185. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State0
4279. For Acting Secretary Parsons, Goodpaster. When I delivered President’s letter to Prime Minister Kishi this morning he asked me to convey to the President how deeply he regretted and apologized for having had to suggest a postponement of the President’s visit. He was deeply conscious of the fact that President had left for Asia with the firm intention of visiting Japan, and that having to suggest a postponement while the President was en route was an act of the gravest discourtesy and impoliteness to the President and to the people of the United States. Kishi, obviously deeply moved, again expressed his profound regrets and personal apologies. However, Kishi said that he had really had no alternative. A fanatical minority acting as the agents of Moscow and Peking and completely out of accord with the Japanese people plus some others who are not members themselves of this fanatical minority but who have been influenced by it, have created a situation which challenges the very existence of law and order in Japan. If the President had come under such conditions, some serious incident might well have occurred from actions of fanatical minority which in the end might have resulted in worsening our relations.
[Page 369]Accordingly and with full realization of discourtesy to President and American people and of seriousness of the action, he had had to suggest postponement. Kishi said however he wanted emphasize that Japanese people remained sound. Great majority of them wanted very much to welcome President but situation had developed so that Japanese public could not properly express its true feelings of welcome and friendship. Kishi said he was firmly determined to take whatever actions were required to oppose forces of international communism at work in Japan. He was resolved to continue his work to establish even closer relations between our two countries and he hoped very much that President would be able to visit Japan at later date. I told Kishi that President fully understands reasons which made postponement of visit inevitable and how painfully difficult it was for Kishi to request the postponement. It was clear that Moscow and Peking have committed every asset they can mobilize against GOJ, against rule of law in this country and against Japanese Parliamentary Democracy itself. I said it would be grave mistake to think their use of force and violence would taper off at this point. As consideration of new security treaty by House of Councillors reaches final stage, large scale insurrectionary actions can be expected and GOJ will have to be prepared to counter this violence. I noted we had reports today that communist dominated people’s council against revision of security treaty is changing its name to people’s council for abrogation of security treaty. It was evident that use of force and mob violence would continue and that communist apparatus was going all out to smash government.
Kishi replied he agreed entirely as to gravity of situation confronting Japan. He fully recognized that communist efforts to prevent President’s visit was only part of integrated campaign Moscow and Peking were carrying out to divide US and Japan. Intensity of their efforts would now be increasing, but GOJ and Japanese security authorities now understand the danger and are more prepared to meet threat.
I said that until security treaty was ratified it would remain focus for communist force agitation and I stressed to him, as I had to Fujiyama day before (Embtel 4272)1 how important it was we exchange instruments of ratification soonest possible following approval of the treaty by our respective legislative bodies. Kishi expressed full agreement and said that the treaty would of course by ratified by upper house automatically at midnight of June 18 but it was possible that the House of Councillors would affirmatively vote on the treaty today or tomorrow. It would be necessary for the upper house to pass certain enabling legislation to conform domestic laws with the new treaty. He anticipated that [Page 370] this legislation (which does require vote by the upper house) could be completed by the early part of next week. He would then wish to proceed with the instruments of ratification immediately. I replied that it seemed very possible that the Senate would approve the treaty by June 20 and that we would be able to move as swiftly as he desired thereafter.