Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, December 16, 1960, 4 p.m.

1752. Japanese press features report Mr. Dean Rusk¹ will shortly hold private talks with certain Japanese to review US policy for Japan and formulate future policy. In light of this and since new governments assuming responsibility in both Japan and US, it seems important and urgent to summarize Japanese-American postwar relations and assess situation and problems new US administration will face in Japan over next four years. However, to project future it first necessary to examine briefly evolution of our post-war relations with Japan to see where they now stand.

I.

When second Eisenhower administration was inaugurated in 1957, Japanese-American relations were just entering the third and critical phase of our postwar relations with Japan. Policies which had served well in earlier phases were not altogether adequate for the new period and Japanese-American relations were not on an entirely satisfactory basis. In first of these three phases, occupation period (1945–1952), we had had two basic objectives: (a) to bring about democratic reforms so Japan’s vigorous people would not again fall under total agrarian [totalitarian] leadership and (b) to help this war devastated nation attain economic stability, an essential condition precedent to social and political stability so that it would not fall victim of Communist subversion.

In second phase which began in 1952 Japanese sovereignty was legally restored by peace treaty. However, this restoration of sovereignty was in some respects nominal because Japan was still heavily dependent on United States and felt it had to do very much as we wished in both domestic and foreign matters. Diplomatically, Japan was largely isolated; economically it was still receiving grant aid from us and its commercial trade balance was heavily adverse; in security matters it had scarcely begun to share burden of its own defense. Furthermore, many vestigial remnents of our occupation period had inevitably carried over into this second phase.

As we entered third and critical phase of our relations with Japan four years ago in which a fully sovereign Japan stood restored as one of leading nations of free world, there was need to put our relations on sounder basis. For certain aspects of our occupation policy in form of one-sided agreements and unilateral rights and privileges had survived the period of their usefulness and, despite benefits they had afforded, were beginning to be too costly, politically, to maintain. Japanese had a whole list of complaints and grievances stemming from occupation period and were progressively beginning to chafe under what they considered to be unequal or discriminatory treatment which did not take into full account either Japan’s sovereign and legitimate interests or its remarkable growth and recovery. After Kishi took office in February 1957 he listed many of these complaints or grievances to Ambassador. They included:

1. Girard case in which United States seemed unwilling to honor its international commitment to Japan under administrative agreement and turn Girard over to Japanese jurisdiction.

2. Presence of too many members of our armed forces in Japan which was creating pressures for withdrawal of all US forces and bases from Japan.

3. Complaints against large number of areas and facilities our military authorities were holding which were needed by Japanese economy.

4. Opposition to continuing payments of “support costs” for US military forces in Japan. Progressively many Japanese were calling these “occupation costs” since no other country where we had troops stationed was making such payments.

5. War criminals problem where US still held almost one hundred individuals in Sugamo Prison even after other countries including Republic of China and Philippines which had suffered greatly had paroled their war criminals. Many Japanese viewed this as an effort on our part to maintain a “living stigma” of Japan’s war guilt.

6. Insistence we transfer administration of Bonin Islands to Japan and if that not possible we at least permit return dispossessed inhabitants of Bonin Islands (whom, with exception of those having some Western blood, we had refused to repatriate) or alternatively offer them monetary compensation.

7. Strong public demands by GOJ that we return administrative control of Okinawa and Ryukyu islands to Japan.

8. Strong and emotional insistence we cease testing nuclear weapons in Pacific.

9. Insistence that we modify security treaty which had been negotiated while Japan was under occupation and which many Japanese had come to regard as having been “imposed” on Japan and as being a one-sided instrument which gave United States rights and privileges which it enjoyed in no other country, including right to commit Japan to an act of belligerency and war without her knowledge or consent.

10. Concern over lack of US cooperation with Japan in Asian economic development typified by rejection “Kishi plan.”

11. Major anxiety lest United States, on heels of cotton textile agreement in 1956, adopt broad and far-sweeping trade restrictions against Japanese imports into US that would make it difficult or virtually impossible for Japan to expand its trade which was essential for economic and social progress.

