48. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0

3403. Manila pass COMNAVPHIL and THIRTEENAF; COMNAVPHIL pass CINCPAC 173 and CINCPACFLT. Department pass AFCIN1A1 CNO. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Manila for MLG. This is eighth in series of current broad evaluations by country team of changing Indonesian situation. It covers period March 20–27.

GOI military operations in Sumatra have proceeded successfully during past week. Short-lived coup at Medan week before and uncertainty concerning the future in that area may have slowed down timetable of GOI military clean-up of rebel held areas and drive on Padang will probably be delayed about two weeks. GOI However, has not suffered a military setback and recently has kept propaganda machinery in high gear boasting of success of its armed forces. Again this week Americans and American property in Sumatra have not suffered; as precaution, However, American dependents from Medan area have been temporarily evacuated to Singapore. CALTEX and STANVAC are back in operation and their dependents are moving back to usual places of residence in Central Sumatra.

Hampering the Central Government’s satisfaction at its successes in the initial stages of the Sumatra campaign are irritations, and in some cases fear, concerning “foreign intervention”. This has been a dominant issue in Djakarta for many days and during past week has taken variety of forms.

PKI and PNI elements, reportedly instigated by persons in authority, have made SEATO their target and singled out US as SEATO member most involved. Student, youth and “farmer” groups have called in person at Embassy and residence to present petitions, and have painted slogans and hung banners on streets in front of US establishments, condemning SEATO. Almost as prominent have been allegations that arms are being supplied rebels from Taiwan, and pro-GRC Chinese are fearful that GOI, or leftists with GOI concurrence, will take out their spite on them next. PKI interest in the campaign to discredit SEATO is evident in the Communist newspapers call to intensify the anti-SEATO action with massive effective actions throughout entire country. Airdrop at Pakanbaru of US-manufactured arms has continued to receive heavy publicity.

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Another aspect of “foreign meddling” which may have far-reaching consequences is Soviet aid. Privately Prime Minister Djuanda has expressed his concern at accepting ten ships from USSR but has assured Ambassador Jones that Russian officers and crews will not remain in Indonesia. According other reports, However, Russian officers and engine crews will stay. Publicly opposition papers (including PSI daily which military authorities have since closed down) have suggested arrival of Soviet vessels constituted intervention which invited retaliation.

Official statements of foreign involvements have verged on the sensational but have kept in bounds by the narrowest of margins. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, However, have passed up opportunities freely opened to them by newsmen to press the attack on SEATO. Their restraint and caution has been equally noticeable and no doubt reflects their understanding of the actual situation, in their affirmations that GOI is responsible for and capable of safeguarding Americans in zone of operations and that therefore US Seventh Fleet vessels should depart adjacent waters. In this context should be considered also Sukarno’s insistence that military moves in Sumatra are only police action. Several Indonesian observers have linked this comment to Secretary Dulles’ suggestion that legal aspects of granting belligerency status to rebels required further review by legal experts.

International insurance and liability problems led to decision to return to Dutch owners KPM ships interned in Indonesian harbors since last December. This has not been popular with labor and leftist groups. Indeed, on this issue Communists and Communist labor union have taken their most outspoken exception to GOI action and brought unstuck somewhat GOI-PKI solidarity on some recent problems.

Sporadic banning of specific issues of American publications, recent banning of Time magazine until further notice and exclusion from Indonesia of many foreign reporters show growing sensitivity of GOI to reporting abroad which puts Central Government in unfavorable light. Domestic censorship has continued also. Newspapers Keng Po (Independent) and Pedoman (PSI) have been closed down, reportedly on orders from the top, for not having followed strict government line in reporting Sumatran developments. Simultaneous muzzling of two Communist line papers generally regarded as window-dressing since ban is expected to be temporary only.

Although political mixture remains much the same as before, Hatta has indicated he considers himself still force to be reckoned with, Djuanda is speaking again of SukarnoHatta cooperation once rebellion has been militarily suppressed, and NU and others are talking of new non-Communist Cabinet after Padang is subdued. Still to be heard from in significant military or political manner are Padang leaders. Their [Page 89] stock has not been enhanced by their unreliable pronouncements on Padang Bukittinggi radio and military retreats of their troops before GOI advances. Hopes for their eventual success, However, have not been abandoned by their adherents in Djakarta.

Some moderates in Djakarta still claim prospects are good that Sukarno will soon take positive stand against Communists, but definite action in this direction seems to remain as remote as ever.

Jones
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/3–2758. Secret; Niact. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to The Hague, Canberra, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and Manila.