Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

211. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Jones)⁰

Washington, February 3, 1958.

SUBJECT

• The Arrest of Cho Bong-am

On January 13, Cho Bong-am, Chairman of the Progressive Party and recipient of 2,164,000 votes in the 1956 Presidential elections, was arrested by the ROK police on charges of violation of the National Security Act.¹ On immediately preceding days, four other top officials of the Progressive Party and Progressive Party Assemblyman, Kim Tal-ho, were arrested on similar charges.² There have since been reports that some four other members of the party have been detained and that there are reported plans to arrest nine more party leaders. Confidential information indicates that the Government may be seeking to outlaw the Progressive Party.

The arrests appear thus far to be a retrogression to methods used by the Government against the Opposition in 1949 and 1952. Charges against the suspects have included the familiar paraphernalia of suspected contacts with spies, communist intention of contacting Progressives, advocacy of “peaceful unification”, similarity of party program to the communists, and “materialism and Marxism”. The Embassy “believes the purported evidence is, at best, flimsy” and reports its own sampling of Korean opinion as expressing lack of belief in the charges.³ Mr. Cho is an experienced politician and has been one of the most closely watched men in south Korea for years. Hearings on a writ of habeas corpus were held on January 27 and 28; release was denied by the Seoul court on January 30, on the basis of evidence of communist contacts.

The Government is evidently seeking to discredit and thwart the Progressive Party before the April elections and, by inference, to issue warning to all members of the opposition. The arrests may likewise indicate fear of Cho’s personal popularity and apprehension about the possible increase in popular sentiment favorable to “peaceful unification” and to the Progressive Party’s socialist platform. The ROK press has thus far discreetly questioned the arrests but has raised no outcry. Government action will probably tend to drive underground sentiment favorable to peaceful unification and will further disillusion popular hopes for improvements on the governing of Korea by the democratic process. Cho himself is likely to be kept in jail until after the elections; in the long run, however, Korean imprisonment tends more to abet than to dampen a political career and Cho has given every indication that he has the courage to withstand this form of pressure.

Should the Government, as intimated, seek during the trial to claim that advocacy of peaceful unification can be traitorous, it will by inference make support of both UN and U.S. policy in Korea on this issue criminal and may further undermine international support of our position on the Korea question at the UN General Assembly.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/2–358. Confidential. Drafted by Gregory Henderson.
1. An intelligence note on the arrest of the Progressive Party leaders, prepared in INR on January 13 for Dulles, reported that Cho Pong-am was an ex-Communist active in ROK politics since the end of World War II. Although his political views were far to the left of Rhee’s he had advocated a program of peaceful unification of Korea and there was no evidence to support the allegation that he was engaged in subversive activities. (Ibid., 795.00/1–1358) See Supplement. On January 17 in telegram 533 from Seoul, the Embassy reported that Korean officials claimed that Cho confessed to involvement in a Communist plot to undermine the Government of the Republic of Korea and had been in direct contact with Communist agents. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/1–1758) See Supplement.
2. Telegram 520, January 13, listed the Progressive Party officials arrested along with Cho. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1-1358) See Supplement.
3. In despatch 466 from Seoul, January 21, the Embassy assessed the arrests of Cho and his five associates. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/1–2158) See Supplement.