200. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Burgess) to We Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)0

Dear Walter: I have been giving further thought to the problem of supplying arms to Indonesia which we discussed in Washington in April,1 and believe it might be helpful to put some of my ideas on paper.

We have two responsibilities here in this matter. One is to execute U.S. policy as effectively and persuasively as possible. The other is to reflect to the Department our own best thinking as a contribution to continuing policy formation. For both these duties I found the talks with you very helpful. This letter is addressed to the second purpose.

We and our NATO Allies recognize the importance of trying to keep Indonesia out of the Communist camp, though there are differing opinions as to the value of arms deliveries for this purpose. I welcome evidence on this score which we can give our colleagues. I do not underestimate this. Arms are often the surest road to the hearts of generals.

It is also essential in our long range policy that we consider the effects of this program on NATO.

From our conversations here, we believe that what the Dutch, and others, are worrying about are three things:

  • First, that, following the lead of the U.S., other countries will find it impossible to resist commercial pressures to sell arms to Indonesia (a fear that is now being shown to be well founded) and that the cumulative total of military equipment from all sources, both East and West, will give such a degree of strength to Indonesia as to tempt them, at some propitious moment to undertake some kind of military exploit against West New Guinea either openly or under the guise of protecting the Indonesians there.
  • Second, they are concerned that public pressures at home, in light of this growing Indonesian military strength, may lead to a demand for reinforcing the defense of West New Guinea at the expense of the Dutch contribution to the NATO defense effort in arms, money, and men.
  • Third, they are concerned at the psychological effect on the whole NATO Alliance, which is the cornerstone of Dutch foreign policy and defense policy, lest public reaction against sales to Indonesia by NATO Allies should be transformed into a real breach with Western Allies.

These three problems, we must agree, are real political problems to which our policy affords no clean answer. We have not given a binding [Page 380] security commitment to intervene in the event of Indonesian attack on West New Guinea. It is therefore difficult to count on the extent to which the Dutch will be able to satisfy criticism at home by referring to the statements we have made to Sukarno that we would be in opposition to any such move.

Whether or not the Dutch could adequately reinforce their forces in West New Guinea to hold it against an Indonesian assault, or provide adequate protection to their nationals there, the emotional and political pressures on the Dutch Government to make a show in this direction are great. And if substantial reinforcements are sent, as the Dutch have said, it is doubtful that the Netherlands Parliament would vote additional funds to replace the forces that the Netherlands would withdraw from NATO to serve that end. The NATO defense effort would, in political fact, have to foot the bill because Dutch public opinion will hold its NATO Allies in large part responsible for having created this problem.

This is where we have serious problems. The Dutch have been one of the stoutest of our Allies, providing on an outstanding scale the great part of their NATO military requirements. In the political area, the Dutch have taken a sound, practical, tough line against all of the traps the Communists attempt to set in order to destroy NATO. It would have a serious effect on the Alliance should a change of policy result in a diminution of the Dutch defense effort or a change in Dutch attitude towards NATO unity and toughness. We would indeed be losing a leader in the cause we serve, and I fear that there might be other waverers that would use the Dutch example to reduce their defense effort or to vary their policy. I think we can reduce the dangers in this situation in several ways:

1.
We should lend an attentive ear to the Dutch request to purchase further military equipment at “surplus” prices.
2.
We should limit further sales to Indonesia especially of arms of an offensive character.
3.
I think very frankly we can be more forthcoming in dealing with the Dutch than we have been in the past. Granted that they are hyper-sensitive and granted that they have their own goals in mind, I think we can be a little more considerate in dealing with them in the future. We have now made our position clear, and although it makes them squirm they know what it is. I would urge that in the future we make every effort to advise them in advance of the issuance of license for export and in advance of the conclusion of sales agreements. I know that the Indonesians are also sensitive, and that if they thought Dutch agreement was involved in our actions, the goal of the program would be jeopardized. But the Dutch can be trusted to keep a confidence for the maybe forty-eight hours involved in advance notification. This would simply be following the accepted procedure for NATO consultation, which is followed in all areas.

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I am sending a copy of this letter to Foy Kohler, in Livie Merchant’s absence.

Sincerely,

Randy
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.56/5–1859. Secret.
  2. No record of this discussion was found in Department of State files.