Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

300. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, April 19, 1960, midnight.

890. CINCPAC for POLAD. I saw President tonight at my urgent request.¹ Defense Minister Kim and Home Minister Hong only others present. Interview lasted 50 minutes.

President tired, somewhat nervous and shocked by crisis but mind functioning as well as usual. When I opened by expressing my sorrow at tragic events of today he agreed but his following remarks confirmed he is substantially out of touch with realities of present situation and wrong in his assessment of causes, nature and probable consequences of uprisings. He assured me that troubles fomented by small group masterminded by subversives and disorder had now been thoroughly scotched by firm measures taken this afternoon with no likelihood recurrence. When I expressed disagreement and outlined evidence that manifestations were spontaneous upwelling of deeply held feelings of large group representative Korean people, he voiced his certainty that people were not alienated from him and that he had done right thing in approving drastic action to control mobs when situation got out of hand. He condemned Vice President Chang Myon in bitter terms, along with secondary DP leaders, as fomenters and abettors of uprising. He refrained from calling them subversives but indicated they were perhaps unwittingly in league with unidentified subversive ringleaders who had planned entire movement. President said he was grieved over death of students killed today but had no idea of numbers involved until I gave him Embassy estimate based on late canvass of hospitals and newspapers of probably 21 dead and at least 27 critically wounded.

Ministers pointed to destruction of anti-Communist center, destruction of 2 newspaper buildings, attacks on two broadcasting stations and strong mob action directed at presidential palace and Home Ministry as evidence Communist direction.

My objectives were (1) prevent bloodshed incident to troops taking over administration of martial law in Seoul tonight, (2) dissuade President from taking punitive action against leaders Democratic Party and any drastic punishment of student demonstrators, (3) convince him of authentic nature of protest by people and necessity for taking positive action to meet in some measure their complaints, (4) demonstrate that Communist participation not now present but real danger of Communist exploitation of current situation which still explosive, if prompt remedial action not taken, (5) remind him of our UNC responsibility, which gave US vital interest in maintenance of secure and stable operating base, which now jeopardized, and (6) bring him to accept undoubted fact that widespread and gross frauds and police coercion in March 15 election is principal source of people’s disaffection. I broached all these subjects in most restrained and conciliatory nature I could consonant with nature of representations. I believe I had some limited measure of success in making President at least temporarily aware of depth of challenge and the consequent threat to his government and the country. He professed ignorance of election fraud allegations saying he could not believe that his trusted Ministers such as Hong and Kim could have lied to him or concealed such a bad situation from him. I was able to get limited admissions from Kim and Hong that appreciable election irregularities had occurred. This seemed visibly to shake the President although they assured him that in their view frauds were not so bad as to have affected the outcome of the election. Hong, by stating that at least theoretical possibility existed that Supreme Court could declare election null and void, gave me opening to tell President that in my view any official action setting aside the election and calling for new election for President would do more to relieve immediate situation than anything else.

I urged President to issue personally recorded broadcast message to Korean people which would restore confidence in him by his expressing regret at recent occurrences, sympathy with legitimate aspirations of people and assurance that government would seek to redress rightful grievances. President said he would consider recommendation.²

President said he had affection for students and would not want to see them shot. President, Kim and Hong all expressed confidence that 15th ROK Division moving in tonight could and would control situation without resort to firearms. Kim assured me that officers were trained and instructed to go to greatest lengths to control situation without shooting. President said he recognized inadvisability of taking action against DP leaders or ordinary demonstrators and gave me grounds for hope that government will show moderation in these respects.

I told President I had instructions from Washington which referred to our deep concern at some of the basic issues which required attention, but would defer a meeting with him on this fundamental subject in view of the lateness of the hour and his preoccupation with the crisis. He thanked me, said he wanted to talk with me again on the subject and indicated he was glad I had come. I believe I retained his confidence and good will.

On balance I think visit did some good at least in that it had limited informational and warning effect on President, put Cabinet on defensive as to election practices, highlighted our immediate concern from security standpoint and possibly influenced government to show some moderation and restraint in dealing with immediate aftermath of today’s events. However, I saw no evidence of recognition of basic issues or any disposition or capability to come up with answers to them.³

McConaughy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–1960. Secret; Niact. Repeated to CINCPAC.
1. Before calling on President Rhee, McConaughy released, on his own authority, a statement to the press in which he noted that the Embassy deplored any resort to violence and hoped that both demonstrators and authorities would consider the consequences of their actions “with a view to the immediate restoration of law and order and a settlement of justifiable grievances toward which the demonstrations are directed.” (Telegram 880 from Seoul, April 19; ibid.) McConaughy read the text of the press release to Defense Minister Kim and obtained his assent to its publication and broadcast by radio. McConaughy also told Kim that he could not emphasize too strongly the need for control measures that did not involve bloodshed and the need for immediate action to redress the justifiable grievances of the demonstrators. (Telegram 882 from Seoul, April 19; ibid.) See Supplement.
2. On April 20 President Rhee issued a statement in which he noted that the previous day’s demonstrations had been a shock to him. It was too soon, he felt, to discuss causes or to fix blame. Rather, he called for a restoration of order and promised that those who were guilty would be punished and those with legitimate grievances could be certain of redress. (Telegram 910 from Seoul, April 20; Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–2060)
3. In response to inquiries from the press following his meeting with Rhee, McConaughy issued a statement that reads, in part: “The Ambassador called to review developments and to express his concern that the measures adopted to maintain law and order would take into account the basic causes and grievances behind the disorders. He expressed hope that every effort would be made to avoid further casualties.” (Telegram 891 from Seoul, April 19; ibid., 795B.00/4–1960)