143. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Relations With Communist China

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Kishi raised the question of relations with Communist China. He mentioned that, at the meeting with the President, there had been quite a bit of discussion of this question but that he wished to add briefly to his remarks at that meeting. He said that the Japanese Government faces difficulties on the Communist China issue not only from the Socialists and other left-wingers but even from such Conservatives as Messrs. Ishibashi and Matsumura. These two Conservative leaders were invited to Communist China and their visits exploited by the Chinese Communists. However, despite Communist China’s exploitation of these visits, the very fact that Conservatives went to Peiping can be utilized to the general benefit of the Conservative Party. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that the U.S. would view the visits in that light and emphasized there was no need for concern on the part of the U.S. regarding a change from Japan’s policy towards Communist China as he had explained it to the President.

Mr. Kishi pointed out that Japan’s relations with Communist China were completely ruptured through no fault of the Japanese. Japan would like to resume trade with Communist China under proper conditions. The Prime Minister said that in the past there had been a tendency among some Japanese to overestimate the benefits to be derived from such trade. However, this feeling was receding and not much trade with Communist China is now expected by Japan. He pointed out that, nevertheless, the pressure of historical ties and geographical propinquity require some trade and other contacts under appropriate circumstances. The Prime Minister said that, therefore, while the basic policy of non-recognition will continue to guide Japanese relations with Communist China, there may be some increased contacts in the future with Peiping depending upon developments and particularly upon Communist Chinese actions. He mentioned possible contacts in the fields of communication, postal services, meteorology, radio, rescue on the high seas and other technical areas. (Assistant Secretary Parsons, with Secretary [Page 278] Herter’s approval, subsequently indicated to Ambassador Asakai that two points are important with respect to any steps Japan may take at the technical level with Communist China. First, in any action taken by Japan, the Japanese should make it publicly clear that these are not steps toward recognition. Secondly, the Japanese should–within the framework of partnership and consultation with the U.S.–consult with the U.S. and inform us of the actions they contemplate.)

Secretary Herter inquired whether there had been any trade talks with Communist China since the Communist Chinese trade mission had created difficulties by insisting upon raising a Communist Chinese flag in Japan, which would have been tantamount to recognition.1 The Prime Minister said that there have been no contacts with the Communist Chinese since they had ruptured trade relations.

Secretary Herter informed the Prime Minister that the U.S. would be very glad to receive a high level Japanese Government official to discuss with him all matters relating to Communist China on whatever basis is agreeable to the Japanese Government. The Prime Minister said that he had been very pleased to receive from the President the basic thinking of the U.S. on Communist China and did not think a further exchange was now necessary. The Secretary mentioned that the U.S. had had fruitful exchanges of views with Britain and France on the impact of Communist China on Southeast Asia. He said that, if such talks would be helpful to the Japanese Government, we would be glad to sit down with a top Japanese Government official.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1584. Confidential. Drafted by Sneider and approved in S. See also Documents 139142 and 144146.
  2. The incident is described in telegram 2728 from Tokyo, April 17, 1958. (Department of State, Central Files, 493.9411/4–1758) See Supplement.