175. National Security Council Report0

NSC 6008/1


Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council


NSC 5516/1
NSC 5913/1
[Page 336]
NSC Actions Nos. 2072 and 2219–b–(1)
OCB Report on NSC 5516/1, dated April 8, 1959
NIE 41–60
NSC 6008
NSC Action No. 22401

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Acting Secretary of Labor, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 446th NSC Meeting on May 31, 1960, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6008, subject to the amendments set forth in NSC Action No. 2240–c.

The President after further consideration of the discussion at the 446th NSC Meeting with respect to paragraph 60 of NSC 6008, directed that the following wording at the end of the first sentence of that paragraph be deleted as being too detailed for inclusion in an NSC policy paper:

“; preventing the pirating of designs, infringement of patents, cartels and other unfair business practices.”

The President, as of this date, approved the statement of policy in NSC 6008, as amended and enclosed herewith as NSC 6008/1; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

The Financial Appendix will be circulated at a later date.2

By NSC Action No. 2240–d, the Council noted the President’s determination, with respect to paragraph 51 of NSC 6008 as revised, that for the time being the present degree of control over the islands enumerated in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty is essential to our vital security interests.

The enclosed statement of policy, as approved, supersedes NSC 5516/1.

James S. Lay, Jr.3
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General Considerations


1. Japan stands today as a fully independent and influential member of international society. It has made a spectacular recovery from the 1945 low point, particularly on the economic front, and is unique as the only highly industrialized nation in the Asian-African area. Given its demonstrated capabilities and its aspirations for international prestige and leadership, Japan will have in the coming years a growing impact on the balance of power in Asia. The chief task of U.S. policy is to assure that Japan continues to exercise its international role predominantly in concert with Free World interests. The decision on Japan’s international orientation will be made by its own leaders on the basis of their assessment of its vital national interests and domestic political factors, but U.S. policy will have a crucial bearing on this determination because of Japan’s critical dependence upon the United States for defense and trade.

Importance of Japan

2. Japan’s dramatic recovery emphasizes its importance to the United States and the Free World. In overall strategic terms, Japan is one of the four major industrial complexes in the world and, if Japan’s industrial strength were harnessed to Communist Bloc power, the world balance of power would be significantly altered. Militarily, Japan is the key to the defense of the Western Pacific against Communist aggression. Her logistic facilities and bases are indispensable to an economical and effective defense of the Far East. Economically, Japan is the second largest export market for the United States and the largest purchaser of U.S. agricultural products; the United States is the largest importer of Japanese goods. Finally, Japan, as an Asian nation, has potential for contributing–particularly in the area of economic assistance–to the development of the many newly-emerging underdeveloped nations in Afro-Asia.

Internal Situation

3. Political power in Japan may be expected, barring unforeseen developments, to remain in the hands of the moderate conservative forces, whose policies will be most strongly guided by Japan’s economic interests and the urge to satisfy Japan’s international aspirations. The [Page 338] conservatives enjoy solid majority support mainly by virtue of the inherent conservatism of the Japanese people, their demonstrated success in meeting Japan’s economic problems, and the extremism of much of the opposition, although their position would be threatened if living conditions failed to improve over an extended period of time.

4. The principal cause of political instability is the factionalism endemic to the Japanese conservative movement, which can breed ineffectual governments if not curbed. Although the leaders of all factions of the Liberal Democratic Party appear in varying degrees to recognize the necessity of close ties with the West, some have shown serious political irresponsibility in their intra-party struggles for power. As a consequence, conservative governments in Japan have been tempted occasionally to sponsor opportunistic policies, to be less cooperative with the United States, and to be susceptible to appeals based on emotionally-tinged nationalism.

5. The chief opposition to the conservative Liberal Democratic Party in the Diet has come from the Socialists, who are dominated by extreme left-wing elements advocating a Communist-oriented neutralism. Recently the minority moderate Socialists split off, forming the Democratic Socialist Party. Although this new party is still in a formative stage, the split may in time offer a broader-based moderate, responsible, center-right Socialist alternative to continued Conservative rule. At present, however, left-wing extremists still outnumber moderate Socialists both in the Diet and in the trade union movement; presenting difficult problems for the United States, since these extremists are strongly anti-United States.

