Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

164. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, May 26, 1960, 6 p.m.

3871. Eyes only for Secretary. Since both Kishi’s residence and office are being picketed by leftist groups and his every move followed by press it was not possible for me to meet personally with him today without it becoming public knowledge which would have been very unhelpful for him. Accordingly I met with Vice FonMin Yamada this morning and discussed postponement of visit along lines Embtel 3825¹ and your very helpful 2786.² I indicated to Yamada that personally I thought various considerations indicating postponement made sense. Yamada promised to convey substance our discussion to Fujiyama and Kishi at once.

This afternoon I met secretly with Fujiyama. He said that following Yamada’s report, question of postponement of President’s visit had been discussed by both LDP leadership and government. While there were varying opinions within Conservative Party, after careful consideration Kishi and Fujiyama believed that it was best for visit to proceed as planned with President arriving June 19,

Fujiyama explained that in Kishi’s and his considered judgment present Communist offensive against GOJ by Soviet Union, Communist China, and leftist elements within Japan had three basic aims: (1) to defeat treaty, (2) to oust Kishi who is regarded by both Soviets and ChiComs as public enemy no. 1 because of his staunch stand favoring US-Japanese partnership, and (3) to forestall indefinitely President’s visit to Japan. Present campaign against GOJ is, Fujiyama said, being master-minded and supported in many ways by ChiComs and Soviets.

Fujiyama said Kishi is determined to press through ratification of treaty although until treaty is ratified and enters into effect there will be undesirable difficulties and disturbances fomented by pro-Communist elements perhaps even including general strike. However GOJ is determined to push treaty through.

With respect to President’s visit while Kishi and Fujiyama recognize that there may be some demonstrators along road from airport waving red banners and like and while there might be certain “other undesirable scenes” GOJ is certain that it can fully assure safety of President and that there is no personal risk involved for him.

In conclusion Fujiyama said that he and Kishi felt that President’s visit as scheduled would strengthen substantially elements in Japan that favor Japanese-American partnership and would be of material assistance with respect to public opinion in connection with all aspects of Japanese-American partnership including new treaty.

I replied to Fujiyama that I fully appreciated considerations which he had outlined. However, I must tell him frankly and on purely personal basis that I had some reservations and felt that further consideration should be given by himself and Kishi to possibility of postponement. I went on to say that if there were demonstrations against President even though his personal safety were not involved an image might be created in United States and elsewhere of hostile anti-American Japan. In their efforts to drive wedge between Japan and US, creation of such an image was, I felt, one of basic objectives of Communists in addition to three objectives which he had mentioned. I also wanted to mention another consideration as result of what had transpired recently in Paris.³ I had seen comments in American press indicating that there is body of opinion in America that believed President should not travel abroad if it is clear in advance that situations may arise which not only create embarrassment but strike at dignity of Office of President. I said while pro-Communist elements will have continued capability to create disturbance if they so desire whenever President visits Japan, some people think that June 19 visit is bad timing because of conjuncture of President’s arrival with entry into effect of treaty. Given announced leftist intentions, this would seem to make inevitable disturbances. On other hand if visit were postponed until end of July and early August leftist forces would have no such pretext and if they then demonstrated they would be universally condemned by public opinion everywhere.

I said that it would be one thing if it were question of cancellation of President’s visit as this might be interpreted as great victory for Communist elements in Japan. However, we were talking about postponement not cancellation or indefinite putting off of visit. The proposition is that if GOJ so desires, postponement could take place but in announcement of postponement it would be specifically stated that visit would take place “last few days of July and early days of August.” Under these circumstances I did not think postponement could be exploited successfully as leftist victory to detriment of Kishi and his government. I concluded by asking Fujiyama to be good enough to consult again with Prime Minister and give him my personal views and considerations which I had put forward.

Fujiyama said that he would gladly do so. Kishi and GOJ in reaching conclusion that it would be best for visit to proceed on schedule had been thinking largely in terms of Japanese picture and Japanese public opinion whereas I had introduced several other considerations which were important. Fujiyama said that in concluding visit should proceed as scheduled on 19th. GOJ planned to have treaty voted by upper house by about June 10, even though opposition would not be present, so that final ratification by both houses of Diet would be completed before President’s arrival. Under these circumstances Kishi feared among other things that with Japanese ratification completed postponement of President’s visit on Japanese initiative might be used by Kishi’s opponents to charge that Kishi was merely trying to postpone visit in order to prolong life of his government. Nonetheless he would try to see Kishi tonight and would in any event see him and be in touch with me by tomorrow morning.⁴

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/5–2660. Confidential; Niact.
1. Document 161.
2. Document 163.
3. Reference is to the collapse of the summit meeting, May 16-17.
4. The Department replied in telegram 2795 to Tokyo, that “if it remains considered judgment of Kishi that Presidential visit in June as scheduled is vital, President is prepared to come.” MacArthur was asked to convey this to Kishi and assure him that Eisenhower wanted to avoid any action that would risk “Japanese-American partnership.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/5–2660) See Supplement.