Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

77. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State ⁰

Djakarta, May 2, 1958, 2 p.m.

4004. Manila pass priority COMNAVPHIL and 13th AF; COMNAVPHIL pass CINCPAC 241 and CINCPACFLT. Department pass AFCIN–1A1 ACSI, CNO. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Manila for MLG. Embtel 3974.¹ Djuanda’s statement concerning aid provided by American and Taiwanese adventurers to rebels is climax of and puts official stamp of approval on propaganda build-up which was started in Indonesia weeks ago against foreign intervention as result of GOI conviction rebels have had active assistance foreign powers. Fact that Prime Minister himself made statement and his reference to government’s possession of “sufficient proof” of foreign assistance to rebels take whole matter out of realm of speculation or Communist-inspired propaganda and put Free China and particularly US on the spot. Embassy considers implications for future relations between US and Indonesia (and US policy toward Indonesia) are as serious as suggested by Djuanda himself, in point 7 of his statement.²

British and Australian Ambassadors told me yesterday they considered statement most temperate in light situation here and had concluded it was carefully drafted so as not to be too inflammatory and avoid direct accusation any foreign government as such of intervening. In Embassy view, however, statement is merely slightly veiled and will be taken by most Indonesians as conviction on part GOI that US is in fact involved. This gives rise to important question of what next GOI step will be.

Created by centuries of antagonism against Dutch and, spilling over to all Western “colonialists and imperialists”, latent xenophobia is perhaps even nearer surface here than most Asian countries. Recent West Irian and anti-SEATO campaigns are examples of anti-foreign sentiments which can be aroused without provocation. Chinese minority hated by Indonesians as cat’s paw of Dutch and exploiters of people are special case and represent specific target against which Indonesia feeling in past frequently manifested by outright massacre. Indonesians also have common penchant for placing blame on others for many of their own troubles. Djuanda’s charges, therefore, can be expected find emotionally conditioned and receptive audience here. Foreign appeal, principally to Asian-African nations, to condemn US and GRC intervention can hardly fail to evoke response from many sides and especially Communist countries and fellow neutrals.

According to Djuanda’s statement, GOI, using all means and strength available to it, is confident she will shortly destroy all rebel remnants in eastern part of Indonesia. Embassy’s Military Attachés believe that establishment of military command under Colonel Rukmito in Central Sulawesi is indication that GOI plans further military action in Central and North Sulawesi as soon as possible after completion action in Sumatra. Attachés also believe recent bombings either by rebels or on rebels’ behalf have served to stiffen GOI resolve to settle issue by force. Djuanda’s statement lays groundwork for increased public support of such action by making possible transformation of civil war, or internal police action, into fight against foreigners and foreign supporters of rebel cause. If Djuanda’s lead is followed, original issues may well come out of focus entirely and rebel goal of reformed, non-Communist, “constitutional” government may be lost sight of completely as struggle becomes identified as part of cold war and thus an international affair. If this happens, however, issues unfortunately will not be Communist/anti-Communist to Indonesians, but Indonesians versus foreign interventionists and public opinion here will be easily marshalled against US.

Whatever chances may previously have been for settlement by negotiation or compromise, they would appear to have considerably dimmed as result Djuanda’s charges of foreign intervention. If GOI continues this tack, possibility of overt Soviet assistance, even Soviet “volunteers” should not be ignored although GOI would unquestionably withhold approval until last extremity. In one portion Djuanda makes this clear when he warns that aid provided to rebels by American and Taiwan adventurers might invite “other quarters” to interfere and thus make Indonesia battleground for interests of foreign powers. Whether this materializes may depend to considerable degree, in Embassy’s view, on response which US makes to Djuanda’s appeal that American citizens be prevented from providing aid to rebels and on whether GOI has cause for believing “American adventurers” are continuing to assist rebels. Simultaneous diplomatic démarche by Indonesian Foreign Minister reported Embtel 3965³ provides us opportunity to respond without in effect “putting on shoe which fits”.

Regardless of longer-range implications, Djuanda’s official pronouncement appears to be shrewdly conceived effort to put Indonesia’s Civil War in new framework of Indonesians versus foreigners as well as accomplish basic purpose of quieting activity rebel behalf. By-product may well be to render ineffective whatever pressures rebels may have built up for changes in central government by associating them with universally-feared “foreign intervention.”

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756. D.00/5–258. Secret; Priority. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to The Hague, Manila, Canberra, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore,
1. Telegram 3974, April 30, transmitted the text of a press release that was issued by Prime Minister Djuanda that afternoon. In this statement Djuanda stated that the Indonesian Government had collected sufficient proof about foreign assistance in the bombings of various regions in the eastern part of Indonesia. “The conclusion could be drawn,” the statement read in part, “that the pilots being employed by the rebels are foreigners and the reports which we have received from Menado indicate that these pilots are Americans and Taiwanese. Apart from that, it should also be inferred that the gasoline used has been illegally imported from abroad.” (Ibid., 756D.00/4–3058) See Supplement.
2. Point 7 of Djuanda’s statement as reported in telegram 3974 from Djakarta, reads as follows: “As a consequence of the actions taken by these United States and Taiwan adventurers there has emerged a strong feeling of indignation amongst the Armed Forces and the people of Indonesia against the United States and Taiwan and if this is permitted to develop it will only have a disastrous effect in the relationships between Indonesia and the United States.”
3. Document 74.