6. The Communist Party, though numerically weak, exercises a significant influence over Japanese opinion particularly through its penetration of mass organizations, labor, education and the information media. The ruling conservatives are aware of the dangers inherent in this situation and the prospects are that the countermeasures already begun will keep this Communist influence from significantly increasing.

7. Japan has one of the fastest rates of economic growth in the world (averaging 7.6 percent annually during the past three years) and is currently enjoying unprecedented prosperity, with new highs in nearly all sectors of the economy in 1959. While the extraordinarily high rate of investment (nearly 30 percent in recent years), the modern industrial plant, and technical skills of the labor force have contributed to this prosperity, essentially it would not have been possible without the significant expansion of Japan’s international trade and sound governmental fiscal and monetary policies. Increased exports brought about a marked improvement in Japan’s international accounts in the past two years and indications are that this improvement will continue at least [Page 339] over the short term. Substantial surpluses on current account were registered and are reflected in relatively high foreign exchange reserves.

8. This prosperity enables Japan to contribute to the development of less-developed countries not only through the reparations programs, but also through private Japanese investments and bilateral government programs. Through reparations and settlements of war-time obligations, Japan is committed to provide certain Southeast Asian nations with more than one billion dollars in grants and to facilitate loans and investments amounting to more than $700 million over the next 20 years. Disbursements average about $70 million annually. Other bilateral government programs amounted to about $130 million in 1959, and included not only Southeast Asia but also India and some of the Middle East nations. Japanese private investors are also investing abroad in substantial amounts with funds flowing to Southeast Asia, Latin America and even to parts of the United States. Japan does, however, have sizeable external obligations in connection with IBRD and EX-IM loans and the prospective GARIOA settlement. Export-Import Bank loans to Japan are of direct assistance to Japanese industry and trade but are primarily a means of expanding U.S. agricultural exports to Japan. IBRD loans have financed essential infrastructure power and transportation items.

9. The current excellent state of the Japanese economy, however, should not obscure the fact that Japan faces economic handicaps, including a heavy dependence on international trade which involves factors over which Japan itself has little direct control, and natural resources limited in relation to its population, its industrial development and its importance in world trade. The Japanese economy can be materially affected by recessions in other industrial nations and by the degree of discrimination against Japanese exports. A long history of discrimination against Japan in international trade has caused the Japanese to become extremely sensitive politically to fluctuations in world trade levels.

10. Despite the prosperity and a steadily rising level of personal consumption, the standard of living of the Japanese, though the highest in the Far East, is still low by Western standards (per capita GNP is about one-eighth that of the United States) and there are constant pressures to raise it more rapidly. To maintain its economy at a high and expanding level Japan must have continued adequate access to raw materials and to markets for its industrial products, and this access depends largely on the policies pursued by the other countries. In meeting its trade problems, Japan heavily depends upon the United States not only as its most important source of industrial raw materials and largest single market but also for leadership in fostering liberal trade policies throughout the Free World and particularly among the industrial nations [Page 340] of Western Europe. If Japan’s trade relationship with the United States significantly deteriorated, the Japanese leadership would consider a shift toward reliance on the Communist Bloc to be the only alternative.

11. The Japanese self-defense establishment is presently capable of maintaining internal security and making a limited contribution to the defense of the Japan area against a conventional attack and an even more limited contribution to defense against nuclear attack. The ground forces, most advanced of the three services, can conduct limited defensive operations; the Navy can contribute to anti-submarine warfare as well as to escort and coastal defense operations; and the Air Force has assumed increasing responsibility for the aircraft control and warning system and the air defense of Japan.

12. The Japanese Government is moving ahead with a defense program which, if carried out, would produce by 1965 small, modern, high-quality military forces, but with no nuclear capability. The present mission of the Japanese defense forces, other than that of supporting the police in the maintenance of internal security, is to participate in the defense of the Japan area. Any expansion of this mission to use those forces outside the Japan area is barred by Article 9 of the Constitution which, as it is presently interpreted, limits the deployment of Japanese military forces to the self-defense of Japan. If the forces develop as planned, Japan will commensurately assume defense responsibilities now borne by the United States, but by 1965 will still have only limited ability to defend Japan against a major attack and virtually no capability to survive an extensive nuclear attack.

