Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security
Council
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Commerce, the Acting Secretary of Labor, and the Director,
Bureau of the Budget, at the 446th NSC
Meeting on May 31, 1960, adopted the statement of policy on the subject
contained in NSC 6008, subject to the
amendments set forth in NSC Action No.
2240–c.
The President after further consideration of the discussion at the 446th
NSC Meeting with respect to
paragraph 60 of NSC 6008, directed that
the following wording at the end of the first sentence of that paragraph
be deleted as being too detailed for inclusion in an NSC policy paper:
The President, as of this date, approved the statement of policy in
NSC 6008, as amended and enclosed
herewith as NSC 6008/1; directs its
implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of
the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as
the coordinating agency.
Attachment
STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD JAPAN
General Considerations
Introduction
1. Japan stands today as a fully independent and influential member
of international society. It has made a spectacular recovery from
the 1945 low point, particularly on the economic front, and is
unique as the only highly industrialized nation in the Asian-African
area. Given its demonstrated capabilities and its aspirations for
international prestige and leadership, Japan will have in the coming
years a growing impact on the balance of power in Asia. The chief
task of U.S. policy is to assure that Japan continues to exercise
its international role predominantly in concert with Free World
interests. The decision on Japan’s international orientation will be
made by its own leaders on the basis of their assessment of its
vital national interests and domestic political factors, but U.S.
policy will have a crucial bearing on this determination because of
Japan’s critical dependence upon the United States for defense and
trade.
Importance of Japan
2. Japan’s dramatic recovery emphasizes its importance to the United
States and the Free World. In overall strategic terms, Japan is one
of the four major industrial complexes in the world and, if Japan’s
industrial strength were harnessed to Communist Bloc power, the
world balance of power would be significantly altered. Militarily,
Japan is the key to the defense of the Western Pacific against
Communist aggression. Her logistic facilities and bases are
indispensable to an economical and effective defense of the Far
East. Economically, Japan is the second largest export market for
the United States and the largest purchaser of U.S. agricultural
products; the United States is the largest importer of Japanese
goods. Finally, Japan, as an Asian nation, has potential for
contributing–particularly in the area of economic assistance–to the
development of the many newly-emerging underdeveloped nations in
Afro-Asia.
Internal Situation
3. Political power in Japan may be expected, barring unforeseen
developments, to remain in the hands of the moderate conservative
forces, whose policies will be most strongly guided by Japan’s
economic interests and the urge to satisfy Japan’s international
aspirations. The
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conservatives enjoy solid majority support mainly by virtue of the
inherent conservatism of the Japanese people, their demonstrated
success in meeting Japan’s economic problems, and the extremism of
much of the opposition, although their position would be threatened
if living conditions failed to improve over an extended period of
time.
4. The principal cause of political instability is the factionalism
endemic to the Japanese conservative movement, which can breed
ineffectual governments if not curbed. Although the leaders of all
factions of the Liberal Democratic Party appear in varying degrees
to recognize the necessity of close ties with the West, some have
shown serious political irresponsibility in their intra-party
struggles for power. As a consequence, conservative governments in
Japan have been tempted occasionally to sponsor opportunistic
policies, to be less cooperative with the United States, and to be
susceptible to appeals based on emotionally-tinged nationalism.
5. The chief opposition to the conservative Liberal Democratic Party
in the Diet has come from the Socialists, who are dominated by
extreme left-wing elements advocating a Communist-oriented
neutralism. Recently the minority moderate Socialists split off,
forming the Democratic Socialist Party. Although this new party is
still in a formative stage, the split may in time offer a
broader-based moderate, responsible, center-right Socialist
alternative to continued Conservative rule. At present, however,
left-wing extremists still outnumber moderate Socialists both in the
Diet and in the trade union movement; presenting difficult problems
for the United States, since these extremists are strongly
anti-United States.
6. The Communist Party, though numerically weak, exercises a
significant influence over Japanese opinion particularly through its
penetration of mass organizations, labor, education and the
information media. The ruling conservatives are aware of the dangers
inherent in this situation and the prospects are that the
countermeasures already begun will keep this Communist influence
from significantly increasing.
