Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

154. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, May 11, 1960, 6 p.m.

3628. Embtel 3464.¹ Funada, Chairman LDP Policy Board, called on Ambassador this morning to discuss latest developments on treaty. Funada noted that when they last met (reftel) he had expected treaty would pass lower house shortly before May 20. Circumstances, including U–2 incident, have compelled LDP leadership to modify treaty schedule. He now believes it possible that lower house will pass treaty sometime between May 25 and end of month with upper house approval assured 30 days later although Diet might be extended somewhat beyond that point.

Funada explained that inability make good on previous schedule stemmed from flap over U–2 involving new outburst of LDP factionalism and DSP’s failure to acquiesce in lower house vote before May 15 under “Kiyose formula” (Embtel 3458).²DSP stand, in turn, reflected differences between Nishio and Mizutani groups. In addition to DSP’s wavering, LDP anti-mainstream had been insisting that treaty not be forced through Diet and that there be further deliberation before vote in lower house (Embtel 3609).³ Funada said that while U–2 incident has created tremendous uproar he does not think opponents of treaty will be able to continue to exploit it for too long and he particularly welcomed forthright statement by us (Depcirtel 1408).⁴

Funada said that Miki forces have made it a condition of support for treaty that government clarify explicitly certain controversial points with regard to treaty. It is planned to take care of this partly by prearranged interpellations of GOJ tomorrow by Furui of Miki group (Embtel 2581).⁵ In addition, Miki group may propose resolution to Diet clarifying treaty’s purely defensive character, fact that Far East cannot be geographically defined, meaning of consultation, etc. Such a resolution would not require any change in treaty or related documents and actually would only enunciate definitively what GOJ has been trying to explain in the interpellations. Funada said any such resolution would be worked out carefully within party and that he believed most of principal anti-mainstream elements would join with mainstream in supporting it.

To Ambassador’s question, Funada believes, but cannot be certain, anti-mainstream will join mainstream in putting treaty to vote in lower house late this month even if DSP in end decides to boycott. Basic approach of Kishi and LDP leadership is to put treaty through as smoothly as possible, with DSP present. This may take a few extra days but as a result of LDP leadership’s concessions, prospect now is that in end all LDP faction leaders except Ishibashi and Matsumura (and handful of their followers) will vote for treaty.

Funada said he realized inability meet original schedule for Diet passage of treaty would create complications in handling of treaty by US Senate. He asked, however, if it might not be possible for Senate to conduct all necessary hearings and debate in June after treaty passes lower house and thus be prepared to take final vote immediately after final Diet approval accomplished and before Senate goes out of session.

Ambassador informed Funada Senate would be extremely pressed in closing days of session and would almost certainly close early in July. He could not say whether Senate leadership would be willing conduct hearings on treaty before upper house of Diet has acted but would, however, explore matter with Washington. Ambassador will cable separately his view re Senate action (Deptel 2587).⁶

As conversation closed, Funada said following Diet public hearings May 13–16 situation would be much clearer and he could give us a more considered view re lower house ratification schedule. He will be in touch with Ambassador again at that time.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.947/5–1160. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC and HICOMRYIS for POLAD and to COMUS/Japan.
1. Telegram 3464 from Tokyo, April 26, reported on MacArthur’s meeting with Funada to discuss the lower house’s failure to put through the treaty on April 26, which necessitated an extension of the Diet. Student riots in Korea, according to Funada, encouraged the JSP to make efforts to resort to violence to block approval of the treaty. (Ibid., 611.947/4–2660)
2. Telegram 3458 from Tokyo, April 25, reported that the LDP, DSP, and JSP accepted the formula proposed by Speaker Kiyose: the debate on the treaty would continue and all parties would refrain from actions that would disturb peace and order in the Diet. (Ibid., 611.947/2560)
3. According to telegram 3609, May 10, both the DSP and LDP anti-mainstreamers used the U–2 incident to ask for further debate on the treaty. (Ibid., 611.947/5–1060)
4. Circular telegram 1408, May 7, transmitted a statement made by the Department’s spokesman on the U–2 incident. The statement acknowledged the United States had made flights of unarmed civilian U–2 aircraft for legitimate intelligence gathering “along the frontiers of the Free World for the past four years.” (Ibid., 761.5411/5–760) For text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1960, pp. 818–819.
5. Telegram 2581 from Tokyo, February 10, reported import and export figures. (Department of State, Central Files, 494.00/2–1060)
6. Telegram 2587 to Tokyo, May 6, deals with the establishment of Mace missiles on Okinawa. (Ibid., 794C.56311/5–560)