13. Japanese defense expenditures are extremely low relative to those of other industrialized nations. Although in six years the Japanese Government has more than doubled its defense budget, only about 1.3 percent of the gross national product (about 10 percent of the government budget) is devoted to defense. Although a gradual increase in actual defense expenditures will be necessary if the presently projected build-up is to be carried out on schedule, the rate of increase may not be commensurate with the rate of growth of the economy. In the absence of a significant change in the present situation or greater receptivity on the part of the Japanese to U.S. efforts at persuasion, a more substantial increase in defense expenditures is not likely in view of (a) the latent pacifism and the anti-militarism among substantial segments of the populace, (b) the pressures for better living standards in general, tax reductions, and increased social and public services in particular, (c) the need to meet Japan’s growing external commitments, which derives in part from its desire to exert its influence abroad through assistance to less-developed areas, (d) the underlying conviction that Japan is indefensible in a nuclear war, and (e) the lack of a widespread public acceptance [Page 341] in Japan of the view that forces of the size and capability which the United States envisages for Japan are essential to Japanese security.

14. Despite the above, the Japanese Government is accepting the idea that Japan should carry an increasing share of the cost of its own defense. U.S. assistance has been particularly effective in stimulating these increased expenditures and decisions to modernize the Japanese forces. Indeed, it is estimated that the projected increase in Japanese defense expenditures will be attainable only if the United States is successful in utilizing the MAP cost-sharing technique to induce a maximum Japanese defense effort. Japanese reaction to a phasing-out of U.S. military assistance would depend upon the rate and manner of the reduction. If new commitments were terminated abruptly, the Japanese would probably not only fail to make a compensatory increase in other expenditures but would probably reduce expenditures from presently planned levels, thereby virtually halting any further build-up and modernization of the Japanese armed forces and precluding the gradual assumption by Japanese armed forces of missions now performed by U.S. forces in defense of Japan. Even if reductions in new U.S. commitments were to be made gradually and phased over a period of several years, the Japanese would probably fail to take up the slack for several years at least, and there would be adverse political effects.

15. Japan will rely primarily for its security on U.S. military power. The new treaty arrangements provide for the United States to maintain bases and exercise certain rights in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. Therefore, the United States will probably be able to maintain a substantial military position in Japan. [19 lines of source text not declassified]

International Orientation

16. In foreign policy there are three courses of action open to Japan: (a) close cooperation and alignment with the Free World, particularly the United States; (b) a course of expedient opportunism where Japan would play the Free World off against the Communist world; and (c) political and economic accommodation with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Japan is committed at present to a policy of alignment with the Free World and this alignment will be strengthened by the coming into effect of the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States.

17. Japan, however, can be expected to continue this commitment only as long as it satisfies its vital interests. The most crucial considerations will be Japan’s need for expanding trade and, consequently, for access to a fair and reasonable share of the U.S. market and other Free World markets. In this context, access to the European market and close [Page 342] association with Free World industrial groupings is likely to have an increasing bearing on Japanese policy. The commitment to the Free World is also conditioned upon our treatment of Japan as a full and major ally and Japanese confidence in our ability and determination to deter Communist aggression.

18. Japan will be under constant pressures to disengage from its alignment with the Free World. Neutralization or disengagement of Japan is given very high priority by the Sino-Soviet Bloc which must be expected to continue its present intensive efforts to accomplish this objective. The Sino-Soviet campaign will employ every tactic from threats and encouragement of conservative factionalism, to such inducements as trade, territorial concessions, easing of existing fishing restrictions and access to Siberian and Mainland China development. There is already a vocal minority in Japan supporting disengagement from the Free World. In the event of a serious impasse in U.S.-Japanese trade relations, particularly during a period of weak conservative government, the attraction to disengagement could quickly grow based on appeals to national pride, pacifism and anti-militarism, fears of involvement in another nuclear war, and the underlying distrust of foreign military bases. On the other hand, a fruitful relationship with the United States and the Free World is likely over the years to strengthen and solidify Japan’s commitment to this policy.