7. Japan has one of the fastest rates of economic growth in the world
(averaging 7.6 percent annually during the past three years) and is
currently enjoying unprecedented prosperity, with new highs in
nearly all sectors of the economy in 1959. While the extraordinarily
high rate of investment (nearly 30 percent in recent years), the
modern industrial plant, and technical skills of the labor force
have contributed to this prosperity, essentially it would not have
been possible without the significant expansion of Japan’s
international trade and sound governmental fiscal and monetary
policies. Increased exports brought about a marked improvement in
Japan’s international accounts in the past two years and indications
are that this improvement will continue at least
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over the short term. Substantial
surpluses on current account were registered and are reflected in
relatively high foreign exchange reserves.
8. This prosperity enables Japan to contribute to the development of
less-developed countries not only through the reparations programs,
but also through private Japanese investments and bilateral
government programs. Through reparations and settlements of war-time
obligations, Japan is committed to provide certain Southeast Asian
nations with more than one billion dollars in grants and to
facilitate loans and investments amounting to more than $700 million
over the next 20 years. Disbursements average about $70 million
annually. Other bilateral government programs amounted to about $130
million in 1959, and included not only Southeast Asia but also India
and some of the Middle East nations. Japanese private investors are
also investing abroad in substantial amounts with funds flowing to
Southeast Asia, Latin America and even to parts of the United
States. Japan does, however, have sizeable external obligations in
connection with IBRD and EX-IM loans and the prospective GARIOA settlement. Export-Import
Bank loans to Japan are of direct assistance to Japanese industry
and trade but are primarily a means of expanding U.S. agricultural
exports to Japan. IBRD loans have
financed essential infrastructure power and transportation
items.
9. The current excellent state of the Japanese economy, however,
should not obscure the fact that Japan faces economic handicaps,
including a heavy dependence on international trade which involves
factors over which Japan itself has little direct control, and
natural resources limited in relation to its population, its
industrial development and its importance in world trade. The
Japanese economy can be materially affected by recessions in other
industrial nations and by the degree of discrimination against
Japanese exports. A long history of discrimination against Japan in
international trade has caused the Japanese to become extremely
sensitive politically to fluctuations in world trade levels.
10. Despite the prosperity and a steadily rising level of personal
consumption, the standard of living of the Japanese, though the
highest in the Far East, is still low by Western standards (per
capita GNP is about one-eighth that of the United States) and there
are constant pressures to raise it more rapidly. To maintain its
economy at a high and expanding level Japan must have continued
adequate access to raw materials and to markets for its industrial
products, and this access depends largely on the policies pursued by
the other countries. In meeting its trade problems, Japan heavily
depends upon the United States not only as its most important source
of industrial raw materials and largest single market but also for
leadership in fostering liberal trade policies throughout the Free
World and particularly among the industrial nations
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of Western Europe. If Japan’s trade
relationship with the United States significantly deteriorated, the
Japanese leadership would consider a shift toward reliance on the
Communist Bloc to be the only alternative.
11. The Japanese self-defense establishment is presently capable of
maintaining internal security and making a limited contribution to
the defense of the Japan area against a conventional attack and an
even more limited contribution to defense against nuclear attack.
The ground forces, most advanced of the three services, can conduct
limited defensive operations; the Navy can contribute to
anti-submarine warfare as well as to escort and coastal defense
operations; and the Air Force has assumed increasing responsibility
for the aircraft control and warning system and the air defense of
Japan.
12. The Japanese Government is moving ahead with a defense program
which, if carried out, would produce by 1965 small, modern,
high-quality military forces, but with no nuclear capability. The
present mission of the Japanese defense forces, other than that of
supporting the police in the maintenance of internal security, is to
participate in the defense of the Japan area. Any expansion of this
mission to use those forces outside the Japan area is barred by
Article 9 of the Constitution which, as it is presently interpreted,
limits the deployment of Japanese military forces to the
self-defense of Japan. If the forces develop as planned, Japan will
commensurately assume defense responsibilities now borne by the
United States, but by 1965 will still have only limited ability to
defend Japan against a major attack and virtually no capability to
survive an extensive nuclear attack.
