254. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)0
SUBJECT
- Korean Revised National Security Law
We have received a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report (Tab A)1 reporting President Rhee’s reaction to Ambassador Yang’s report on his meeting with you on December 5.2 At that meeting you expressed to the Ambassador our concern over the effects on Korea’s international position of the current controversy over the proposed revision of the National Security Law and particularly over certain provisions of the Law affecting freedom of the press and political activities.
President Rhee was angered at what he termed U.S. intervention in ROK internal affairs (your comments to Ambassador Yang). President Rhee accused the U.S. of infringing on ROK sovereignty and of trying to bring about his removal from power. In this connection, he criticized the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, which he claimed favored the opposition Democratic Party. He likened the situation to that in Pusan in 1952. Regardless of U.S. policy, the President reportedly stated, the ROK intended to fight the Communists and he intimated that anti-American demonstrations might result should the U.S. persist in its views. He strongly criticized [Page 516] the Democratic Party, which he said was becoming a tool of the Communists and implied, in referring to “abuse” of press freedom, that opposition papers would be closed if they persisted in “following the Communist line”.
Ambassador Dowling has also reported on a conversation he had with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance and Justice on December 8 (Tab B).3 The Justice Minister claimed the U.S. failed to understand the purpose of the revised National Security Law. The Government, he said, had no intent to suppress press or political opposition but there was a need to get at charges against the Government which hurt the national interest. (A few days earlier the Minister of Justice had told Embassy officers on a highly confidential basis that the controversial provision of the proposed law was written by Liberal Party members who had suppression of the press and of the opposition in mind.) Ambassador Dowling responded by giving the substance of the telegram reporting on your December 5 conversation with Ambassador Yang. The Foreign Minister then said that Ambassador Yang had reported his conversation with you and argued that there was no other way to stop criticism by the press and the opposition except by the suppressive provisions in the proposed law, such as Article 17 paragraph 5. He also argued that the ROK public is immature and needed curbing. Koreans, he continued, were too active politically.
Subsequently, however, the Foreign Minister intimated that the Liberal Party was considering rewording of Article 17, paragraph 5, at least, and perhaps other improvements in the language of the proposed law. The Embassy also reported that the Democratic Party had rejected tentative Liberal Party proposals advanced informally but had left the way open for further discussion. Despite President Rhee’s reaction, therefore, there may be a possibility a compromise will be worked out by the Liberals and Democrats.
A report on an interview with President Rhee carried by CBS radio on December 11, 1958 indicated that the President had justified the need for the revised National Security Law on the grounds there was an invasion of Communist subversive agents and a danger of war. He accused Democratic Party leader Cho Pyong-ok of, in effect, playing into the hands of the Communists in opposing the law. Cho is obviously in trouble as a result of his strong criticism of the National Security Law and his recent statement supporting UN supervised elections throughout Korea for unification. According to the CBS broadcast, President Rhee clearly rejected elections on any basis other than in the north alone. [Page 517] It is possible that President Rhee’s strong feelings against Cho Pyong-ok and the Democratic Party will lead to actions against Cho, at least, and in fact there has apparently been some talk within the Liberal Party of prosecuting Cho and even seeking to have him deported from the ROK. It is quite clear by now that the purpose of strengthening the National Security Law by passing a revised version is to use its provisions against the press and the Democratic Party.
These tactics indicate strongly the possibility of a repetition of the 1952 crisis, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] At the time of the 1952 crisis, the ROK constitution provided for the election of the President by the National Assembly. Faced with a hostile, opposition Assembly, President Rhee charged that there was a subversive plot to have Chang Myon elected President, who would then form a coalition government and one willing to deal with the north Korean regime to end the hostilities and unify Korea. Martial law was declared, Assemblymen arrested and political turmoil resulted. Despite our efforts to exert a moderating influence (including, I believe, letters from President Truman to President Rhee on the matter) and the efforts of the Australian UNCURK representative (who was very close to President Rhee), President Rhee succeeded in forcing the National Assembly to amend the constitution through authoritarian action so that the President would be chosen through popular elections.
There is still considerable resentment among opposition and independent Koreans against the U.S. for not intervening in the 1952 crisis and for failing to insist on the application of constitutional and democratic processes. At the time, however, the decision was made at a high level within the U.S. Government not to interfere with the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, President Rhee felt at that time, and apparently he still does, that many officials of the U.S. Government opposed him and the tactics he followed.
As a final point, we have learned on a highly classified basis that President Rhee has instructed that a letter be written protesting your démarche to Ambassador Yang.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.34/12–1058. Secret. Drafted by Barbis and approved by Lane and Bane.↩
- Not found attached.↩
- See Document 253.↩
- Telegram 246 from Seoul, December 10; not found attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.34/12–1058) See Supplement.↩