Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea⁰

Washington, April 19, 1960, 5:14 p.m.

848. Your 872.¹ Secretary calling in Ambassador Yang 4:30 p.m., Washington time April 19 and will deliver to him Aide-Mémoire text of which follows:

“The United States Government is most seriously concerned at (a) numerous unprejudiced reports of the undemocratic manner in which the March 15 elections and preparations therefor were carried out, and with (b) the resulting aftermath of riots and acts of violence in which a number of deaths have occurred.

Although these matters are of primary concern to the Government of the Republic of Korea, this Government feels itself obliged to take cognizance of them as the principal sponsor of the Republic of Korea as an applicant for United Nations membership and because, in the eyes of the world, the United States is associated with Korea as a close friend and ally. The United States believes that the demonstrations are a reflection of popular anger and that the current situation, if not corrected so as to restore public confidence, could easily provide a fertile ground for Communist manipulation.

The United States Government also feels obliged to take cognizance of these matters in view of its responsibilities toward maintaining security in Korea and the western Pacific area generally. The stability and security of the Republic of Korea likewise appear to have been compromised through involvement of the police and military in politics. This could seriously detract from their efficiency, alienate the public from law enforcement agencies, and contribute to an atmosphere exploitable by the Communists.

This Government considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the Republic of Korea to the seriousness of the international repercussions which must be anticipated, and many of which have already been manifested, as a result of the conduct of the March 15 elections and the subsequent riots and acts of violence. Among these are:

(a) a loss of Republic of Korea prestige in the Free World community;

(b) an increased difficulty in maintaining Free World support for the admission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations and for the annual resolution presented to the United Nations General Assembly dealing with the reunification of Korea;

(c) an increased opportunity for the Communists to exploit evident dissension within the Republic of Korea and to portray the Republic of Korea to Koreans throughout the peninsula and abroad as a totalitarian state;

(d) a diminution of Republic of Korea prestige in the minds of the United States public and Congress;

(e) the expectation that the Department will be questioned closely by elements of the American public and Congress as to the propriety of the President visiting the Republic of Korea this summer.

The United States Government, therefore, believes that the interests of Korea will be served if the Government of the Republic of Korea takes action to counteract effectively the adverse developments noted above. The United States Government is convinced that such action should be aimed at restoring confidence in the intention of the Government of the Republic of Korea to protect democratic rights of freedom of speech, of assembly, and of the press; to preserve the secrecy of the ballot; and to prevent unfair discrimination against political opponents of a party in power. This Government does not consider that martial law provides a solution to the present situation in Korea. There are, however, certain actions which this Government believes the Government of the Republic of Korea might well consider taking:

(a) in view of the allegations of the partisan nature of the actions taken by the Government of the Republic of Korea over the course of the last year or so in preparation for the recent elections, it is important that the Government of the Republic of Korea take actions, such as those following, which would serve to counter these allegations and renew the people’s confidence in the fact that the Government of the Republic of Korea genuinely endorses a democratic two-party system:

(1) a thorough examination of complaints of election irregularities and removal of public and party officials responsible for election irregularities;

(2) an examination of election laws by a special bi-partisan commission with a view to their amendment so as to render as difficult as possible abuse of the electoral process;

(3) the reopening of Kyonghyang Sinmun;

(4) repeal of the amendments to the Local Autonomy Law adopted December 24, 1958;

(5) repeal of the controversial articles of the National Security Law adopted December 24, 1958;

(b) In order that the Korean people may be given the opportunity to express their free will through genuinely secret elections, the following actions would serve to restore the confidence of the Korean people and cope with the rapidly mounting dissatisfaction and resentment which is being manifested more and more openly as time passes:

(1) the establishment of the House of Councillors in accordance with Article 32 of the Republic of Korea Constitution, which provides for the election of its members by secret, universal, equal and direct vote.

(2) the immediate issuance of a statement by the Government of the Republic of Korea that it will take actions designed to restore the people’s confidence in the Government and ensure the return to full democratic processes.”

As foregoing indicates, Department increasingly of view that continuation of present trends will lead ROK into spiral of repression and violence with ultitimate extreme vulnerability to Communist action both overt from north and covert by effective infiltration of disaffected areas. Important that Rhee should not misinterpret our approach as attack on him in support of his opponents. Its simple purpose is to encourage return to methods tolerable by people and hence productive of strength and progress for ROK.

Ambassador should seek appointment with President Rhee as soon as possible after Secretary delivers Aide-Mémoire Yang and deliver to him identical Aide-Mémoire. You should also undertake see responsible Korean leaders such as Minister of Finance Song, Minister of Defense Kim, Minister of Reconstruction Sin, Minister of Commerce Kim, Kim Dong Jo, etc., as well as key responsible military leaders in order inform them our most serious concern and substance our approach ROKG as reflected Aide-Mémoire.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–1860. Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Lane and cleared by Bane, Parsons, and Herter.
1. In telegram 872 from Seoul, April 18, the Embassy proposed several revisions in the aide-mémoire that the Department instructed the Ambassador to present to President Rhee to express U.S. concern over the impact of the March 15 elections. (ibid.) The text of that aide-mémoire was transmitted to Seoul in telegram 840, April 15, and was similar but not as pointed or urgent as the revised aide-mémoire transmitted on April 19 in telegram 848. (Ibid., 795B.00/4–1560) See Supplement. The initial aide-mémoire was overtaken by the events of April 19 before it could be delivered. In telegram 879 from Seoul, sent at 4 p.m. April 19, McConaughy urged that the Secretary call in Ambassador Yang and deliver a note based upon the proposed aide-mémoire. At that point, with Seoul “in uproar” and several buildings in flames, the Ambassador did not know when he would get a chance to deliver a similar note to President Rhee. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–1960) See Supplement.