13. Japanese defense expenditures are extremely low relative to those
of other industrialized nations. Although in six years the Japanese
Government has more than doubled its defense budget, only about 1.3
percent of the gross national product (about 10 percent of the
government budget) is devoted to defense. Although a gradual
increase in actual defense expenditures will be necessary if the
presently projected build-up is to be carried out on schedule, the
rate of increase may not be commensurate with the rate of growth of
the economy. In the absence of a significant change in the present
situation or greater receptivity on the part of the Japanese to U.S.
efforts at persuasion, a more substantial increase in defense
expenditures is not likely in view of (a) the latent pacifism and
the anti-militarism among substantial segments of the populace, (b)
the pressures for better living standards in general, tax
reductions, and increased social and public services in particular,
(c) the need to meet Japan’s growing external commitments, which
derives in part from its desire to exert its influence abroad
through assistance to less-developed areas, (d) the underlying
conviction that Japan is indefensible in a nuclear war, and (e) the
lack of a widespread public acceptance
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in Japan of the view that forces of the size
and capability which the United States envisages for Japan are
essential to Japanese security.
14. Despite the above, the Japanese Government is accepting the idea
that Japan should carry an increasing share of the cost of its own
defense. U.S. assistance has been particularly effective in
stimulating these increased expenditures and decisions to modernize
the Japanese forces. Indeed, it is estimated that the projected
increase in Japanese defense expenditures will be attainable only if
the United States is successful in utilizing the MAP cost-sharing technique to induce a
maximum Japanese defense effort. Japanese reaction to a phasing-out
of U.S. military assistance would depend upon the rate and manner of
the reduction. If new commitments were terminated abruptly, the
Japanese would probably not only fail to make a compensatory
increase in other expenditures but would probably reduce
expenditures from presently planned levels, thereby virtually
halting any further build-up and modernization of the Japanese armed
forces and precluding the gradual assumption by Japanese armed
forces of missions now performed by U.S. forces in defense of Japan.
Even if reductions in new U.S. commitments were to be made gradually
and phased over a period of several years, the Japanese would
probably fail to take up the slack for several years at least, and
there would be adverse political effects.
15. Japan will rely primarily for its security on U.S. military
power. The new treaty arrangements provide for the United States to
maintain bases and exercise certain rights in Japan for the purpose
of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of
international peace and security in the Far East. Therefore, the
United States will probably be able to maintain a substantial
military position in Japan. [19 lines of source
text not declassified]
International Orientation
16. In foreign policy there are three courses of action open to
Japan: (a) close cooperation and alignment with the Free World,
particularly the United States; (b) a course of expedient
opportunism where Japan would play the Free World off against the
Communist world; and (c) political and economic accommodation with
the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Japan is committed at present to a policy of
alignment with the Free World and this alignment will be
strengthened by the coming into effect of the new Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security with the United States.
17. Japan, however, can be expected to continue this commitment only
as long as it satisfies its vital interests. The most crucial
considerations will be Japan’s need for expanding trade and,
consequently, for access to a fair and reasonable share of the U.S.
market and other Free World markets. In this context, access to the
European market and close
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association with Free World industrial groupings is likely to have
an increasing bearing on Japanese policy. The commitment to the Free
World is also conditioned upon our treatment of Japan as a full and
major ally and Japanese confidence in our ability and determination
to deter Communist aggression.
18. Japan will be under constant pressures to disengage from its
alignment with the Free World. Neutralization or disengagement of
Japan is given very high priority by the Sino-Soviet Bloc which must
be expected to continue its present intensive efforts to accomplish
this objective. The Sino-Soviet campaign will employ every tactic
from threats and encouragement of conservative factionalism, to such
inducements as trade, territorial concessions, easing of existing
fishing restrictions and access to Siberian and Mainland China
development. There is already a vocal minority in Japan supporting
disengagement from the Free World. In the event of a serious impasse
in U.S.-Japanese trade relations, particularly during a period of
weak conservative government, the attraction to disengagement could
quickly grow based on appeals to national pride, pacifism and
anti-militarism, fears of involvement in another nuclear war, and
the underlying distrust of foreign military bases. On the other
hand, a fruitful relationship with the United States and the Free
World is likely over the years to strengthen and solidify Japan’s
commitment to this policy.