19. Within the framework of its alignment with the United States, Japan, as its power and self-confidence grow, will be disposed to act with a greater degree of independence, shaping its policies to suit its interests rather than U.S. desires. In its relations with the United States, it is likely in particular to seek a larger voice in the framing of Asian policies, and to insist on more U.S. support in breaking down the barriers to access to European and other regional markets and economic groupings. Japan will continue to seek an increasing degree of participation in Ryukyuan affairs, and the presently quiescent issue of U.S. administration of the islands must be recognized as a politically sensitive problem in U.S.-Japanese relations should major issues arise in U.S. relations with the islanders. Another issue which may arise and cause difficulty is resentment over exclusion of Japanese nationals from other Pacific territories under U.S. administration. Japan will devote major effort and interest to strengthening its relations, particularly economic, with the Afro-Asian nations and Latin America, contributing to their economic development and seeking a more prominent role among these nations while exercising a moderating influence against extremism. It is likely to expand cautiously its trade and cultural exchanges with the Sino-Soviet Bloc but to avoid political recognition of Communist China and economic dependence on the Bloc.

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20. In sum, Japan will play a role of increasing importance in international affairs, and, assuming its ties with the United States and the Free World remain strong, will be a constructive international force. Its own contribution to Free World strength will be principally as an economic force and as a moderating influence on the Afro-Asian area. Unless there is a significant change in Japanese thinking on military matters, Japan is not likely to enter regional security arrangements, but the availability of logistic facilities and military bases to the United States will contribute significantly to Free World military strength in the Pacific.

U.S. Role

21. Because Japan continues to be almost entirely dependent on the United States for military security and heavily dependent on the United States economically, the United States is in a position to have a critical impact on Japan’s international orientation and has an opportunity in the coming years to strengthen and make more secure the present U.S.-Japanese alignment and Japan’s commitment to the Free World.


22. Preservation of the territorial and political integrity of Japan against Communist expansion or subversion

23. A Japan closely allied to the United States and cooperating fully with the other nations of the Free World.

24. A politically stable, internally secure Japan maintaining the principles of representative government.

25. A prosperous, strong and self-supporting Japanese economy, capable of providing rising living standards and oriented toward, and having satisfactory economic relations with, the Free World.

26. A Japan prepared to complement U.S. and other Free World powers in stabilizing the international power balance particularly in Asia and, in this connection, able and willing (a) to contribute to the economic development of less-developed nations of the Free World; (b) to exercise a constructive and moderating leadership in the Afro-Asian Bloc; (c) to strengthen its own defense against external aggression; and (d) to contribute further to the security of the Far East through the continued provision to U.S. military forces of rights, bases and other facilities.

27. A Japan ultimately willing and able to participate more actively in the defense of Free World interests in the Far East.

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Major Policy Guidance


28. Promote the maintenance of an effective, moderate conservative government in Japan as basic to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives.

29. Where appropriate, seek the understanding of, cooperation with and active support for U.S. policies.

30. Encourage–without alienating conservative support–the development of a moderate, responsible political opposition. As appropriate take steps to reduce the influence of extreme left labor leaders, to encourage the transfer of trade union leadership to moderate elements, and to encourage developments which would have a moderating influence on left-wing socialist elements.

31. Devote special attention to dispelling attitudes unfavorable to, and to reinforcing attitudes favorable to, the United States and its policies, particularly among opinion leaders in the information media, intellectual and educational circles, and labor groups.

32. Encourage and, as appropriate, assist the Japanese Government in taking effective internal security measures striking at the organizational basis of Communist power and undermining Communist financial and political strength.

33. Conduct U.S. relations with Japan in a spirit of partnership and equality, giving full consideration to Japan’s vital interests and consulting with the Japanese Government on matters of mutual interest.

34. Encourage and promote U.S. and, as appropriate, Japanese-sponsored cultural, labor, educational and other exchange programs and seek to broaden scientific cooperation including outer space technology.

35. Continue to associate Japan with U.S. and international planning for cooperative development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; make nuclear equipment and training for peaceful uses available to Japan and exchange nuclear information under appropriate conditions.

36. Promote the further development of cooperative relations between Japan and other free nations and encourage and assist Japan to exercise a moderating and constructive influence on the Afro-Asian nations, particularly at the United Nations. Encourage an over-all settlement between Japan and the Republic of Korea.

37. Use Japan as an example to the less-developed countries of the feasibility of achieving rapid economic progress within a framework of free institutions, in contrast to the harsh and repressive methods adopted by the Communists.

