136. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Communist China and Other Asian Problems
PARTICIPANTS
- [Here follows the same list as Document 132.]
The President and Prime Minister discussed Communist China and other Asian problems. The President reaffirmed that there would be no change in United States policy toward Communist China as long as the Communist Chinese continued their present conduct. Furthermore, Communist China’s entry into the UN would lead to such a strong public reaction in the United States that the UN might well be forced to leave the United States. The President said that, if the Chinese Communists changed their ways and took such actions as renouncing the use of force, releasing American prisoners and living up to their promises, then we would face a different problem. However, they have not indicated any intention of taking such actions at the present time and there is no need to consider a change in United States policy. The President also indicated that he realized Japan faced an even more difficult problem in Red China due to its geographical proximity to China. He assured the Prime Minister of his willingness to consult with Japan at any time on the question of Communist China.
The Prime Minister expressed appreciation for the President’s assurances and declared that his administration and party have no intention [Page 264] of changing their policy on non-recognition of Communist China. He thought, however, that it was necessary to recognize that the Communists do exercise effective control over China, that we should not expect the collapse of Communist China and that Communist China is industrializing and making progress. The Prime Minister said that Japan also assumes the Sino-Soviet alliance will hold together despite reported differences between these two Communist powers.
The Prime Minister felt that these facts must be faced, particularly by Japan, because of its proximity and historical affinity to China. The Prime Minister also mentioned the neutralist pressures on his government for recognition. Nevertheless, he emphasized, the cornerstone of his policy is the relationship with the U.S. and this is why the government had entered into the new treaty. He concluded that, while Japan would not recognize Communist China, there might be contact with Communist China in non-political technical fields as well as a possible resumption of trade. The Prime Minister expressed a desire for the closest consultation with the United States on all Asian problems, such as Communist China and Korea, as well as on security matters.
The President agreed with the need for such close consultation. He referred, in this connection, to our efforts to keep the differences between Japan and the Republic of Korea from becoming unmanageable. He also expressed concern with the repercussions from a failure to consult closely, as was the case with the Japanese decision to repatriate Koreans in Japan to north Korea.1
In the discussion of Asian problems, the Prime Minister referred to the difficulties faced by Indonesia due to its political instability and Sino-Soviet activities in that country. He mentioned Japanese reparation payments and other economic efforts to help develop Indonesia and hoped the United States and Japan would cooperate to prevent this country falling under the Communists. The President indicated the United States wished to consult on this area too, since we share the Japanese view.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Parsons. See also Documents 132–135, 137, and 138.↩
- Under the terms of the Calcutta Agreement, signed on August 13, 1959, between the Red Cross Societies of Japan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Korean residents in Japan who desired to go to North Korea were enabled to do so. Applicants were screened by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The first group of repatriates departed from Japan on December 14, 1959. The Republic of Korea objected to the agreement as well as to the repatriation activities. Documentation on this subject is in Department of States, Central File 294.9522. See also Document 142.↩