19. Within the framework of its alignment with the United States,
Japan, as its power and self-confidence grow, will be disposed to
act with a greater degree of independence, shaping its policies to
suit its interests rather than U.S. desires. In its relations with
the United States, it is likely in particular to seek a larger voice
in the framing of Asian policies, and to insist on more U.S. support
in breaking down the barriers to access to European and other
regional markets and economic groupings. Japan will continue to seek
an increasing degree of participation in Ryukyuan affairs, and the
presently quiescent issue of U.S. administration of the islands must
be recognized as a politically sensitive problem in U.S.-Japanese
relations should major issues arise in U.S. relations with the
islanders. Another issue which may arise and cause difficulty is
resentment over exclusion of Japanese nationals from other Pacific
territories under U.S. administration. Japan will devote major
effort and interest to strengthening its relations, particularly
economic, with the Afro-Asian nations and Latin America,
contributing to their economic development and seeking a more
prominent role among these nations while exercising a moderating
influence against extremism. It is likely to expand cautiously its
trade and cultural exchanges with the Sino-Soviet Bloc but to avoid
political recognition of Communist China and economic dependence on
the Bloc.
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20. In sum, Japan will play a role of increasing importance in
international affairs, and, assuming its ties with the United States
and the Free World remain strong, will be a constructive
international force. Its own contribution to Free World strength
will be principally as an economic force and as a moderating
influence on the Afro-Asian area. Unless there is a significant
change in Japanese thinking on military matters, Japan is not likely
to enter regional security arrangements, but the availability of
logistic facilities and military bases to the United States will
contribute significantly to Free World military strength in the
Pacific.
U.S. Role
21. Because Japan continues to be almost entirely dependent on the
United States for military security and heavily dependent on the
United States economically, the United States is in a position to
have a critical impact on Japan’s international orientation and has
an opportunity in the coming years to strengthen and make more
secure the present U.S.-Japanese alignment and Japan’s commitment to
the Free World.
Objectives
22. Preservation of the territorial and political integrity of Japan
against Communist expansion or subversion
23. A Japan closely allied to the United States and cooperating fully
with the other nations of the Free World.
24. A politically stable, internally secure Japan maintaining the
principles of representative government.
25. A prosperous, strong and self-supporting Japanese economy,
capable of providing rising living standards and oriented toward,
and having satisfactory economic relations with, the Free World.
26. A Japan prepared to complement U.S. and other Free World powers
in stabilizing the international power balance particularly in Asia
and, in this connection, able and willing (a) to contribute to the
economic development of less-developed nations of the Free World;
(b) to exercise a constructive and moderating leadership in the
Afro-Asian Bloc; (c) to strengthen its own defense against external
aggression; and (d) to contribute further to the security of the Far
East through the continued provision to U.S. military forces of
rights, bases and other facilities.
27. A Japan ultimately willing and able to participate more actively
in the defense of Free World interests in the Far East.
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Major Policy Guidance
Political
28. Promote the maintenance of an effective, moderate conservative
government in Japan as basic to the accomplishment of U.S.
objectives.
29. Where appropriate, seek the understanding of, cooperation with
and active support for U.S. policies.
30. Encourage–without alienating conservative support–the development
of a moderate, responsible political opposition. As appropriate take
steps to reduce the influence of extreme left labor leaders, to
encourage the transfer of trade union leadership to moderate
elements, and to encourage developments which would have a
moderating influence on left-wing socialist elements.
31. Devote special attention to dispelling attitudes unfavorable to,
and to reinforcing attitudes favorable to, the United States and its
policies, particularly among opinion leaders in the information
media, intellectual and educational circles, and labor groups.
32. Encourage and, as appropriate, assist the Japanese Government in
taking effective internal security measures striking at the
organizational basis of Communist power and undermining Communist
financial and political strength.
33. Conduct U.S. relations with Japan in a spirit of partnership and
equality, giving full consideration to Japan’s vital interests and
consulting with the Japanese Government on matters of mutual
interest.
