288. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Steeves) to Secretary of State Herter0
SUBJECT
- 1960 Presidential Elections in the Republic of Korea
March 15 will be the fourth presidential election to be held in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Since the demise of the opposition Democratic Party’s presidential candidate, Dr. Cho Pyong-ok, on February 15,1 President Rhee is unopposed, needing only 1/3 of the total vote cast to be elected to his fourth term in office. The primary contest is consequently for the office of vice president; the present Democratic incumbent Chang Myon is opposed to the Liberal Party’s candidate, and President Rhee’s protegé, Speaker Yi Ki-pung.
The Liberal Party is sparing no effort to ensure the election of Speaker Yi, as well as President Rhee. The violent passage of the National Security law on December 24, 1958; the closing of the leading opposition daily, the Kyonghyang Sinmun; the execution of the Progressive Party leader Cho Bong-am; and the steady tightening at every level of the administration’s governmental and political control are all indications of the direction in which the Liberal Party is moving. At the same time, activities have been undertaken to solicit the military vote for the Liberal Party, including the formulation by the ROKCIC of a detailed operational plan to influence the military vote in favor of the Liberal Party.
Over the past half year several re-elections were held for National Assembly seats which had been invalidated by the Supreme Court because of irregularities in the 1958 elections. In all of these elections the Liberal Party won by ever-increasing majorities. Our Embassy has affirmed that the most recent re-elections were marked by the application of intensive pressures by the government, Liberal Party and the Korean Anti-Communist Youth Corps. Special plain clothes police were [Page 601] brought into the districts and governmental officials, including school teachers and village chiefs, actively canvassed for Liberal Party nominees. On election day the majority of the voters wore Liberal Party arm bands and cast ballots by teams. Whole villages voted at specific times and many voters cast open ballots (showing of marked ballots to election officials or the voting team). The Embassy commented that these tactics may represent “outstanding successful dress rehearsals for the 1960 attempt to win huge majorities and thus overwhelm [expected]2 Democratic Party urban majorities”.
There is little doubt that the Rhee Administration’s decision to hold the elections earlier than usual on March 15 was a political move to capitalize on the Liberal Party’s advance preparations and to take advantage of the disorganization in the faction-ridden opposition party. Moreover, this move was taken after the announcement of the departure for medical treatment of the opposition party’s candidate, although it appears that this move may have been decided some time before Dr. Cho’s illness became known.
During the past two weeks further evidence of the Liberal Party’s determination to secure victory for its candidates has developed. In addition to requiring students to attend school last Sunday during a Democratic Party rally in a major city, the National Police were apparently employed to post pictures of Chang Myon smearing him as a former Japanese collaborator. A tour of the two southern provinces by Embassy officers March 1–6 led Embassy Seoul to conclude that, on the basis of observations made on this trip, it is apparent that the opposition is not being given a fair chance to compete in the campaign in which the Liberal Party and Rhee Administration are making every effort to determine the outcome in advance of the actual voting.3
On March 1 the Democratic Party publicly disclosed that it had uncovered details of Liberal Party plans to perpetrate massive election frauds. The target was to obtain 85 percent of the vote for the Liberal Party. According to this report, methods to be used included stuffing of the ballot boxes, double votes by government supporters, open voting, barring of many known opposition supporters from the polls, restriction of the activities of opposition election committee representatives and observers, and mobilization of the Korean Anti-Communist Youth Corps. Although these charges were denied by the Home Minister, a U.S. Eighth Army G2 report4 intimates that the information may be authentic. Considering the past record of the Rhee Administration, it is [Page 602] indeed quite probable that there is a large element of truth in these charges.
We understand that most of the major wire services and many leading journals will send reporters to cover the elections. At the same time the Embassy is planning a comprehensive observation of the campaign and election day activities. UNCURK, which has received ROK Government assurances of cooperation, plans to send out five observation teams during the final days of the campaign and the British and French Embassies may also participate on a very limited basis. We are under no illusions, however, that such participation of outside observers will have any inhibiting effect whatever on the determination of the Rhee Administration and the Liberal Party to let nothing stand in the way of a landslide victory at the polls. Previous intimations to President Rhee and Liberal Party officials by Congressmen and other United States officials concerning prevailing undemocratic practices have not had any tangible deterring effect. It does not appear that the United States can take further steps to prevent further abuse of democratic processes in Korea without doing violence to our own principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of foreign sovereign states.
Conclusions: Given the present evidence, it would appear that the March 15 elections will have at least the following effects: (1) a serious setback to the operation of democratic institutions and processes in the ROK, involving the mass frustration of the opposition minority party to an extent that the two-party system (essentially in effect for the past few years) may be seriously undermined, (2) a further deterioration in the international standing of the ROK, which will be particularly reflected in the United Nations, (3) a decrease in the support afforded the ROK by the Congress, particularly in connection with the economic aid program, and (4) a compounding of the Department’s problems in dealing with the Rhee Government, which, by reason of the increased concentration of power in its hands, may be expected to become still more intransigent on questions which, in President Rhee’s view, affect essential interests of the ROK.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/3–1060. Confidential. Drafted by Klemstine on March 8 and cleared by Peterson. Copies were also sent to M for Merchant, to H and IO. Parsons was in Manila for an Asian Chiefs of Mission conference.↩
- On January 22, Cho Pyong-ok announced that he had decided to go to the United States for diagnosis and possible treatment of an unspecified illness. (Telegram 551 from Seoul, January 27; ibid., 795B.00/1–2760) A preliminary examination of Cho by surgeons attached to the U.S. Army in Korea indicated an advanced condition of stomach cancer. (Telegram 523 from Seoul, January 19; ibid., 795B.00/1–1960) Cho was admitted to Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C., where he underwent surgery and subsequently died on February 15. (Telegram 575 to Seoul, February 15; ibid., 895B.41/2–1560)↩
- Brackets in the source text.↩
- Telegram 695 from Seoul, March 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/3–760)↩
- Not found.↩