31. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State 0

2949. Manila pass COMNAVPHIL and 13AF. Dept pass AFCIN1A1, ACSI, CNO. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Manila for MLG. Three meetings between Foreign Minister and Cottrell took place today,1 during which oil situation was discussed, upshot of which was assurance (1) that Padang oil installations would not be destroyed and (2) that Prime Minister Djuanda would advise Saturday2 morning whether he recommends evacuation of CALTEX dependents from Pakanbaru.

At 9 a.m. meeting Cottrell again sought GOI assurances that American owned oil installations in Padang would not be destroyed by government [Page 56] forces, referring to protest made to Secretary General Suwito on March 4 (see Embtel 2852).3 Foreign Minister replied that he was unable to give such assurances. He said the government has given full consideration to this request and that he and the Prime Minister had supported it. However, he said Foreign Office views on many things do not prevail during this emergency. He said best he could do would be to assure Cottrell that if the installations were destroyed full compensation would be provided.

Cottrell replied that he was very sorry to hear this because the reaction to destruction under the present circumstances would cause repercussions which were exactly those that he was sure the Foreign Ministry would like to avoid. Cottrell reiterated reasons why he believed such an act would be disastrous to relations between two countries.

Cottrell then referred to Pakanbaru situation and asked if Foreign Minister would care to comment on any government decision to take over the CALTEX fields. The Foreign Minister said that the GOI must take over CALTEX fields because they could not permit the rebels to retain control. Cottrell then reviewed the many reasons why such an operation on the part of GOI would be counterproductive. The Foreign Minister agreed to logic of every point raised by Cottrell except one. He said real reason was psychological; that the government must do it to indicate they could impose control wherever they wished in Indonesia. Unable to dissuade the Foreign Minister from this position, Cottrell said this left CALTEX in a completely untenable position since either GOI or rebels had power to cut down or destroy CALTEX installations. Cottrell asked what Foreign Minister thought they could do. Did he suggest CALTEX shut down operations now and evacuate? The Foreign Minister replied yes, since this appeared to be only course open. He said if CALTEX shut down, it would probably provide less reason for either side to destroy any installations.

Cottrell raised point of timing. Could the Foreign Minister say when the GOI attack would be made because no evacuation could be orderly in the midst of battle. The Foreign Minister said this was military secret and he did not know. Cottrell said he would immediately confer with CALTEX and would request an appointment later in the morning with Foreign Minister to discuss evacuation plans if the company decided to undertake them. Report on second and third meetings follows.

Jones
4
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 856F.2553/3–758. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Canberra, Bangkok, The Hague, Manila, and CINCPAC.
  2. Accounts of these meetings were transmitted in telegrams 2944, 2950, and 2951 from Djakarta, all March 7. (Ibid., 756D.009/3–758, 756D.00/3–758, and 856F.2553/3–758) See Supplement. See also Document 32.
  3. March 8.
  4. See Document 28.
  5. Ambassador Jones arrived in Indonesia March 6 and presented his credentials to President Sukarno March 10.