12. Finally, strong feeling on part of Japanese that if Japanese-American relations were to be really meaningful they must be based on equality and mutual respect and United States must treat Japan as equal partner and not as subordinate and must cease taking Japan for granted.

These then were major Japanese grievances against United States with Japanese progressively becoming more vocal in their complaints on both our attitude and our actions. It was clear in 1957 that we must move expeditiously and with flexibility to meet foregoing situation if we were not to risk collapse of Japanese-American partnership. What have we done since then to redress situation:

1. We turned Girard over to Japanese jurisdiction and our action was upheld by our Supreme Court.

2. We withdrew all ground combat forces, substantially reduced other forces so that now we have less than half as many forces stationed in Japan as in early 1957. This took steam out of anti-base movement except for extreme left.

3. We returned to Japanese hundreds of areas and facilities our military had retained.

4. In new treaty arrangements we eliminated support costs for US forces. (By this action we removed serious point of friction and at same time obtained continued rent-free use of privately owned military facilities and areas for which GOJ willingly pays $17 million annually.)

5. War criminals in Sugamo Prison have all been paroled in accordance with practice of our other allies.

6. We obtained Congressional authorization for $6 million compensation for dispossessed Bonin Islanders.

7. While not returning administration of Okinawa to Japan, we reformed our land acquisition policy from lump-sum payments to rentals and instead of excluding Japan from Ryukyuan affairs as theretofore, began to work together in appropriate instances with both Japan and Government of Ryukyus in economic and social development of islands, thus letting air out of “reversion” balloon.

8. We suspended nuclear tests in Pacific thus taking into account Japanese views.

9. We agreed to far-sweeping changes in security treaty favoring Japan to make it consistent with our treaty engagements with other allies and also keep it fully consistent with Japanese interpretation of Japanese constitution.

10. Although not agreeing to Kishi plan SEA economic development, we cooperated with Japanese in Asian economic development, which is so important to Japan, in projects such as Orissa and through off-shore procurement.

11. Despite strong pressures from American protectionist groups we maintained liberal trade policy with respect to Japan, and Japanese exports to America have almost doubled in past four years and correspondingly Japan is now our second largest export market.

12. In our dealings with Japanese we have sought to treat them on a basis of equality and mutual respect. We worked to secure their admission to UN and election to Security Council and recently supported their candidate for ICA. We have also consulted closely with them on policies in all parts of world. And when Japanese balance of payments were in such serious trouble in 1957 we helped with Export-Import Bank and DLF loans to about $325 million to tide them over until upswing of Japanese economy. We tried to demonstrate we were a good partner.

II.

As result of these actions, some of which took several years because of differing views within our government, problems which four years ago risked embittering relations and destroying Japanese-American partnership have either been solved to Japanese satisfaction or dealt with by us in manner aimed at keeping them within manageable proportions. Most Japanese appreciate that we have tried to treat them as equal partners and this sentiment, coupled with Japanese realization that they also need our friendship and cooperation, was largely responsible for total failure of pro-Communist and anti-American elements to transform turmoil of last May and June into broadly based anti-American movement. This relatively satisfactory state of our relations also prompted Ikeda last July, in response to press query at his first press conference after becoming Prime Minister, to reply that he had no suggestions to make to United States for changes or modifications of its policy toward Japan since American policy served best interests of both countries. FonMin Kosaka reiterated this the other day, in other words at present there are no immediate and burning issues to plague our relations. There is a very cooperative and pro-Western Japanese Government in power and Japanese people are generally friendly and, much more important, feel their own interests are being served by Japanese-American partnership.

III.

