Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

231. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)⁰

Washington, July 11, 1958.

SUBJECT

• NSC Planning Board Review of Paragraphs 9a and 10 of NSC 5702/2,¹ August 9, 1957, “U.S. Policy Toward Korea”

It is understood that the Planning Board on July 11 will meet to consider inter alia the OCB recommendation, approved by the NSC on July 3,² that paragraphs 9a and 10 of NSC 5702/2 be reviewed since the policy guidance set forth in these paragraphs expired on June 30, 1958.

Paragraph 9a gave policy guidance on the continued deployment of two U.S. infantry divisions and an air unit to the Republic of Korea(ROK) through FY 1958. Paragraph 10 gave policy guidance with respect to ROK armed forces through FY 1958 and provided for the immediate negotiation with the ROK for a reduction in ROK armed forces and for the consideration of further reductions in the longer range; in this latter respect, it called for plans for gradual further reductions, taking into account the enemy situation, the effect of the initial reductions and the over-all level of U.S. military assistance programs world-wide (sub-paragraph 10c).

With respect to paragraph 9a, we believe that the policy guidance of 5702/2 should be continued and that two U.S. infantry divisions and an air unit should continue to be deployed in Korea. There has been no lessening of tension and threat in Northeast Asia during the past few months–a period marked by Peiping’s vehement support of the murder of Nagy³ in the name of bloc solidarity and by Peiping’s sudden suspension of all trade ties with Japan. Meanwhile, there has been no improvement in the prospects for a political settlement in Korea and the Communists have not changed their position regarding a settlement. The Communists have mounted an intensive propaganda campaign, following the announcement of February 19, 1958 that Chinese Communist troops would be withdrawn from north Korea, to force the withdrawal of UN and particularly of U.S. troops from south Korea. The withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops from north Korea, however, has not altered the military-strategic situation in the Korean peninsula. The Communist threat remains, involving the capability of launching another attack against the ROK. Therefore, at least until the Armistice Agreement is replaced by a political settlement, the U.S. must retain its forces in Korea. To withdraw our forces in advance of a political settlement would remove whatever bargaining power we have for bringing the Communist side to agree to an acceptable political settlement. Moreover, recalling the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1949 and the resultant Communist invasion, the ROK would consider the withdrawal of U.S. forces to constitute an abandonment of Korea to its fate. Although it is impossible to predict the precise actions the ROK would take under these circumstances, a situation would be created in which it undoubtedly would be impossible to attain U.S. policy objectives in the ROK. Other Asian countries likewise would be gravely concerned with such an apparent abandonment of Korea. Furthermore, in such an eventuality, we cannot be sure that the Communists would not attempt to again exploit the situation through force.

It is also our opinion that we cannot now afford a further reduction in ROK armed forces beyond that recently negotiated with the ROK, partly for reasons mentioned above. Lengthy negotiations were held with the ROK, pursuant to paragraph 10 of NSC 5702/2, which were completed only when the U.S., with the President’s approval, modified its objective from a reduction of four ROK divisions to two divisions and extended the period during which the U.S. would assist in supporting the new force level from FY 1959 to CY 1959. Despite the fact that the U.S. agreed by way of a quid pro quo to convert one of the existing ROK Air Force wings to jets and to furnish improved transportation and communications equipment to the ROK armed forces, the ROK finally agreed to a reduction on this basis reluctantly, with a new ceiling in its armed forces of 630,000 as compared with the previous ceiling of 720,000.

Although recognizing that the military assessment as to whether the military-strategic situation will permit further reductions (we assume Defense and the JCS will provide this assessment) is an important factor in any consideration of further reductions, we believe that the political factors which must be taken into account are at least of equal importance. The Koreans have made it quite clear that they will strenuously resist any further reduction proposals on our part. Should we propose negotiations for further reductions in ROK armed forces in the near future, the repercussions to be anticipated would be of such a serious nature from a political viewpoint as to impair the prospects for the attainment of U.S. policy objectives in the ROK. We can expect the U.S.–ROK relations would become strained and that problems in U.S.–ROK cooperative efforts would result, not only in the military field but also in the political and economic areas. Moreover, if we were to force the ROK to accept further reductions, the least we could anticipate the ROK to insist on as a quid pro quo would be the provision to the ROK of atomic-capable weapons and other types of modern equipment. We obviously could not accept such a quid pro quo.

From an economic viewpoint, a cut in the size of ROK military forces would not necessarily decrease the amount of outside resources which would be required by the Korean economy to support, while maintaining political stability, the kind of military establishment that would then be necessary. The reduction in the Korean force levels which is already underway is expected to do no more than offset the rising trend in the cost of maintaining the substantial military establishment which will remain. Furthermore, an attempt to force a reduction in the ROK force level by cutting aid could prove self-defeating since, given the strong feelings held by President Rhee, it is not at all impossible that, despite a reduction in aid, the ROK would insist on maintaining force levels through deficit financing, thereby inviting an inflation which could be disastrous to the country and to the continued success of our own aid programs.

Recommendation:

That you bring FE’s viewpoints to the attention of the NSC Planning Board in connection with its consideration on July 11 of paragraphs 9a and 10 of NSC 5702/2.

0. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, U.S. Policy Toward (NSC 5817, NSC 5907). Secret. Drafted by Barbis and Lane, and approved in FE by Regional Planning Adviser Marshall Green.
1. See Document 225.
2. The record of the discussion of the Korea item at the 371st meeting of the NSC on July 3 is limited to the observation that the NSC “Noted the reference report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.” (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See Supplement. Attached to this memorandum is a briefing paper on the OCB Progress Report, which was apparently used to brief the NSC. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See Supplement.
3. On June 16, the Hungarian Ministry of Justice announced that former Premier Imre Nagy and three of his closest associates in the 1956 Hungarian revolt had been tried in secret and executed.