286. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin)0
Dear Jack: In the last few months, discussions have been held by members of your staff and mine in the course of which we have been asked to express our views on the question of the provision of dual-capable weapons to the Republic of Korea (ROK.) I have been informed [Page 597] that some time ago CINCPAC proposed the transfer to the ROK Army of one Nike-Hercules battalion, but that the Department of Defense subsequently withdrew this proposal from the FY 1960 MAP for Korea because of fund limitations. Nevertheless, members of your staff have requested an expression of this Department’s views on the subject of transferring certain dual-capable weapons to the ROK armed forces in anticipation, when budgetary conditions permit, of providing such weapons as the Nike-Hercules and Hawk to the ROK Army.
As you know, the current FY 1961 MAP for Korea includes the programming of one Nike-Hercules and one Hawk battalion to the ROK Army and we have given our general agreement to the overall program, reserving our decision regarding the inclusion of such new weapons pending complete justification by the Department of Defense.
We fully appreciate the seriousness of the air threat from north Korea in view of the current estimate indicating a four or five to one superiority of the north Korean air force over that of the ROK, and we agree that there is a genuine need to provide the ROK with the Nike-Hercules and Hawk systems in order to strengthen its air defense. We feel strongly that the ROK military establishment must be maintained as a conventional force and that it should be understood that the provision of these weapons constitutes nothing more than the equipping of the ROK with more modern and powerful, but conventional, weapons. In our view, a conventional capability is highly important from the stand-point of a time-phased reaction to a Communist probe. As was demonstrated at Quemoy, tranquilization can be achieved by a graduated conventional response which may be stepped up until the degree of risk for the Communist aggressor becomes greater than that which he was prepared to accept. If we were to lack conventional strength, our choice of withdrawal in the face of Communist attack or resort to nuclear retaliation must be faced at once, without the advantage of time in which graduated military plus diplomatic and psychological measures could prove effective. Thus, there should be no question but that the Nike-Hercules and Hawk would be provided as defensive, non-nuclear weapons. We, of course, presume that if the Communists should mount an attack from outside the Korean peninsula utilizing non-Korean forces, the ROK could not long survive without massive assistance from our own forces.
Well before the subject of these weapons is broached with the ROK, we consider it incumbent upon us to consult with the “Sixteen”, starting first with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth members. In 1957 and in 1958 we assured several of the “Sixteen” that we did not intend to provide the ROK with dual-capable weapons. Moreover, we so informed the United Kingdom in writing at its request. All of the “Sixteen” have a deep interest and vital concern in what we do in the military [Page 598] field in Korea and it is certainly in our best interests to maintain the maximum international support for our policies in Korea and to do our utmost to avoid any reduction in participation in the United Nations Command. We believe that the concern of the United Kingdom and others of the “Sixteen” stems, in large part at least, from the fear that by providing such weapons we would actually be undertaking to convert the ROK armed forces into a nuclear-equipped establishment. This, of course, is a mistaken idea and we would wish to make this point to them at the appropriate time.
We are also convinced that it is imperative for us to avoid any premature disclosure of our internal planning for the provision of these weapons to the ROK–not only in regard to public statements but also in regard to any intimation to Korean officials. This position is dictated by a desire not to allow the present Korean administration, by premature knowledge and publicity, (1) to use such a step on our part for its own domestic political purposes in connection with the forthcoming Korean presidential election, (2) to arouse fears among the “Sixteen” that we might be in effect encouraging President Rhee’s military ambitions or converting the Korean military establishment to a nuclear force, or (3) to assume a more threatening posture vis-à-vis Japan and thus play into the hands of the left wing in Japan in a crucial period prior to the ratification of the revised United States-Japan Security Treaty. Our concern about any disclosure is, of course, temporary, inasmuch as the consultations with the “Sixteen”, the ratification of the new United States-Japan Security Treaty and the next Korean presidential election should all be completed by the end of next spring. Thereafter, we would naturally assume that the necessary confidential discussions with ROK officials could begin in order to implement this program–assuming funds have been made available.
I would appreciate your reaction to the points I have made, and I know that you will keep me informed as your planning regarding this matter develops.
With best personal regards,
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5–MSP/12–1559. Secret. Drafted on December 1 by Lane and Manhard and cleared by Steeves, Weiss, and Merchant. A note from Edward T. Long in G to Assistant Secretary Gerard C. Smith in S/P was attached to the source text and indicates that Merchant initialed the letter but wanted Smith to see it before it went to Dillon. Smith initialed the note, indicating his clearance. There is no indication on the source text that the letter was cleared by Dillon.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