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38. Urge the Japanese Government to continue to refuse diplomatic recognition to Communist China and to oppose entry of Communist China into the United Nations.

39. Support and encourage Japan in asserting its legitimate territorial fishing and other claims against the Sino-Soviet Bloc and in resisting Sino-Soviet pressures for neutralization and political concessions; do not concede the Soviet Union’s claim to sovereignty over the Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin.


40. Maintain the new security arrangements signed on January 19, 1960, including the base rights provided therein, and, in accordance with the provisions of these arrangements, maintain in Japan a level of U.S. military facilities and forces required (a) by U.S. security interests and (b) to demonstrate our determination to fulfill our treaty commitments in Japan and the Far East: but at a general level no higher than that mutually agreed upon by the United States and the Japanese Government.

41. Under the provisions of the security arrangements with Japan:

a. Assist in the defense of Japan in the event of an armed attack against the territories under the administration of Japan. [2 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

42. Inform the Japanese, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of major U.S. logistic operations from bases in Japan to areas outside of Japan and of the major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan.

43. Seek maximum cooperation and support from the Japanese Government and public in implementing the new status of forces agreements.4

44. While avoiding pressures likely to be counter-productive, encourage Japan to develop and maintain armed forces capable of assuming increasing responsibility for the defense of the Japan area and thereby, together with U.S. forces, of coping with and deterring Communist aggression in the Pacific. Respond positively to, but until conditions permit take no action to stimulate, initiatives by Japan to participate more actively in the defense of Free World interest in the Far East.

45. Continue to consult with the Japanese Government concerning the rate and direction of defense development and the scope and nature of U.S. military assistance. While avoiding pressures and other actions [Page 346] prejudicial to Japan’s political and economic stability, encourage Japan to increase its defense effort and to modernize its military forces. Continue grant military assistance for the present, by so doing seeking (a) to elicit a greater Japanese defense effort; (b) to stimulate the modernization of Japan’s military forces; (c) to permit continued U.S. influence over the evolution of Japan’s defense forces; and (d) to provide for the continued transfer to Japan’s forces of defense missions now discharged by the U.S. forces in Japan. In order to achieve the orderly reduction and early elimination of new commitments for the provision of military equipment to Japan on a grant basis, undertake, as soon as deemed feasible by the President, consultations with the Japanese Government toward this end. Seek to place new commitments on a cost-sharing basis to the maximum extent possible.

46. Consult with the Japanese Government on security and defense matters of mutual interest, using such consultations to develop a better understanding of the common security objectives of the Free World defense arrangements and the importance of regional security efforts, but avoiding direct pressures on the Japanese Government to join collective security arrangements. Broaden arrangements for coordinated U.S.-Japanese military planning and operations of the defense of the Japan area.

47. In order to assure the maintenance of specialized logistic capabilities in Japan as required by U.S. security interests, encourage Japan to maintain selected defense and defense-supporting industries.

48. Develop arrangements with the Japan Defense Forces for cooperation in military research and development.

49. Recognizing the unique Japanese sensitivities to the employment of nuclear weapons and the desirability from a military point of view of obtaining permission to store in Japan nuclear weapons for U.S. forces in Japan, continue as appropriate the present discreet and selective efforts to bring about a better understanding and acceptance by Japan of the importance of nuclear weapons in modern warfare.

Ryukyus, Bonins and Other Pacific Islands

50. Take into account Japanese interests in the Pacific Ocean area.

51. Taking into account the Communist threat in the Far East and the new security arrangements with Japan signed on January 19, 1960, maintain the degree of control over the islands enumerated in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty5 deemed by the President to be essential to our vital security interests.

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52. Take those steps best designed to limit reversionist pressures in Japan and in the Ryukyus, recognizing that, although there are no major difficulties at present, administration of the Ryukyus is a continuing politically sensitive issue in U.S.-Japanese relations. To this end Japanese requests for closer relations with the Ryukyus in such areas as trade, cultural relations, provision of economic assistance and the interchange of nationals should be considered sympathetically6 consistent with U.S. security interests in the area.