34. Encourage and promote U.S. and, as appropriate,
Japanese-sponsored cultural, labor, educational and other exchange
programs and seek to broaden scientific cooperation including outer
space technology.
35. Continue to associate Japan with U.S. and international planning
for cooperative development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
make nuclear equipment and training for peaceful uses available to
Japan and exchange nuclear information under appropriate
conditions.
36. Promote the further development of cooperative relations between
Japan and other free nations and encourage and assist Japan to
exercise a moderating and constructive influence on the Afro-Asian
nations, particularly at the United Nations. Encourage an over-all
settlement between Japan and the Republic of Korea.
37. Use Japan as an example to the less-developed countries of the
feasibility of achieving rapid economic progress within a framework
of free institutions, in contrast to the harsh and repressive
methods adopted by the Communists.
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38. Urge the Japanese Government to continue to refuse diplomatic
recognition to Communist China and to oppose entry of Communist
China into the United Nations.
39. Support and encourage Japan in asserting its legitimate
territorial fishing and other claims against the Sino-Soviet Bloc
and in resisting Sino-Soviet pressures for neutralization and
political concessions; do not concede the Soviet Union’s claim to
sovereignty over the Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin.
Military
40. Maintain the new security arrangements signed on January 19,
1960, including the base rights provided therein, and, in accordance
with the provisions of these arrangements, maintain in Japan a level
of U.S. military facilities and forces required (a) by U.S. security
interests and (b) to demonstrate our determination to fulfill our
treaty commitments in Japan and the Far East: but at a general level
no higher than that mutually agreed upon by the United States and
the Japanese Government.
41. Under the provisions of the security arrangements with Japan:
a. Assist in the defense of Japan in the event of an armed attack
against the territories under the administration of Japan. [2 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not
declassified]
42. Inform the Japanese, [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] of major U.S. logistic
operations from bases in Japan to areas outside of Japan and of the
major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan.
43. Seek maximum cooperation and support from the Japanese Government
and public in implementing the new status of forces agreements.4
44. While avoiding pressures likely to be counter-productive,
encourage Japan to develop and maintain armed forces capable of
assuming increasing responsibility for the defense of the Japan area
and thereby, together with U.S. forces, of coping with and deterring
Communist aggression in the Pacific. Respond positively to, but
until conditions permit take no action to stimulate, initiatives by
Japan to participate more actively in the defense of Free World
interest in the Far East.
45. Continue to consult with the Japanese Government concerning the
rate and direction of defense development and the scope and nature
of U.S. military assistance. While avoiding pressures and other
actions
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prejudicial to
Japan’s political and economic stability, encourage Japan to
increase its defense effort and to modernize its military forces.
Continue grant military assistance for the present, by so doing
seeking (a) to elicit a greater Japanese defense effort; (b) to
stimulate the modernization of Japan’s military forces; (c) to
permit continued U.S. influence over the evolution of Japan’s
defense forces; and (d) to provide for the continued transfer to
Japan’s forces of defense missions now discharged by the U.S. forces
in Japan. In order to achieve the orderly reduction and early
elimination of new commitments for the provision of military
equipment to Japan on a grant basis, undertake, as soon as deemed
feasible by the President, consultations with the Japanese
Government toward this end. Seek to place new commitments on a
cost-sharing basis to the maximum extent possible.
46. Consult with the Japanese Government on security and defense
matters of mutual interest, using such consultations to develop a
better understanding of the common security objectives of the Free
World defense arrangements and the importance of regional security
efforts, but avoiding direct pressures on the Japanese Government to
join collective security arrangements. Broaden arrangements for
coordinated U.S.-Japanese military planning and operations of the
defense of the Japan area.
47. In order to assure the maintenance of specialized logistic
capabilities in Japan as required by U.S. security interests,
encourage Japan to maintain selected defense and defense-supporting
industries.
48. Develop arrangements with the Japan Defense Forces for
cooperation in military research and development.
49. Recognizing the unique Japanese sensitivities to the employment
of nuclear weapons and the desirability from a military point of
view of obtaining permission to store in Japan nuclear weapons for
U.S. forces in Japan, continue as appropriate the present discreet
and selective efforts to bring about a better understanding and
acceptance by Japan of the importance of nuclear weapons in modern
warfare.
