Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

83. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)⁰

Honolulu, May 7, 1958, 5 p.m.

080332Z. Sent CNO. State for Robertson only. Exclusive for Adm Burke from Stump. Deliver during working hours. We have just reviewed Djakarta’s 4028¹ passed as CNO 061757Z and Djakarta’s 4063² passed as CNO 062245Z together with your exclusive to me 061759Z.³

Riley, Steeves and I are of the opinion that Djuanda’s presentation of views to Jones reported in Djakarta’s 4063 reveal that the situation is grave indeed and that there is an imminent possibility of a break of relations between Indonesia and US. If this should transpire, the fat is really in the fire and we will have forced beyond the point of no return anti-Communist elements which may still exist within the framework of the Djakarta government.

If Washington is convinced, as some in State seem to be, that there is possibility that no real will resist communism exists the army or in any other effective area in Djakarta then, of course, we have no alternative but to turn a deaf ear to such pleading as Djuanda presents. If, however, there is any basis to the recent reports that there are strong elements who are still anti-Communist in Djakarta, we are of the opinion that greater risks may be required in order not to turn our backs irrevocably on any possible non-Communist cooperation from Djakarta. We may be asking too much of Djuanda, Nasution and non-Communists of like mind to take the steps which you have outlined in your 061759Z before we indicate any willingness to cooperate.

[1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified]

It seems to us that Jones should be allowed to make a forthright proposition to Djuanda and Nasution with possibly knowledge of our offer coming to the ears of men like Soekanto, Hatta, and possibly Subandrio, that we are prepared to mediate between the GOI and the dissidents, to offer aid promptly, both military and economic, to non-Communist forces if they will give us any encouragement that they are willing to take a stand.

Even if we should launch such a program, we can still play a cat and mouse game if their anti-Communist protestations turn out to be deceitful; [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–858. Top Secret. Repeated to the Department of State, which is the source text.
1. Document 78.
2. Document 80.
3. Not found.