Office of the Historian

235. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Acting Secretary of State Herter0

Washington, August 6, 1958.

SUBJECT

  • Status of Negotiations on Reduction of ROK Armed Forces

The NSC will meet on August 7 at 4:30 p.m. to consider the proposed revision of paragraphs 9 and 10 of NSC 5702/2, prepared by the NSC Planning Board. The NSC originally was scheduled to consider this matter on July 31, 1958 but did not reach this item on its agenda. These paragraphs are being revised since the original policy guidance expired on June 30, 1958. Paragraph 9 of NSC 5702/2 deals with the retention of United States armed forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Paragraph 10 deals with the ROK armed force levels which we are willing [Page 479] to support through CY 1959. The Department’s position on these two paragraphs is set forth in my memorandum of July 30, 1958 to the Secretary,1 the original of which, I understand, is being made available to you for your use in the NSC meeting this coming Thursday. The following information is additionally set forth for your possible use in connection with this meeting.

In connection with paragraph 10 of NSC 5702/2, lengthy negotiations were held with the ROK in accordance with which an agreement in principle was reached last February to reduce the over-all ceiling level of ROK armed forces from 720,000 to 630,000 by December 31, 1958. The ROK subsequently requested that this agreement be formalized through a revision of Appendix B of the Agreed Minute of Understanding of 1954, which sets forth several basic principles and procedures relating to United States support of the ROK military establishment, including the level of forces to be supported. Ambassador Dowling and General Decker were not authorized to conclude the formal agreement with the ROK until July 2, 1958. FYI: In his telegram of August 1 (no distribution outside the Department) (Tab A),2 Ambassador Dowling has informed us that the ROK Minister of National Defense has told him privately that when he saw President Rhee a few days ago on concrete plans for the reduction of ROK armed forces, the latter reacted strongly saying that reduction at this stage of world affairs was out of the question. The Defense Minister also told Mr. Dowling that he had hoped to announce the retirement of two ROK Army divisions on August 25 but that this would now be impossible. Mr. Dowling has recommended that, under the circumstances, we give the ROK Defense Minister some additional time to resolve the issue with President Rhee. End FYI.

On August 1, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense queried CINCUNC as to the status of negotiations on a reduction of ROK armed forces and requested an estimate as to when the negotiations might be concluded. (Tab B)3 The inquiry was prompted by Defense’s concern regarding the problem relating to the transfer of a wing of F–86 jets to the ROK Air Force following a completion of their rehabilitation. These aircraft are a part of the quid pro quo to which we agreed in connection with the ROK agreement in principle to reduce the over-all ceiling of its armed forces. On August 4, CINCUNC replied (Tab C)4 that [Page 480] President Rhee has indicated his reluctance, in light of the world situation, to approve formally plans of the Ministry of National Defense for reduction. CINCUNC further stated that action is also being delayed by the ROK Marine Corps, which violently opposes a reduction of 3,500 men, and that informal discussions with the ROK Ministry of National Defense reveal that the anticipated ROK counterproposal regarding Appendix B will vary from the United States version to such an extent to require resubmission to Washington. CINCUNC reported further that, despite this general situation, the ROK Army meanwhile is proceeding with plans for reduction.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ROK Army Chief of Staff Paek Son-yop has stated that a reduction in ROK armed forces appears unlikely because President Rhee opposes any cut in strength until Korea has been unified. (Tab D)5

  1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 60, Korea. Secret. Drafted by Lane.↩
  2. See footnote 3, Document 232.↩
  3. Document 234.↩
  4. Not found attached. Telegram DEF 945972 to CINCUNC, August 1, indicated again that “the transfer of aircraft, transport and communications equipment is dependent on acceptance by ROK proposed reduction of ground forces.” (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Department of the Army Communication Center Files)↩
  5. Not found attached. Reference is to UK 978330 from CINCUNC, August 4. (ibid.) See Supplement.↩
  6. Not found attached.↩