Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

272. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, August 24, 1960, 9:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Farewell Call on the President by Ambassador Moekarto

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• His Excellency Moekarto Notowidigdo, Ambassador of Indonesia
• J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

Ambassador Moekarto said that he had been here seven years as Ambassador and two years as Indonesia’s representative to the United Nations. He said he greatly enjoyed his stay and had learned much which would be of benefit to him in his later service to his country. He and his family were most grateful for the hospitality and courtesy they had everywhere received. The President expressed his gratification and asked if the Ambassador’s successor had arrived. Mr. Moekarto replied that he was today requesting agrément for Madame Supeni who for ten years has been Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Indonesian Parliament. He said that she is an outstanding and able woman. He added that also in his country women had equal status with men and as a matter of fact there were perhaps greater numbers of women in Parliament and in public life there than here. The President referred to the several women he had sent as Ambassadors during his Administration and said that he would particularly like to meet Madame Supeni. He specifically requested that when she came the State Department arrange for him to set aside more than the usual time for her initial call.

Ambassador Moekarto said that he wanted to bring up particularly the subject of the length of time students from Indonesia could stay in this country. At independence his country was left without trained people in all fields and it was so to speak “technically underdeveloped.” Indonesia had benefited from and was grateful for United States technical assistance in the amount of about ten million dollars a year and many hundreds had come to this country to learn. He wished, however, that they could stay long enough to come to understand our institutions and our way of life so they could contribute more usefully in the future. Mr. Dulles before his death had written him expressing enthusiasm for the thought of finding some way for students to stay for not six months to a year but for a longer term, say four to six years. The Ambassador realized that there were difficulties for us but hoped that some way could be found to make longer stays possible. He thought it would be a good “intellectual investment” for the United States.

After asking how many students come here each year, the President said that he could see some justification for varying the length of stay of people in different categories. For instance, those who were learning a profession needed to stay a longer time, whereas an agricultural expert who in fact lived with people interested in agriculture during his training could learn about this country and its ways more quickly. He said he agreed with what the Ambassador had said as to the value of a longer stay for students in the United States and he hoped that something could be done.

The Ambassador then raised the West Irian question which he described as a delicate political issue. The recent Dutch action in sending the carrier Karel Doorman to West Irian had greatly aroused Indonesian concern and it was feared that some action by the Karel Doorman might set off a conflagration.¹ The Ambassador briefly described the Indonesian case on West Irian and mentioned that the matter had been taken up in the United Nations but Indonesia had not secured a two-thirds majority. He hoped that the United States could help in preventing a clash and in securing a favorable resolution of this issue on which his people felt most strongly.

The President said that while he had not been to West Irian he had been to other outlying and undeveloped areas in the Far East and he found it difficult to understand why the feeling which had arisen over West Irian was so strong. He did not know why the area was important although he understood there was bauxite there and, the Ambassador added, oil. The President had talked to Ambassador Young who had told him that Dutch feeling on the issue was almost incandescent.² Perhaps the Dutch had the feeling of being kicked out with the help of others and perhaps they regarded this issue as symbolic as though, so to speak, it kept the Dutch flag flying and added to their prestige a little. He would however talk to the State Department, to Secretary Herter in fact, and get the best possible briefing to see if there was anything we could do.³ He thought, however, that in this situation it was hard to be “a friend of the court” and be caught in the middle.

In taking his leave the Ambassador expressed his good wishes to the President for the future. The President in replying particularly asked that the Ambassador give his warm regards to President Sukarno whose visit here and whose Young son he remembered well.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601. 9811/8–2460. Confidential. Approved by the White House on August 26. Herter briefed Eisenhower for this meeting in a memorandum dated August 12. (Ibid., 601.9811/8–1260) See Supplement. Moekarto’s farewell call on Secretary Herter on August 10 was summarized in telegram 225 to Djakarta, August 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.9811/8–1060) See Supplement.
1. During his independence day speech on August 17 President Sukarno announced the severance of diplomatic relations with the Netherlands. He stated that this step was being taken in response to the dispatch of the Karel Doorman to West New Guinea. In telegram 439 from Djakarta, August 17, the Embassy informed the Department of Sukarno’s action, indicating that aside from the remarks concerning the breaking of relations with the Netherlands the speech did not depart very much from the draft text that the Department had already received. There was no mention in the speech of the nationalization of Shell, as earlier speculated, or any other specific moves against Netherlands interests. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.98/8–1760) See Supplement.
2. No record of this conversation has been found.
3. See Document 276.