12. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McElroy 0
Washington,
May 1,
1958.
SUBJECT
- Strategic Importance of Okinawa (U)
- 1.
- A major requirement for the ultimate security of the United States is the ability of the United States to maintain strategic control of the Pacific Ocean. Effective control of that ocean demands secure operating bases for facilitating full exploitation, both defensively and offensively, by United States Military Forces. The United States has major bases in the Ryukyu Islands which can be rapidly expanded in an emergency and which are not dependent upon the political disposition of a foreign sovereign power. In the event of global war or expanded hostilities in which it is necessary to launch attacks, including atomic, against the USSR, China, or Communist forces elsewhere in the Far East, it is essential that the United States be able to stage operations from these strategically placed bases without curtailment. The entire United States strategic position in the Pacific would be seriously jeopardized if the Ryukyus were to come under the control of Japan, whose political instability [Page 30] might lead to a denial of the use of these bases by U.S. operating forces at a critical time.
- 2.
- Under the provisions of Article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, the United States exercises all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands. The retention of this authority conflicts with the desire of Japan for the return to it of administrative control over the islands; however, overriding security reasons forbid any reduction in the full control in the Ryukyus now exercised by the United States. In the Eisenhower–Kishi communiqué of 21 June 1957,1 the President reaffirmed the United States position that Japan possesses residual sovereignty over these islands, but he pointed out that so long as the conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East, the United States will find it necessary to continue the present status.
- 3.
- On 29 November 1957, by a memorandum subject “Future Deployments of the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (C)”,2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided you with recommendations concerning IRBM deployments. Among the locations recommended was the island of Okinawa. A major consideration in the selection of Okinawa was the fact that the IRBMs could be deployed and operated from that location without requiring negotiations with any other government.
- 4.
- With reference to Okinawa, informal information indicates that the Department of State recently requested that the Department of Defense notify it prior to any deployment of IRBMs, or to the undertaking of any action, such as the construction of sites, which might lead to public knowledge of U.S. intentions to deploy IRBMs on the island. This request was made in order that the Department of State would be afforded the opportunity to seek the advice of the American Ambassador in Japan as to whether he considers it desirable to provide the Japanese Government with advance information regarding U.S. intentions in this matter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is inadvisable to consult with the Japanese Government concerning any military activities in the Ryukyu Islands.
- 5.
- While it is understood that the knowledge of the introduction of IRBMs on Okinawa might have an effect on the political situation in Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not feel that this should be the deciding factor. Since it does not appear possible that the United States will be able to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan in the foreseeable future, the importance of Okinawa as a base for the IRBMs is increased.
- 6.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views with regard to the continuing importance of Okinawa as a military base, which should be kept under United States control without encroachment by Japan.