Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

66. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 18, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Indonesia—Possible Action U.S.

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Leslie Munro, New Zealand Ambassador
• Mr. G.D.L. White, Counselor, New Zealand Embassy
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Mein, Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs

Mr. Robertson explained he had asked the Ambassador to come in to correct an impression he had evidently gathered from a conversation with someone concerning possible action by the United States in the Indonesian situation. Mr. Robertson explained that our Ambassador in Wellington had reported that Prime Minister Nash had been informed by Sir Leslie that the U.S. was planning to intervene with force in Indonesia, and that the Prime Minister felt he must make a public statement on this matter.

Mr. Robertson told the Ambassador that the U.S. is not considering going into Indonesia with force. He reviewed briefly the picture on Sumatra, pointing out that the dissidents at the present time controlled very little of the area and were giving up Padang and other areas without a fight. Mr. Robertson said he agreed with Prime Minister Nash that nothing could be more catastrophic than our going in with force.

Mr. Robertson said that the Department would inform our Embassy at Wellington of this, pointing out that Sir Leslie must have been misinformed or must have misunderstood his informant.

The Ambassador asked whether Mr. Robertson’s statement meant in effect that the U.S. had written off the rebels. Mr. Robertson replied in the negative, adding that from the information available to us it appears that a stalemate might develop and that as a result of this and the deteriorating economic situation a compromise may be worked out. He indicated we would welcome a compromise since we fear that if the dissidents are wiped out or disappear, Hatta and other moderates may lose any leverage they may have and Sukarno may become difficult to deal with. He pointed out that many people are of the opinion that the army may be the only element capable of checking the Communists. Nothing in the situation, therefore, would justify such action as the Ambassador had been given to understand we were contemplating.

Sir Leslie said that he wanted Mr. Robertson to know that he had not gotten the information from anybody in the State Department, but he also wanted to make it clear that he had not misunderstood his informant. Sir Leslie assured Mr. Robertson he would convey the information given to him to Prime Minister Nash.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/4–1858. Confidential. Drafted by Mein.