However, there is no room whatsoever for complacency on our part or to feel that just because we have solved major problems of past nothing need be done in future to hold Japanese-American partnership together. In first place, Japan remains target no. 1 in all of Asia for Moscow and Peking, whose supporters inside and outside Japan are working ceaselessly to divide Japan and United States and to exploit to hilt inevitable differences which will always occur even between close friends and partners. Moreover, in Japan there is a widespread spirit of latent neutralism which Socialists have recently succeeded in exploiting to some extent. This latent neutralist sentiment, which is more a “mood” than a “policy” supported by Japanese public, is encouraged by an intellectual community which is in large part fuzzy-minded and abstractionist. Furthermore, there are also certain problems which although now within manageable proportions will never be totally solved because they are inherent in nature of Japanese-American partnership and the somewhat differing kind of interests of two countries with respect to the specific problems. It is this type of problem that we must watch with utmost care and be prepared to make timely and constructive modifications with respect to our actions and policies before such differences become aggravated and serious public friction ensues.

Most important problems in this category appear to be:

1. US-Japan trade relations. Economic facts of Japan’s life dictate that Japan must trade to live and therefore must finally end up where and with whom she can earn a living. If Japan cannot have access to a fair and reasonable share of our and other free world markets, on basis of course of reciprocity, then Japan will be forced into unwilling accommodation with Communist Bloc, with assets of this great major industrial complex added to present formidable Communist Bloc capabilities. While Japan must reciprocate a liberal trade policy toward us, it is imperative that we avoid a policy of restrictionism and that we also continue to encourage other free world countries to be more liberal re Japanese imports. For most fundamental, and by far most essential tie between our two countries in Japanese view is not security but that of trade and commerce which is Japan’s daily bread. In period immediately ahead we must be particularly careful in developing policies to meet our balance of payments problem not to strike a major blow at Japan’s economic stability and economic ties with us.

Moreover, Japan can make great contribution to massive problems free world faces in Asia and Africa by its moderating influence and its contributions of technology and economic cooperation. However, it can make this substantial economic contribution only if Japan itself is economically sound and this depends on its trade and foreign earnings.

2. US-Japan military security ties. Japan’s cooperation in this field is important to us not because of material contribution Japan makes to free world defense in terms of size and power of its military forces (which for indefinite future will remain modest in size), but because without our ability to use Japanese island complex for deployment and logistical purposes, our ability to maintain free world strength in the western Pacific as a deterrent to Communist aggression and as an important morale factor for our free Asian allies would be both seriously impaired and made infinitely more expensive. Perhaps even more important is fact that for foreseeable future Japan’s security alignment with free world can only be attained through security ties with us. Japan is unwilling to have military ties with other free nations, and if Japan’s security ties with us were ended and she became militarily neutral, impetus toward political neutralism would be greatly accelerated. And latent mood of neutralism represents an important aspect of problem with which we must deal in maintaining existing security ties which for present are fully accepted as necessary although with no great enthusiasm.

Had we waited longer to adjust our security arrangements with Japan we would have been in real trouble. However, as result of new security treaty and related arrangements our security ties are now generally satisfactory to Japan although we cannot rule out possibility of Japanese desire for some further adjustments in next several years. Moreover, as long as we have forces in Japan inevitably frictions and problems will arise such as Fuji–McNair Maneuver Ground,² Japanese labor on our bases, facilities and areas, incidents involving US servicemen, etc. All such matters have potentially serious political implications, and if not dealt with in timely fashion and in constructive manner acceptable to Japanese public opinion they will soon become inflamed and be exploited by pro-Communists and neutralists to destroy Japanese-American security ties. In dealing with such problems it is imperative we not stand rigidly on past procedures, practices, or arrangements, but examine these problems with open mind and flexibility in order to reach agreement with which Japanese can live even if it means some modifications involving less satisfactory arrangements than we now have. In view of strong latent spirit of neutralism in Japan, our security ties represent a vulnerability in certain respects which unless handled with wisdom could be exploited to rupture Japanese-American partnership. Over long term and in light of cold war our security relations with Japan are more important as a major link in Japan’s alignment with US and free world than as a military base platform.

An important factor in Japanese-American security cooperation has been MAP which we have extended to Japan. While Japanese recognize eventually they must assume entire burden for modernizing and maintaining their own forces, we should not arbitrarily eliminate all military assistance for next several years in certain specified cases where it is very much in our own security interest that Japan increase its capabilities (i.e., ASW, air defense, etc.) For arbitrary use of axe at this juncture would not only be exploited by opponents of our security ties but would also be serious blow to modest Japanese military build-up which is slowly but steadily occurring and which GOJ desires. While we can privately encourage GOJ in steps to develop Japanese forces, we must avoid at all cost giving public impression that it is we who are insisting on “remilitarization of Japan” and our public posture should be that size of Japanese forces is for Japan to determine.