53. Conduct our administration of the Ryukyus so as to promote political stability, economic advancement, and reasonable satisfaction with U.S. retention, and so as to enhance our prestige in the eyes of the local population and other Asian peoples. To accomplish these goals, provide for sufficient support to supplement local resources for support of effective administration of the islands and reasonable progress in long-term economic development.7


54. Encourage Japan to maintain a strong, healthy, self-supporting and expanding economy which will permit improvement in Japan’s living standards, provide more capital for the development of less-developed nations, and make a greater contribution to the strength of the Free World.

55. Foster a high level of trade between the United States and Japan by:

Maintaining in the United States a liberal import policy and seeking to reduce further U.S. tariffs and trade restrictions on a reciprocal basis in accordance with established trade agreement principles and the GATT,8 having due regard for foreign policy objectives, national security and total national advantage.
Continuing to press Japan to abolish discrimination against imports from the United States.

56. Foster a high level of trade between Japan and other Free World nations by:

Pressing for a general reduction of trade barriers.
Urging those Free World nations which discriminate against Japanese goods to eliminate such discrimination, particularly seeking to persuade those countries which now invoke Article XXXV of GATT9 against Japan to rescind their action and accord to Japan the full privileges of GATT membership.
Seeking to ensure that Japan has access on a non-discriminatory basis to Free World sources of raw materials.

57. Cooperate with Japan and other countries in seeking a multilateral solution to the problem of market disruption within the framework of GATT.

58. Encourage Japan to eliminate restrictions on international trade and payments, to provide a hospitable climate for foreign investment, and to eliminate restrictions on direct investment in Japan.

59. Seek to prevent Japan’s becoming dependent on Communist areas for essential food and raw material supplies and for export markets.

60. Encourage Japan in its progress toward following internationally accepted trade practices. Encourage orderly marketing practices and the avoidance of market disruption.

61. Terminate the grant Technical Assistance program at the end of FY 1961.

62. Continue encouragement of private U.S. investments in Japan.

63. In so far as possible, advise the Japanese Government of impending developments expected to have a major effect on U.S. Government expenditures in Japan.

64. Urge Japan to settle without delay the GARIOA claims and other property and claims matters.

65. Encourage Japan to provide increasing amounts of capital and technical assistance for the development of less-developed nations through private industry, Free World international institutions, and bilateral government programs; take Japanese assistance programs, including reparations, into account in the framing and implementation of U.S. aid programs in third countries, coordinating with the Japanese where appropriate.

66. Actively support Japan’s continued participation in the Development Assistance Group and at the appropriate time sponsor Japan’s association with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, through its development assistance organization, and with any other appropriate multilateral economic organizations.

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67. Encourage Japan to continue its activities in support of the proposed Asian Productivity Organization; and to continue to cooperate in the Third Country Training Program.

68. Urge Japan’s continued cooperation in COCOM on the agreed level of export controls on trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and endeavor to handle questions of routine exceptions in such a manner as to preserve and foster Japan’s willingness to retain the agreed level of controls.

  1. Source: Department of State S/SNSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6008 Series. Secret.
  2. See footnotes 17 and 15, Document 168.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  5. Agreement regarding the status of the United States forces in Japan, and agreed official minutes, signed at Tokyo February 19, 1954, and entered into force for the United States June 11, 1954. For text, see 5 UST (pt. 2) 1123.
  6. These include the Ryukyu Islands (exclusive of the Amami Islands), the Daito Islands, the Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands, Rosairo Island, Parece Vela Island and Marcus Island. [Footnote in the source text.]
  7. The term “considered sympathetically” is to be interpreted as meaning that a positive attitude will be taken toward Japanese requests. [Footnote in the source text.]
  8. H.R. 1157, now pending in the Congress, would authorize appropriations of up to $6 million annually from Federal income taxes withheld at the source from persons stationed or employed in the Ryukyu Islands, for the purpose of promoting economic and social development in the Ryukyu Islands. In connection with this legislation, the Administration has taken the position that appropriations made under this authorization would meet the broad requirements of this guidance. [Footnote in the source text. The bill was signed into law on July 12 as P.L. 86–629. For text, see 74 Stat. 461.]
  9. For information on GATT negotiations and meetings, see vol. IV, pp. 152 ff.
  10. This is the provision permitting GATT members to withhold from new members benefits–such as most-favored nation status–granted under the GATT agreement. [Footnote in the source text.]