15. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State0
3202. For Secretary from MacArthur. Fujiyama has alerted me that following the formation of the new Japanese Cabinet, he and Kishi wish to have serious, confidential discussions with me regarding basic security problems, including revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The FonOff is now working on preparation for these talks, with a view to adjusting basic security difficulties with us, including seeking assurances of full consultation and agreement with the GOJ regarding deployment of US forces and their equipment (i.e., nuclears) in Japan and use of US forces based in Japan in hostilities elsewhere in Asia.
The strong pressures within Japan for an equal voice in the basic decisions mentioned above, which directly affect Japan’s national interests and security, are the inevitable consequence of Japan’s recovery from postwar weakness to a position as one of the leading nations in the world.
While Kishi faced heavy political pressure in the Diet and later in the election campaign to secure assurances from the US regarding introduction of nuclears into Japan, he refused to be stampeded into hasty action. In part, I think, this was due to the fact that I have consistently taken the position with him that until the Japanese elections were over and a new government formed, it was most unwise to try to deal with basic security problems since these issues, which require serious and dispassionate study, would inevitably become enmeshed in the emotional atmosphere of a political campaign.
However, the time has now come when we must deal with these basic security problems. I cannot emphasize too strongly that if we are interested in Japan’s basic security alignment with US and the free world (which I understand to be one of our basic foreign policy objectives), we must now treat Japan as a full and equal partner, and not try to prolong the present one-sided and unequal arrangements which give US on paper certain “rights” which, however, are totally unenforceable.
In other words, in revising the security arrangements, we must be prepared to treat Japan on the same basis of equality that we treat our NATO and SEATO and other Allies. We will lose our shirts if we try to hang onto arrangements which, although necessary and appropriate when the agreements were signed, are now overtaken by the evolution of events.
[Page 35]Given the present situation, it seems to me we have only two courses of action. The first would be to resist revising the security treaty and make piecemeal adjustments in our security arrangements, (i.e. on nuclears, deployment and use of US forces in Japan, etc.) giving in reluctantly inch by inch as the pressure and public opinion mount against us. This, I think, would be a disastrous course to follow and could lead to steady erosion of our position in Japan as forces favoring neutralism gain ground by appealing to public sentiment against the inequalities in the present security treaty. The alternative course of action would be for US to take constructive initiative, when Kishi raises this matter with me, looking toward a new treaty.
Whether we like it or not we are going to have to deal constructively with the problems of nuclears and deployment of forces, etc. I am convinced that it is to our advantage to do so in the context of offering to negotiate a new security treaty which is truly mutual and which would strengthen Japan’s alignment with us rather than by making a series of piecemeal agreements while still holding on to the present security treaty. I say this because the present treaty is extremely vulnerable from the political and psychological viewpoints in Japan because of its one-sided nature.
With respect to the treaty area in a new treaty, my own feeling is that we should propose from the outset that the area include the Japanese islands and the Article 3 islands of the peace treaty (Ryukyus and Bonins). This will be a substantial step forward in terms of engaging Japan’s responsibility for mutual defense outside the area of the Japanese home islands and would be, I think, strongly in our interest. It is quite clear that the Japanese Government will resist any commitment to a broader treaty area which requires them to send their forces abroad into Asia or elsewhere not only because of the present interpretation of the constitution but because the public is unprepared as yet to support such a commitment. To ask for such a commitment at this time will be interpreted by the Japanese as a clear indication that we do not in fact desire treaty revision at this time.
Until this matter is discussed with Kishi, I cannot of course say with certainty what his reaction will be to a new treaty even with the limited treaty and concept. However, I think that there is a good prospect of success and, in any event, the very fact that we have offered such a mutual defense treaty will have beneficial effect on those Japanese who were convinced we intend to hold onto our treaty rights to the bitter end, just as our offer last year to withdraw all our forces took all the steam out of the corresponding pressures for total withdrawal of US forces.
In conclusion I would like to emphasize very strongly that the present atmosphere for constructive discussions with the Japanese is most favorable. Kishi has won a substantial victory at the polls and his position [Page 36] is strengthened. He believes, as a result of his talks with the President and you last June, that we are in deadly earnest regarding the new era of true partnership and he wishes now to make the adjustments in our security arrangements based on the concept of full equality and partnership which will remove a serious source of potential danger in Japanese-American relations. While the situation is now favorable, it will not remain so indefinitely if we are unable or unwilling to take constructive action. If we do not take constructive action, the very security alignment we want with Japan will be undermined; our relations with Japan envenomed; and at the same time we will be undermining the very leadership in Japan which holds the best promise for bringing Japan in the coming period into a long-term, durable alignment with the US and the free world.
I would very much appreciate your views on this vitally important matter in view of my forthcoming talks with Kishi and Fujiyama.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/6–558. Secret; No Distribution Outside Department. Transmitted in two sections.↩