Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

25. Report Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁰

JCS 2180/120

Washington, September 10, 1958.

SECURITY TREATY–JAPAN

[Here follow paragraphs 1–4; see Supplement.]

Conclusions

5. The changes to the present treaty which are acceptable are listed in Appendix “A” to Enclosure “A” hereto.

6. The considerations listed in Appendix “B” to Enclosure “A” hereto are considered essential for inclusion within a renegotiated treaty and administrative agreement.

7. The position of Defense as regards the alternatives of (1) maintenance of the present treaty, (2) changes within the present treaty, and (3) negotiation of a new treaty, should be to advocate the second of these three alternatives.

8. There are other considerations and details which should be studied further prior to determining a final United States negotiating position.

Recommendations¹

9. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Approve the above conclusions.

b. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure “A”, together with its Appendices, hereto, which reflects the above conclusions, to the Secretary of Defense.

10. It is recommended that a copy of this paper be forwarded to CINCPAC.

Enclosure “A”²

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT

• Security Treaty–Japan

1. In response to a memorandum³ by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the above subject, dated 8 August 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the three problems which you noted therein. They agree that possible changes to the present treaty, which are listed in Appendix “A” hereto, are acceptable. Further, they agree that the considerations which are listed in Appendix “B” hereto are essential for inclusion within a renegotiated treaty and administrative agreement, should that course of action be adopted. It is their opinion, however, that it should be the position of Defense to advocate making changes within the present treaty, if possible through the medium of an exchange of notes between the governments of the United States and Japan, not requiring Congressional ratification. Although the above represents the preferred position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this matter, there are no overriding military objections to negotiation of a new treaty if political considerations so dictate and an adequate quid pro quo can be obtained for the concession.

2. Two issues of most critical importance to the Japanese and which are likely to be brought up by Mr. Fujiyama are: (a) use and disposition of U.S. forces, and (b) introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

a. With regard to the former, the United States can accept an agreement to consult with Japan before operational employment of U.S. forces based in or operating from Japan, as well as the provision that any operational employment of these forces will be consistent with the principles of the United Nations Charter;⁴ however, there must be no obligation, implied or explicit, to grant Japan a veto power over the employment of U.S. forces.

b. With regard to introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan, including visits of U.S. ships with nuclear armaments there is virtually no prospect of a solution which will satisfy both sides. The “atom bomb” in any context still remains in Japan a matter of the utmost emotional intensity. Until such time as this feeling moderates to manageable proportions it would be altogether unrealistic to expect to obtain Japanese agreement for the introduction of nuclear components into Japan, although this remains a highly desirable military objective toward which to work. It therefore appears advisable now to seek to maintain the status quo with respect to weapons in Japan.

3. While the points listed in Appendices “A” and “B” are basic to any discussions to be held with the Japanese on this subject, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this is a matter of such far-reaching implications involving so many other, though possibly less vital, considerations that opportunity should be provided for more definite study. They recommend, therefore, that in the forthcoming informal meetings with Mr. Fujiyama he be advised only of the U.S. position as regards the manner of changing the treaty provisions, and that no further details of the changes acceptable to the United States or minimum U.S. requirements be provided him at this time.

Appendix “A” to Enclosure “A”⁵

ACCEPTABLE CHANGES TO PRESENT U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY⁶

1. Revision of the preamble to imply greater mutuality and equality.

2. Revision of Article II to eliminate the requirement for U.S. consent before making certain agreements with third nations and to substitute prior consultation with the United States in such cases. An alternate acceptable revision to this article would be an undertaking on Japan’s part not to contract agreements with third nations which are in conflict with the treaty. This determination would itself require agreement of the parties to the treaty.

3. Provisions for a treaty expiration date at the end of a specified number of years, and then only if one of the parties submits notice of intent to terminate a stated time in advance.

4. Recognition that the treaty is consistent with principles of the U.N. Charter,⁶ provided that the form of this recognition is consistent with the exchange of notes on this subject, dated 14 September 1957.⁷

5. Guarantee of Japanese-U.S. consultation in the event of any threat to peace in the Northeast Asia area.

6. Guarantee that the United States and Japan recognize that an armed attack directed against the territories or areas under the administrative control of the other party would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and that both parties would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

7. Elimination of the current provision for the possible use of U.S. forces to quell internal disorder.

Appendix “B” to Enclosure “A”

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS WHICH MUST BE INCLUDED WITHIN A RENEGOTIATED TREATY AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT

1. Authority for the continued presence of all U.S. military personnel and operation of all U.S. military establishments currently in Japan, with the understanding that the United States may withdraw forces at its discretion and will do so generally in response to the attainment of substantially increased defensive capabilities by the Japanese.

2. Agreement that rights and privileges contained in the current Administrative Agreement⁸ shall remain unimpaired. (If it is agreed that the present Security Treaty should be modified, rather than that a new treaty should be negotiated, there should be no need to alter the Administrative Agreement.)

3. Agreement that U.S. forces and U.S. facilities in Japan may be used in the event of Communist aggression directed against another free Asian nation wherein Japan’s safety is threatened, or in the event of U.N.-sponsored military action. This would require a declared understanding on the part of Japan that she considers any Communist aggression against free Asia as a threat to Japan, and such a declaration should be enjoined.

[Here follow Enclosure B, “Facts Bearing on the Problem,” and Enclosure C, “Discussion.” Both are in the Supplement.]

0. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS .092 Japan (12–12–50). Secret. The report is an attachment to a note of September 10 by H.L. Hillyard, Secretary to the JCS.
1. A covering note indicates that after making amendments, the JCS approved these recommendations on September 10. The JCS directed that copies of the amended pages be inserted in the text and that the old pages be destroyed. The text printed here is as revised September 10.
2. Secret.
3. Enclosure to J.C.S. 2180/118. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. On file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Secret.
6. On file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. On file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Interpretation of the Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement as They Relate to the United Nations Charter, an Understanding effected by an exchange of notes, signed at Tokyo September 14, 1957, and entered into force the same day. For text, see 8 UST (pt. 2) 1571.
8. On file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text.]