Ryukyus, Bonins and Other Pacific
Islands
50. Take into account Japanese interests in the Pacific Ocean
area.
51. Taking into account the Communist threat in the Far East and the
new security arrangements with Japan signed on January 19, 1960,
maintain the degree of control over the islands enumerated in
Article 3 of the Peace Treaty5 deemed by the President to be essential to
our vital security interests.
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52. Take those steps best designed to limit reversionist pressures in
Japan and in the Ryukyus, recognizing that, although there are no
major difficulties at present, administration of the Ryukyus is a
continuing politically sensitive issue in U.S.-Japanese relations.
To this end Japanese requests for closer relations with the Ryukyus
in such areas as trade, cultural relations, provision of economic
assistance and the interchange of nationals should be considered
sympathetically6 consistent with U.S. security interests
in the area.
53. Conduct our administration of the Ryukyus so as to promote
political stability, economic advancement, and reasonable
satisfaction with U.S. retention, and so as to enhance our prestige
in the eyes of the local population and other Asian peoples. To
accomplish these goals, provide for sufficient support to supplement
local resources for support of effective administration of the
islands and reasonable progress in long-term economic
development.7
Economic
54. Encourage Japan to maintain a strong, healthy, self-supporting
and expanding economy which will permit improvement in Japan’s
living standards, provide more capital for the development of
less-developed nations, and make a greater contribution to the
strength of the Free World.
55. Foster a high level of trade between the United States and Japan
by:
- a.
- Maintaining in the United States a liberal import policy
and seeking to reduce further U.S. tariffs and trade
restrictions on a reciprocal basis in accordance with
established trade agreement principles and the GATT,8 having due
regard for foreign policy objectives, national security and
total national advantage.
- b.
- Continuing to press Japan to abolish discrimination
against imports from the United States.
56. Foster a high level of trade between Japan and other Free World
nations by:
- a.
- Pressing for a general reduction of trade barriers.
- b.
- Urging those Free World nations which discriminate against
Japanese goods to eliminate such discrimination,
particularly seeking to persuade those countries which now
invoke Article XXXV of GATT9 against
Japan to rescind their action and accord to Japan the full
privileges of GATT
membership.
- c.
- Seeking to ensure that Japan has access on a
non-discriminatory basis to Free World sources of raw
materials.
57. Cooperate with Japan and other countries in seeking a
multilateral solution to the problem of market disruption within the
framework of GATT.
58. Encourage Japan to eliminate restrictions on international trade
and payments, to provide a hospitable climate for foreign
investment, and to eliminate restrictions on direct investment in
Japan.
59. Seek to prevent Japan’s becoming dependent on Communist areas for
essential food and raw material supplies and for export markets.
60. Encourage Japan in its progress toward following internationally
accepted trade practices. Encourage orderly marketing practices and
the avoidance of market disruption.
61. Terminate the grant Technical Assistance program at the end of
FY 1961.
62. Continue encouragement of private U.S. investments in Japan.
63. In so far as possible, advise the Japanese Government of
impending developments expected to have a major effect on U.S.
Government expenditures in Japan.
64. Urge Japan to settle without delay the GARIOA claims and other property and claims
matters.
65. Encourage Japan to provide increasing amounts of capital and
technical assistance for the development of less-developed nations
through private industry, Free World international institutions, and
bilateral government programs; take Japanese assistance programs,
including reparations, into account in the framing and
implementation of U.S. aid programs in third countries, coordinating
with the Japanese where appropriate.
66. Actively support Japan’s continued participation in the
Development Assistance Group and at the appropriate time sponsor
Japan’s association with the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, through its development assistance organization,
and with any other appropriate multilateral economic
organizations.
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67. Encourage Japan to continue its activities in support of the
proposed Asian Productivity Organization; and to continue to
cooperate in the Third Country Training Program.
68. Urge Japan’s continued cooperation in COCOM on the agreed level of export controls on trade
with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and endeavor to handle questions of
routine exceptions in such a manner as to preserve and foster
Japan’s willingness to retain the agreed level of controls.
