Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

39. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, March 14, 1958, 2 p.m.

3143. Manila pass COMNAVPHIL and 13th AF; COMNAVPHIL pass CINCPAC 129 and CINCPACFLT. Department pass AFCIN–1A1, ACSI, CNO. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Manila for MLG. This is sixth in series of current broad evaluations by country team of changing Indonesian situation.¹ It covers period March 7–14, 1958.

Since GOI commenced military action against Central Sumatra, approximately March 5, Padang regime has been loser both geographically and psychologically. Reassertion Central Government’s authority at Pakanbaru has boosted GOI morale. Nevertheless recognized here too early take initial GOI success as indication Hussein’s forces will be quickly overrun when invasion moves on Padang.

Apparent that General Nasution (whose fate depends on result) and others are anxious crush rebels in military action, but feeling seems growing in Djakarta that military action has accomplished main purpose—showing rebels, fence-sitters and world that Central Government has power move at will in Central Sumatra—and that time has come for negotiation.

Game Sukarno playing is unclear except obvious he is hedging all bets. While it could be concluded Sukarno has less reason consider compromise with Padang than before capture Pakanbaru face-saving as result re-establishment authority Central Government over part Central Sumatra may actually make compromise easier bring about. Particularly if central military run into tough sledding from now on. This possibility still exists for Hatta’s return to top executive position in Central Government. If Nasution successful, Sukarno may consider his position strong enough to make unnecessary any further concession to moderates. He has not closed door to agreement with Hatta, However, and if military venture bogs down he may turn more quickly than is currently forecast to efforts patch together something with Hatta which would be palatable to rebels.

While waiting for smoke to clear, Sukarno is on speaking tour, exhorting army officers and troops and mass meetings to cooperate and contribute their share to settlement of rebellion “by positive measures.”

Sifting available information, our present impression of Hatta’s position re Sukarno and Hatta talks is following:

1. At March 3 meeting Sukarno appeared accept Hatta view that military campaign against Sumatra would be indecisive and Sukarno tentatively agreed to replace Djuanda cabinet with government headed by Sukarno–Hatta and to send A.K. Gani² as emissary to Padang to propose status quo ante February 16.

2. Further Sukarno–Hatta meeting arranged for March 6 then postponed until March 7. Sukarno sent Hatta letter March 7, further postponing meeting until he completed consultations other political leaders. By March 7 it clear to Hatta that Central Government planned proceed with military attack on Sumatra.

3. March 10 Hatta sent strongly worded letter Sukarno expressing disappointment their mutual discussions had been fruitless and belief attack on Sumatra would fail. Hatta reportedly now tends view Sukarno’s motives in their mutual negotiations as insincere. However, he reportedly is prepared resume these negotiations with aim taking responsibility for government himself if military solution abandoned.

Sukarno is still speaking of rebellion at Padang and Menado being used or manipulated by foreign powers, as yet unidentified. Also presence US naval vessels nearby and US concern for safety of Americans and American property in Central Sumatra have been widely noted. Although GOI considers foreign interests subordinate to military requirements restore “unity of Indonesia” they are fully aware danger disregard safety American personnel. Sukarno exhibited cordiality on reception of Ambassador Jones’ credentials and his reaffirmation on that occasion of his friendship for US.

Is possible that reverses in Sumatra or flare-up of troubles elsewhere could lead to less cordial GOI relations with US. Communists and other leftists are eagerly calling attention to US “big-stick” policy toward current Indonesian situation, and there is no assurance if things go wrong for GOI that clamor against US would not take the day.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/3–458. Secret; Niact. Repeated to The Hague, Canberra, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, and Singapore.
1. The Embassy sent its first country team evaluation of the Indonesian situation to the Department in telegram 2348, January 31. (Ibid., 756D.00/1–3158) None of these previous five telegrams is printed; they are all ibid. 756D.00.
2. Former Minister of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia and a leader of the PNI.