3. Communist China. We must recognize that this is most sensitive subject for any Japanese Government and relations could rapidly deteriorate over this issue if not handled skillfully. Japanese people universally view Communist Russia and Communist China in totally different perspectives. Russia continues to be regarded with fear and suspicion as traditionally hostile, barbaric, Western power, whereas Chinese people are regarded as fellow-Asians to whom Japan owes much of its own culture, with whom it has had economic and other ties for many centuries, and with whom Japan must live in harmony regardless of nature of Chinese regime. Furthermore, myth at rice roots that all Japan’s economic problems would be solved if only there were close trade and other relations with ChiComs is believed by numerous Japanese, many of whom also believe it is US which prevents GOJ developing trade and friendship with ChiComs. We do not believe GOJ will seriously consider political recognition of ChiComs in near future unless we change our policy or unless additional major free world allies of US do so, or unless ChiComs get into UN, because Japan has its own problems in this matter in terms of its treaty with and recognition of Nationalist China. However, in coming period, for domestic political reasons if for nothing else, will certainly seek to expand trade and other contacts with ChiComs and may also even enter into official agreements with ChiComs in technical fields including postal exchanges, meteorology, safehaven for fishing vessels, etc. In our discussion and handling of such developments we must be careful to avoid creating public impression that on basis of hostility toward ChiCom regime we are trying to dictate and prevent GOJ from developing trade and friendlier relations with China. At same time we must also recognize that if, in coming period, majority of UNGA favors admission of ChiCom to UN and we then exercise veto, there will be very adverse effect on many Japanese as well as on other Asians regardless of merit of our action. When we press GOJ to support our policies and actions re ChiComs, we must use great care to avoid creating public impression we are trying to force Japan to follow our policy. For any such feeling would seriously damage not only US position but also present pro-Western GOJ, if latter gave impression it blindly and subserviently following our lead. Indeed, today main point in leftist and press attacks against GOJ foreign policy is that in UN and elsewhere it blindly follows our policy.

4. Okinawa. As result our change in land acquisition policy and our new and constructive attitude re GOJ participation with US and Govt of Ryukyus in certain economic development, health, education, and other Ryukyuan matters, sentiment for reversion of Ryukyus to Japan which continues below surface is now within manageable proportions. However, we must recognize that until administration is eventually returned to Japan, problem of reversion will be a constant irritant in Japanese-American relations. There has recently been substantial increase in left wing activity in Japan calling for reversion of Okinawa, and Japanese Socialists are spearheading drive by draft resolution in Diet calling for reversion. If this matter becomes inflamed, not only will Okinawa become an undependable base, but relations between Japan and America can be seriously damaged. There are eight hundred thousand Japanese inhabitants of Ryukyus, and whenever majority of them protest against actions or policies of US, ninety-three million Japanese respond in sympathy. Therefore, key to keeping Okinawa as dependable military base and avoiding having it become major issue of dispute between Japan and America is for our authorities in Ryukyus to keep Okinawans reasonably satisfied [and] have flexible outlook as political or economic problems arise. We must avoid simply standing on past practices or policies simply because they are now in effect. We must frankly recognize that we waited dangerously long to modify certain of our policies in Okinawa re land acquisition, Japanese participation in certain Ryukyuan matters, and almost had an incipient “Cyprus”-type situation on our hands three years ago. We must be prepared to deal with future situations with flexibility and must also continue to bring Japan into picture to maximum extent possible for major argument GOJ now has against Socialist and Leftist insistence on reversion to Japanese administration is that Japan is now working effectively in cooperation with US and GRI in matters affecting economic development, health, welfare, and education of Japanese inhabitants of Ryukyus, and therefore return of administrative control at this juncture is not necessary.

