241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia0

1382. Ur 22901 and previous.

Dept greatly appreciates your full reporting re possible SukarnoKhrushchev deal and related matters. Realize difficulty sifting fact from rumor in connection these rapid developments with their serious implications for U.S. interests Indonesia, but will appreciate receiving your continuing assessment situation which we following closely.
FYI. Re your suggestions Dept consider encouraging anti-Communist elements GOI by moves in West Irian policy field no possibility [Page 468]this could be done. Re seeking persuade Dutch make gesture to negotiate, our present assessment is that Dutch Govt unlikely be receptive suggestion from any quarter that bilateral talks with Indonesians be undertaken. Moreover timing for such suggestion coming from U.S. would be particularly unfortunate since Dutch feelings towards U.S. currently inflamed over recent refusal KLM landing rights U.S. west coast. In connection this refusal Dutch press dredging up variety of Dutch grudges against U.S. including supposed U.S. sabotage Dutch position in Indonesia after Second World War. In any case we would have reservations re advisability our making any moves such as foregoing even if they possible, since they likely appear hasty, fearful improvisations to counter effects Khrushchev visit. End FYI.
If Sukarno intends proceed with reported deal and possesses domestic political strength to carry it through, there seems little or nothing U.S. can or should try do deter him. Only promises of successfully deterring him would seem lie in determined, unified initiative on part those Indonesian political elements which oppose deal and which prepared resist Sukarno this matter with or without U.S. support and encouragement.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 861.0098/2–1960. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore and approved by Parsons. Repeated to The Hague, CINCPAC, and Moscow.
  2. Telegram 2290, February 19, reported that during a meeting that morning between Djuanda and military members of the cabinet, an agreement was reached, according to Sukendro, on the following limitations on Sukarno’s dealings with Khrushchev: 1) a maximum of $100 million in new economic aid could be accepted; 2) no military aid could be accepted; and 3) no bases could be provided to the Communist bloc. (Ibid., 861.0098/2–1960) See Supplement.