37. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)0
Washington,
March 14,
1958.
Dear Mr. Murphy: Reference is made to your letter of February 4, 1958, requesting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the strategic importance of the island of New Guinea to the United States.1
The Department of Defense concurs in the following conclusions that have been reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the strategic importance of New Guinea and Indonesia:
- a.
- New Guinea lies astride the sea-lines of communication between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Based on experience in World War II, only the north coast of New Guinea is considered militarily useful. For Australia, New Guinea represents a shield against invasion from Asia. Australia has always regarded the control of New Guinea by a friendly nation of paramount importance to Australia’s national security.
- b.
- The strategic importance of Indonesia lies in (1) the impact upon the rest of Southeast Asia of eighty million Indonesians who recently won independence from colonial rule; (2) its strategic location astride the sea-lines of communication between the Indian and Pacific Oceans; and (3) its raw materials of rubber, tin, copper, and petroleum. Indonesia is a world-supplier of these materials.
- c.
- In consideration of current U.S. military plans, there are no specific U.S. military requirements in Indonesia or West New Guinea. However, encroachments by the Sino-Soviet Bloc would disrupt the United States policy on Communist containment in the Far East, and would partially isolate Australia. Domination of this area by the Sino-Soviet Bloc would (1) deny to the United States and make available to China and the USSR certain rich national resources; (2) threaten the vital sea lanes through the Indonesian Archipelago; (3) jeopardize U.S. plans for the defense of Southeast Asia, including the Philippines; and (4) greatly weaken the determination of some Southeast Asian states to remain oriented primarily to the West.
- d.
- Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the principal U.S. military interests in New Guinea and the Indonesian Island chain are the denial of these islands and their resources to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In this connection, and in consonance with current United [Page 67] States policy objectives toward Indonesia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should oppose, by appropriate measures, any attempt by a Communist-oriented Indonesia to seize West New Guinea. In recognition of our ANZUS, SEATO, and NATO commitments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States should continue to consult Australia and the Netherlands regarding West New Guinea.
Sincerely yours,
Mansfield D.
Sprague