Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, August 31, 1960, 8 p.m.

616. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Furor over Karel Doorman visit Japan may have tended obscure highly important long-awaited confrontation between Army and Indo Communist Party (PKI). On balance, greatest significance Karel Doorman affair may prove to be extent to which it has affected and will continue affect this confrontation:

PKI has been openly challenged by series unprecedented Army moves past few weeks, culminating outright banning of Party major areas Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. These moves, taken in overt defiance repeated Sukarno calls for national unity, already appear reached stage at which Army drawback difficult without considerable risk discrediting present leadership and opening way subsequent replacement. Army fully aware serious challenge to Sukarno inherent in actions already taken but determined not withdraw them. While somewhat less clear whether Army willing push on toward showdown, ARMA sources state Nasution still determined extend PKI ban to East and West Java in near future, despite Sukarno’s wishes.

Open conflict between Sukarno’s two chief sources support will inevitably pose severe threat to his control over country. If current confrontation progresses to point he no longer able play one off against other President will be faced most serious political dilemma recent years whether acquiesce Army weakening of PKI and risk eventually finding self dependent on Army sufferance, or throw in lot with PKI at risk provoking complete Army take-over or, at least, loss central control over outer islands. Sukarno real pro in political intrigue, however, may yet find means divert Army challenge. Karel Doorman affair has until now been one of chief diversionary weapons in Sukarno arsenal, which as shown by Parliamentary resolution August 31 (Embtel 615)¹ he continuing exploit to hilt; remains be seen whether proposed modification vessel’s schedule if implement [sic] The Hague telegram 268,² may be sufficient blunt his exploitation issue, although it might help.

President apparently endeavoring regain initiative while avoiding head-on clash with Army. As reported Embtel 589,³ he agreed at Bogor not demand revocation bans on PKI to date but insisted no further bans be imposed without approval Supreme War Administration. From other sources understand Djuanda and Nasution, not President, are to be responsible for such approval.

Real test of Army determination force showdown with PKI thus shaping up in Java. Should Army carry through, will be indication Army convinced time ripe and own strength sufficient make bid assume predominant position in power structure, may well mark beginning of end current Sukarno domination national policy. On other hand, Army retreat now would probably be fatal present leadership, give PKI major boost. If Sukarno able engineer form of stand-still agreement (toward which he apparently striving), momentum behind current Army drive will be lost, situation may revert to former precarious balance.

But begins to look as though Army were playing for keeps. For first time in years, PKI faced with serious assault on position, by only force in country strong enough offer successful challenge. This, of course, is goal toward which US has long been working. Final showdown still to come, however, and may yet be put off by Sukarno maneuvering.

This connection, ARMA informed by General Jani August 31 that commanders areas where PKI banned met with Sukarno that morning, strongly defended actions. President later asked Nasution arrange meeting with all ministers, governors, regional commanders, heads armed forces between September 8 and 12 for complete airing matter. Jani said all on Army side would be briefed prior meeting “not be frightened” Sukarno opening statements, believed none would back down. Meantime, according Jani, Army will extend ban on PKI prior scheduled meeting.

Meeting appears Sukarno device gain time further maneuvers while ostensibly acceding strong Nasution position. Sukarno, at his best on platform, undoubtedly hopes use meeting reassert his authority. Nasution according Jani aware of this, will take measures intended prevent weakening Army unity.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 798.00/8–3160. Secret; Priority. Transmitted in two sections. Also sent to CINCPAC and repeated to Manila, The Hague, London, Tokyo, Canberra, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
1. Dated August 31. (Ibid., 790.5856/8–3160)
2. In telegram 615, August 30, Young reported that during a conversation the previous day with Luns the Foreign Minister informed him that the Karel Doorman’s visit to Japan would take place according to the original time schedule, namely, between September 8 and 12. (Ibid., 790.5856/8–3060)
3. Dated July 30. (Ibid., 798.00/7–3060)