166. Editorial Note
On May 20 James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, forwarded to the Council for its later consideration copies of NSC 6008, a draft paper titled “U.S. Policy Toward Japan.” Interagency disagreements in the draft included those in paragraphs 44–45 and 51–52. Paragraphs 44 and 45 read:
“44. While avoiding pressures likely to be counter-productive, encourage Japan to develop and maintain armed forces capable of assuming increasing responsibility for the defense of the Japan area and thereby, together with U.S. forces, of coping with and deterring Communist aggression in the Pacific.
| “Majority | “Defense–JCS |
| “Respond positively to, but do not now stimulate, initiatives by Japan to participate more actively in the defense of Free World interests in the Far East. | “As conditions permit, make discreet efforts to induce Japan ultimately to extend the defense mission of the Japanese military forces beyond that of the defense of the immediate Japan area. |
“45. Continue to consult with the Japanese Government concerning the rate and direction of defense development and the scope and nature of U.S. military assistance. While avoiding pressures and other actions prejudicial to Japan’s political and economic stability, encourage Japan to increase its defense effort and to modernize its military forces. Continue grant military assistance for the present, by so doing seeking: (a) to elicit a greater Japanese defense effort; (b) to stimulate the modernization of Japan’s military forces; (c) to permit continued U.S. influence over the evolution of Japan’s defense forces; and (d) to provide for the continued transfer to Japan’s forces of defense missions now discharged by the U.S. forces in Japan.
[Page 311]| “State–Defense–OCDM–JCS | “Treasury–Budget–Commerce |
| “Bearing in mind the desirability of achieving the ultimate goal of an orderly reduction and eventual elimination of new commitments for the provision of military equipment to Japan on a grant basis, recognize that for the next few years the attainment of this goal may not be feasible and that attempts to reduce substantially the level of U.S. assistance within the next few years would lead to seriously adverse political and military effects. | “In order to achieve the orderly reduction and early elimination of new commitments for the provision of military equipment to Japan on a grant basis, undertake promptly consultations with the Japanese Government toward this end. |
“Seek to place new commitments on a cost-sharing basis to the maximum extent possible.”
Paragraphs 51 and 52 read:
| “Majority | “Defense–JCS |
| “51. Maintain the present degree of control over the islands enumerated in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty so long as it is essential to our vital security interests. | “51. For the duration of the international tensions in the Far East created by the Communist threat, maintain the present degree of control over the islands enumerated in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, in view of their essentiality to our vital security interests. |
“52. Take those steps best designed to limit reversionist pressures in Japan and in the Ryukyus, recognizing that, although there are no major difficulties at present, administration of the Ryukyus is a continuing politically sensitive issue in U.S.-Japanese relations. To this end Japanese requests for closer relations with the Ryukyus in such areas as trade, cultural relations, provision of economic assistance and the interchange of nationals
| “State | “Defense–JCS |
| should be acceded to whenever reasonable and not inconsistent | should be considered sympathetically consistent |
| with U.S. security interests in the area.” |
A footnote on the source text states that the Article 3 islands include the Ryukus (except for the Amamis), the Daito, Bonin and Volcano Islands, and Rosairo, Parece Vela, and Marcus. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6008 Series) For additional information on NSC 6008, see Document 167.