law in order bring fourth point into effect. He pointed out that President’s recommendation would be in favor this revision, and that of course President’s recommendation would have great weight. Gist conversation this point was that constitution would be promptly amended, without any difficulty.

Ambassador McConaughy emphatically pointed out to President Rhee that he considered situation Seoul this day be highly dangerous and explosive and that situation definitely required clear and satisfying statements intent. He asked President Rhee if he thought these four points went far enough in direction people’s demands. President Rhee said ‘we doing all we can’ and Ambassador McConaughy repeated, in strongish terms, a great need for clear and understandable statement intent. He went on say that further equivocation and temporizing, he was convinced, would be dangerous in present situation. President responded by repeating that government doing all it could and by suggesting that implementation corrective actions be left them. Ambassador McConaughy then stated that not only were valid interests Korean people at stake, but fundamental American interests as well, and that we were concerned lest government’s actions not be adequate.

At this point Minister Kim interposed to state firmly that government completely sincere, and would definitely carry out actions above described. Also much needed he went on, was public statement by American Ambassador supporting actions outlined by government, and, to convince Korean people that it, the American Government, believes that Korean Government’s statements are sincere and will be carried out. He thought it of vital importance that name United States be invoked at this time to help restore order and allow these reforms be carried out. Ambassador McConaughy responded by saying that he would at once consider this request and would let Minister Kim know, but that he believed such statement could be made.

Ambassador McConaughy turned to President Rhee and eulogized him as true father Korean nation and man who had in lifetime been revered and respected as no other Korean. He said we indeed have viewed President Rhee as George Washington his country and wished, with sympathy and deep understanding to help him preserve his proper and honored place history. He said however that it happens in life that time comes when people believe that elder statesman, having carried so many burdens for so many years, should step away from his responsibilities, retire to position respect, and turn burdens government, especially in these complicated and difficult times, over to younger men. He said that in his opinion this time had come Korea. President Rhee replied by stating he deeply appreciated these expressions American concern, and he viewed them as representing America desire help Korea.

Ambassador McConaughy turned to ask if Minister Kim felt that President Rhee truly understood mood of population Seoul and mood people now in streets. President Rhee observed that in his younger days he certainly knew his people well and that even now felt himself certainly one of them. At this point Minister Kim interrupted to state he considered time be of great importance, and that United States statement (already referred above, see Attachment B)² be made at earliest opportunity, before bad elements and troublemakers begin influence population. He mentioned specifically name Yi Oh’ol-sung, Democratic Party National Assemblyman, who he felt be active in dangerous way.

At conclusion of conversation Ambassador McConaughy stated that it commonly felt that national police should not be involved in conduct new election, and that some statement should be made which would satisfy people concerning atmosphere within which new election would be held, pointing out that it must be completely fair.

President Rhee responded specifically this point by saying he had already announced that new election would be held fairly, and he repeated that he had been deeply shaken to learn of frauds and illegalities March 15 election. He expressed hope that United States press would be careful in its reporting situation Korea, in view its explosive character. At this point group rose and made its good-byes, leaving Presidential mansion at 11:27 a.m.”³

For Attachments A and B see Embtel Circular 1 and Embtel Circular 3 respectively.

McConaughy

0. Source: Department of state, Central Files, 795B.00/4-2660. Confidential; Priority. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC.
1. Not found attached, but see footnote 2, Document 308.

2. Not found attached. Attachment B was Circular 3 from Seoul, April 26, which transmitted the text of the statement issued to the press by McConaughy after his meeting with President Rhee. The text of the statement reads as follow:

   “This is a day that will long be remembered by the Republic of Korea and its many friends abroad. I am convinced that the authorities are earnestly working toward redressing the justifiable grievances of the people.

   “Therefore trust that the people will show respect for law and authority and return quickly to their useful tasks and daily work, directed toward promoting the process, stability and security of this great nation. This is the way to honor this day.

   “America continues its full support of the Republic of Korea.” (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–2660)

3. In telegram 988 from Seoul, April 26, McConaughy analyzed his conversation that morning with Rhee. He noted that the President’s demeanor throughout was friendly and calm, he did not appear overwrought or unusually tired, he was attentive but rather detached. “I had distinct impression he may not yet have grasped significance of day’s events nor implications for his own position of actions which he promised take with every evidence of complete sincerity.” McConaughy also had the impression that Defense Minister Kim may have played a prime role in drafting and getting President Rhee to agree to the four-point program announced earlier in the day. He noted that Kim was at Rhee’s side throughout the conversation prompting him when necessary, and elaborating or clarifying points on which the President was vague. (ibid.) See Supplement.