Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

248. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)⁰

Washington, April 15, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Projected Visit of Dutch Naval Vessels to West New Guinea

From the point of view of our relations with Indonesia which, as you know, have improved considerably over the past two years, I am concerned by the recently announced Dutch Government plans to send the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman and two DDE’s on a six-month “flag-showing” visit this year to Southeast Asia, including West New Guinea. The Dutch political decision to refrain from giving the United States advance notice of this decision (described in The Hague’s telegram 1315, Tab A)¹ is particularly disturbing, especially in view of their insistence that we keep them and the NAC informed of our plans and programs in Indonesia.

The proposed Doorman tour would present serious problems for us in our relations with Indonesia. The announcement of the tour has been attacked violently in the Indonesian press and Indonesian Government spokesmen have publicly condemned this projected Dutch show of force in the West New Guinea area. On April 11 the Indonesian Minister Counselor, under instructions of his government, raised with the Department the question of the Karel Doorman cruise which he termed belligerent and provocative and detrimental to the peace of the area and to Indonesian-Free World relations (Tab B).² The minister asked whether the United States could not moderate the Dutch attitude. It seems clear that the Doorman visit could seriously undercut the efforts the United States has been making to dampen Indonesian chauvinism with respect to the West New Guinea issue.

The démarche of April 11 represents the third time the Indonesian Embassy has approached the Department in the past two months to express serious concern over what the Indonesians term a Dutch military “build-up” in the West New Guinea area. On February 10 the Indonesians raised the question of the sale of four Dakotas to the Dutch for use in West New Guinea;³ and on March 23 the Indonesians questioned us on possible Dutch plans to purchase Neptune aircraft here to replace obsolete aircraft in West New Guinea.⁴ The main themes running through these Indonesian démarches were that this Dutch military “build-up” could only serve to heighten tensions in the area and that the United States could and should do something to deter the Dutch from this course of action. The Indonesians have shown particular interest in whether or not the United States had concurred in the use of any MAP equipment by the Dutch in West New Guinea.

What concerns me above all about the proposed Karel Doorman tour is, of course, the Dutch intention to retain MAP-furnished carrier aircraft aboard the ship during the Southeast Asia visit. Whether or not it is legally and technically feasible for the Dutch to do this under the existing NATO and MAP agreements, the use of MAP-furnished aircraft by the Dutch in West New Guinea, albeit for a limited period of time, could seriously jeopardize our friendly relations with Indonesia and be generally embarrassing to us in our relations with other Asian countries. If they do not already know, the Indonesians will almost certainly become aware of the presence of MAP aircraft aboard the Karel Doorman and we will be open to the charge of bolstering the Dutch military posture in West New Guinea through the use of United States-owned aircraft. Needless to say, such a situation would be exploited thoroughly by the Communists in the area.

You will recall that in connection with the recent Dutch procurement of four United States Dakotas for use in West New Guinea, the Department took the position (Mr. Dillon’s letter of January 7, 1960 to Mr. Gates)⁵ that “The Department of State would not, of course, propose the transfer of United States military equipment for Dutch non-NATO use unless purchased by the Dutch.” In that case we in fact took pains to sell the Dakotas to the Dutch, after they had been declared surplus, and we were thus able to inform the Indonesians that there was no question of our concurring in the use of MAP equipment in the West New Guinea area. Despite the temporary aspect of the Doorman mission, it appears that we are faced with the same basic questions—i.e., whether or not we would concur in the transfer of MAP equipment for use in West New Guinea by the Dutch defense forces.

Since we will have to reply shortly to this latest Indonesian démarche, and since I assume that EUR is currently considering how the Department should appropriately react to the Dutch plans for the Karel Doorman cruise, I would appreciate an opportunity for EUR–FE consultation on this question.⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5856/4–1560. Secret. Drafted by Wenzel and cleared with Mein and Steeves. Copies of this memorandum were sent to Dillon and Merchant.
1. See footnote 2, Document 247. No tabs were attached to the source text.
2. Memorandum of conversation, April 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5856/4–1160) See Supplement.
3. A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 790.5856/2–1060.
4. A memorandum of this conversation, March 23, is ibid., 790.5856/3–2360.
5. Document 237.
6. Kohler replied to Parsons in an April 15 memorandum. (Department of State, SPA Files: Lot 63 D 436, 322—West New Guinea Problem) See Supplement.