Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

273. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Acting Secretary of State Dillon⁰

Washington, May 12, 1959.

SUBJECT

• NSC Consideration of OCB Report on Korea¹ (NSC 5817)² on May 13

The OCB in its Report on Korea (a copy of which is attached),³ although noting that a full revision of NSC 5817 is not required at this time, recommends that the NSC review that document with particular attention to paragraphs 2d, 9 and 10 and provide policy guidance for the period beginning July 1, 1959 on the level of United States forces to be retained in Korea and on the level of Republic of Korea (ROK) armed forces. We understand informally that Defense has not yet reached a firm position on any changes it may wish to recommend regarding basic United States policy toward Korea as reflected in NSC 5817. The following are the general views we will wish to express at such time as the NSC undertakes its review of our basic policy on Korea:

1. Paragraph 2d of NSC 5817 defines the current United States objective of maintaining the combat readiness of ROK armed forces vis-à-vis the threat of Communist aggression. The paragraph should be amended to take into account the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces, accepted as having been completed last October. In addition, paragraph 6 of the OCB Report on Korea indicates the possibility that the combat readiness of ROK armed forces may not be at the level envisaged by paragraph 2d of NSC 5817. For example, paragraph 2d calls for maintaining ROK forces capable of assuring internal security and, together with United States forces in Korea, capable of deterring or successfully resisting aggression from the North Korean forces alone. Paragraph 6 of the OCB Report, however, indicates that a lack of logistical backup and worn-out condition of much of the ROK equipment would preclude a sustained defense by those forces against an attack from north Korean forces alone without prompt additional logistical and air support. We recommend that paragraph 2d be retained in its present form (with the one change indicated to take into account the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces) with a view to retaining the objectives to be attained by Defense in further developing and strengthening the ROK armed forces. FYI. We understand informally that at an appropriate future moment Defense may suggest that paragraph 2d of NSC 5817 be revised to define objectives reflecting the combat readiness of ROK armed forces that our military has actually been able to develop. End FYI.

2. Paragraph 9 of NSC 5817 sets forth policy guidance on the continued deployment of a minimum of two United States infantry divisions and an air unit to Korea through the period FY 1959. We believe that this policy guidance should be continued through the period FY1960. With further reference to paragraph 9, we believe that the policy should be continued of replacing equipment of United States forces in Korea, including planes, with improved models of such equipment as and when required for military reasons, and equipping United States forces in Korea with modern weapons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

3. Paragraph 10 of NSC 5817 gives policy guidance with respect to ROK forces through CY 1959 and provides for the negotiations with the ROK for a reduction of ROK forces to an over-all authorized and actual ceiling of 630,000. This paragraph should be revised to reflect the successful termination of these negotiations last November. It is also recommended that this policy be updated to provide for assistance in supporting ROK forces up to the personnel strength of 630,000 through CY 1960. The paragraph also calls for the planning during FY 1959 for gradual further reduction in the ROK Army forces as soon as practical, taking into account the international and enemy situation, the effect of the initial reductions (which have already been effected), the effect on the ROK economy, the modernization of United States forces in Korea, and the over-all level of United States military assistance programs world-wide. We believe that we cannot now afford a further reduction in ROK force levels and that any planning for further reductions must be undertaken with great care. This section of paragraph 10 should be updated to provide policy guidance through FY 1960. We concur that military assistance should be continued to the ROK to carry out the military programs and objectives envisaged in NSC 5817.

4. Paragraph 24 of NSC 5817 provides for the actions the United States should consider in the event ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally with the Communists. We believe that this paragraph should be rewritten to provide that, even though we would consider applying the sanctions indicated in the event the ROK should unilaterally renew hostilities, we would inform the Communists of our intention to maintain the territorial integrity of the ROK since we could ill afford either militarily or politically to lose our single toehold on the Asian mainland.

The Report, in evaluating progress since June 25, 1958, concludes that no tangible progress has been made toward the unification of Korea; that friction between the two major parties has resulted from controversial legislation passed last December; that in the event of President Rhee’s death or incapacitation it is less clear that succession could be effected with a minimum of incidents and confusion; that, although production rose significantly in 1958, there was a drop in Korean exports and renewed inflationary tendencies; that ROK-Japanese relations have deteriorated; that renewed aggression from the north would require prompt United States military support; that negotiations were successfully concluded for the reduction of ROK Army forces; that the Communists have continued to endeavor to achieve their purposes through propaganda and subversion; and that the longstanding problem of resolution of the differing views on responsibility for the administration of United States programs in the ROK has now been settled.

The OCB Report was appropriately cleared within the Department and by other interested agencies.

Recommendation:⁴

That the NSC note the OCB Report on Korea and that, if called upon to do so, you express to the NSC the foregoing views regarding future policy guidance.

0. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5907 Series. Secret. Drafted by Lane and cleared by J. Graham Parsons.
1. Dated April 29. (Ibid., NSC 5817) See Supplement.
2. Document 237.
3. Not found attached.
4. There is no indication on the source text that Dillon approved or disapproved the recommendation.