5. GARIOA. While above four issues represent continuing and long-term problems that will be with us indefinitely, GARIOA represents immediate and very difficult problem on which we are pressing for settlement. It is particularly sensitive in this period as we substantially cut back dollar spending in Japan. Anti-American elements here are already preparing to use GARIOA settlement as major weapon with which not only to attack Ikeda but also to strike at Japanese-American relations and settlement must be handled with care, and above all it must be one we believe will be acceptable to Japanese people and Diet. If we mishandle GARIOA we will get no settlement and will afford our enemies club with which to assail Japanese-American partnership. As Japanese official thinking on terms of GARIOA settlement becomes clearer we will submit recommendations with view to possible solutions³ in keeping with our own vital interests, but at same time having maximum chance of acceptability in Japan.

IV.

Conclusion

Japan is one of four major industrial complexes in world. Militarily, Japanese Island complexes vitally important to maintenance our and free world deterrent military strength in western Pacific and Asia. Japan is making substantial contribution to Asian economic development which is indispensable in blocking Communist gains, and will do more. It is, in fact, at present only positive element of real economic and industrial strength in free Asia. Japan’s continued alignment with free world is essential. However, at present such basic alignment must in first instance be maintained largely through Japan’s alignment with US. For in field of military security, Japan will not in foreseeable future be willing to have military ties with any country except US, and severing of US-Japan security ties with ensuing military neutrality would greatly increase mood of neutralism which is latent and widespread in Japan. For this reason, even should we be obliged to accept less satisfactory arrangements from purely military viewpoint, continuation of security ties is most important as one of principal ties in Japan’s alignment with US and free world.

Japan’s most vital self-interest and its strongest tie with free world is trade. American market is essential and as long as Japan’s daily bread depends largely on our cooperation and friendship, we do not believe majority of conservative Japanese people will wish chase Communist rainbow. In other words, Japan’s continuing alignment with West and free world will in first instance depend to great extent on degree of understanding and leadership which US exercises in dealing with our overall relations with Japan, particularly trade, security arrangements and other problems cited above. An essential requirement is to give Japanese conviction we view Japan as equal, whom we respect and not as formerly occupied country that we expect to follow along in our wake.

There are at present no burning issues between Japan and America. We have in Japan conservative middle-of-road people headed by staunchly pro-Western government that believes Japan’s enlightened self-interest requires friendship and cooperation of US, and hence Japanese cooperation with US. As contrasted with some desperately difficult situations in other parts of world where we often have little to work with and cannot exercise decisive influence through our policies and actions as there are other major forces present, in Japan we would seem to have necessary tools at our disposal in terms of wise and flexible policies. Therefore, in absence of unpredictable international developments or serious economic depression affecting Japan the key to maintaining Japanese-American partnership in coming troubled period would seem in final analysis to depend largely on statesmanship we exercise in future in meeting Japanese-American problems.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/12–1660. Confidential. Transmitted in five sections and repeated to Naha, Yokohama, Fukuoka, Nagoya, Sapporo, and Kobe.
1. Secretary of State from January 1961 to January 1969
2. The Fuji–McNair Maneuver Ground, consisting of about 51,000 acres on the eastern slopes of Mt. Fuji, was a facility provided the USFJ under the old Administrative Agreement signed in 1952. The USFJ scheduled firing exercises for July–September 1960 but were hampered by sit-ins and demonstrations by local residents, who presented petitions had to be negotiated in view of the signing of the new Administrative Agreement. Petitions to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, arguing that a new lease with the explicit consent of leasors had to be negotiated in view of the signing of the new Administrative Agreement. Petitions were also presented to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and the GOJ wished to avoid such agitations in the pre-election period. Foreign Minister Kosaka suggested to MacArthur that since the United States rarely used the site, it could be returned to the Japanese Self Defense Agency and that the GOJ would grant the United States permission to use the area for maneuver when requested. No change in the legal status of the ground, however, was effected in 1960. Documents related to the subject are in Department of State, Central File 794.56311.
3. see footnote 1, Document 202.