Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

236. Memorandum of Discussion at the 375th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, August 7, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3.]

4. U.S. Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702/2;¹OCB Report on NSC 5702/2, dated June 25, 1958;² Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 22 and 31, 1958)³

Mr. Gray presented the revisions proposed by the Planning Board in paragraphs 9 and 10 of NSC 5702/2. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)⁴ After explaining the proposed revision of paragraphs 9 and 10–a, Mr. Gray said, with reference to the language “following formalization of the agreement to reduce the ROK forces” in paragraph 10–a, that negotiations for a formal agreement between the United States and the ROK had struck a snag. The Korean Marines were objecting to reductions in Marine forces, even though such reductions had been approved at higher ROK levels. As a result/there is no formal agreement, an ROK counter-offer will not be received until September, and aircraft are piling up because they can’t be delivered to the ROK under present policy in the absence of a formal agreement. The policy issue, therefore, was whether to deliver equipment to the ROK in hope that reductions in ROK forces would be effected/or hold off deliveries and press for a formal agreement.

Secretary Herter said we had a human problem in Korea–i.e., Rhee–who is failing fast but still controls ROK defense. Rhee says he won’t agree to our proposals. Rhee and the United States are within 5,000 men of agreement on total personnel strength, but Rhee does not want a regrouping in a smaller number of divisions.

Secretary Quarles said he did not want the Council to form the impression that little or no progress had been achieved in reduction of ROK forces. The ROK military was cooperating, and much progress had actually been achieved in reducing ROK forces from a nominal 720,000 (actual 690,000) down to 630,000. He thought it would be wise to proceed on the assumption of good-faith performance by the ROK.

Mr. Gray said Secretary Quarles’ suggestion would involve some revision of the proposed paragraph 10–a. He then explained the split in paragraph 10–b,⁵ and asked for a decision on both subparagraphs (10–a and 10–b).

The President said he assumed we would support only the number of ROK personnel we had specified as adequate. If the ROK retains personnel in excess of our figure, it will have to find the money to support such personnel elsewhere than in the United States. With reference to paragraph 10–b, the President thought the Budget-Treasury proposal, “beginning in CY 1960”, should not be adopted.

Secretary Herter suggested substituting “as soon as practicable” for the Planning Board language as well as for the Budget–Treasury language in paragraph 10–b.

The Director, Bureau of the Budget, asked leave to explain the Budget position. He felt ROK forces should be reduced even though there was no formal agreement, and that there should be further reductions beginning in 1960. The following were among the factors not covered in the Planning Board paper: (1) Why ROK forces could not be reduced as U.S. forces were being reduced in the light of modern weapons; (2) why ROK forces were one-fourth the size of U.S. forces; (3) what account was being taken of the reduction of Chinese Communist forces in North Korea; and (4) what consideration had been given to the statement in the limited war study⁶ that ROK forces would not be useful outside Korea. However, Secretary Herter’s suggestion (“as soon as practicable”) was acceptable for paragraph 10–b.

The President said that some of those at the meeting apparently did not know Rhee. Difficulties had been experienced for many years with Rhee, who was so emotional he had once proposed sending ROK forces up to the Yalu River. The situation became worse as Rhee became senile. But we must persuade him or lose prestige. We had fought a war with heavy casualties to keep Korea free; and we would not serve U.S. interests by sticking rigidly to our pre-determined targets in negotiations with Rhee.

General White said the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed with the proposed revision of paragraphs 9 and 10 as written by the majority of the Planning Board, and would agree to Secretary Herter’s suggestion on paragraph 10–b.

The National Security Council:⁷

a. Noted and discussed the proposed revision of paragraphs 9 and 10 of NSC 5702/2, prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 22, 1958; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 31, 1958.

b. Adopted the revision of paragraphs 9 and 10 of NSC 5702/2, subject to the following amendments:

• (1) Subparagraph 10–a: Revise to read as follows:

  “a Continue to seek formalization of the agreement to reduce the ROK forces to an over-all authorized and actual ceiling of 630,000. Whether or not such an agreement is formalized, assist in supporting ROK forces up to this personnel strength through CY 1959, with individual service components as follows: The ROK Army not to exceed 18 active and 10 reserve divisions; the ROK Navy at a level of approximately 60 combatant vessels and one Marine division; the ROK Air Force at a level of 10 air squadrons, including 6 jet fighter-bomber squadrons.

• “(2) Subparagraph 10–b: Delete the bracketed phrase and substitute therefor the words “as soon as practicable.”; delete the footnote.

c. Noted the President’s authorization that deliveries of equipment such as jet aircraft to ROK forces could now be made so long as they are consistent with the above amendment to subparagraph 10-a of NSC 5702/2.

Note:NSC 5702/2, as revised by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5817⁸ for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

[Here follow agenda items 5–7.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Marion W. Boggs on August 8.
1. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIII, Part 2, pp. 489–498.
2. See footnote 2, Document 225.
3. The July 22 memorandum is printed as Document 232. The July 29 and 31 memoranda are cited in footnote 3, Document 232.
4. Not printed.
5. The “spilt” in view among the agencies considering paragraph 10b is outlined in the enclosure to Document 232 and footnote 3 thereto.
6. Not further identified.
7. Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1960, approved by the President on August 11. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
8. Document 237.