227. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State’s Operations Coordinator (Richards) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)0

For your information or action, there is quoted below an excerpt from my preliminary and informal notes on the OCB meeting of June 25:

“Report on Korea

“Mr. Howard Parsons, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, and Mr. Samuel O. Lane, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, were present.

“The OCB consideration of the Report on Korea opened with a discussion of the need for a review of policy, particularly whether or not paragraphs 9a and 10 of NSC 5702/2 were accurate reflections of the present situation in Korea. Mr. Harr said in his opinion the Report did not reflect certain policy developments such as the turning over to the Republic of Korea (ROK) of jet fighter-bombers. General Cutler asked whose fault it was that an agreement reached in January on the strength of the ROK armed forces had not yet been finalized in June. Mr. Sprague (Defense) pointed out that the reduction in the ROK armed forces was already under way and they would soon be at the maximum agreed strength of 630,000 men. In reply to General Cutler’s repeated request as to where the fault lay for the delay in formalizing the US-ROK agreement, Mr. Parsons replied that the fault was partially the Koreans’ and partially interdepartmental. He said the State Department and Defense were continuing to work on a formal US paper that would constitute a memorandum of understanding to be given the ROK Government. Governor Herter said the important thing to bear in mind was that a reduction in forces by the ROK is already well along.

“Mr. Parsons said the Korean Government was aware that the absolute ceiling for the ROK armed forces was 630,000 men and future discussions relating to reductions would be based on this figure. An important element was the modernization of the ROK forces and the introduction of missiles.

“The Korean desire for a Status of Forces Agreement was discussed. There was agreement in the Board that the ROK should not be given criminal jurisdiction over U.S. troops. Mr. Sprague suggested that the term ‘Status of Forces Agreement’ not be used, as this term generally is accepted to include some form of criminal jurisdiction.

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“General Cutler termed the differing views between State and Defense on the responsibility for the administration of U.S. economic aid programs in Korea as ‘this running sore.’ Governor Herter said a compromise would result in a situation which would not improve the present one. The President would probably have to resolve the matter. The crucial question appeared to be whether U.S. operations in the ROK were on a peace or a war footing, and whether the Ambassador or the commanding officer of the armed forces in Korea should exercise the ultimate responsibility. General Cutler promised he would be severely critical with regard to this problem and to the delay in finalizing the reduction in forces agreement when the Korean paper came before the Planning Board. Governor Herter said he understood Mr. Dillon in the next day or so would forward a recommendation that U.S. operations in Korea be ‘normalized’ and the Ambassador invested with the overall responsibility.

“The Board approved the Report, with minor revisions proposed by Mr. Sprague, for transmittal to the NSC.”

ALR
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/6–2558. Secret. Drafted by Frank V. Ortiz of U/OP.