68. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McElroy0

SUBJECT

  • Indonesia
1.
It is increasingly evident that the defeat and ultimate liquidation of the dissident movement in Indonesia can be prevented only by overt U.S. military assistance to them. In the absence of a timely decision to take such action, the United States must seek other means to achieve our basic objective of preventing the communists from taking over all of Indonesia.
2.
There are continuing indications that the Indonesian Army under the Chief of Staff, Nasution, if given some positive gesture of support by this government, might emerge as an anti-communist force in Java. Prior to the current military operations, the Indonesian Army under Nasution was considered to be the strongest anti-communist force in Indonesia. U.S. support of Nasution, or other influential Indonesian Army leaders arranged through appropriate channels, might influence him to take positive action to prevent a communist take-over by political or other means. This does not mean that the dissident forces should be abandoned. It should be clearly understood that the provision of material or financial support to Nasution or the Central Government has the objective of causing removal of communist influence from the Central Government and the cessation of hostilities.
3.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the matter of an approach to Nasution be re-examined on an urgent basis, taking as a point of departure the recommendations of Ambassador Jones in his message number 3729 of 15 April 1958.1 However, they do not concur in his proposal that the Secretary of State make a public announcement prior to a covert approach to Nasution, because of the danger of its failure.
4.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that these views be forwarded to the Secretary of State.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Maxwell D. Taylor
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/4–2158. Top Secret. Transmitted to John Foster Dulles on April 21 under cover of a memorandum from John N. Irwin II, whose covering memorandum reads in part: “This Department believes that the Joint Chiefs’ suggestion warrants serious consideration but at the same time recognizes that many factors are involved. This Department and the Joint Chiefs will be happy to participate in any way you wish in reviewing this matter further.” (Ibid.)
  2. Document 63.